



Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
Command and Staff Academy



STAFF OFFICER'S HANDBOOK PART ONE OPERATIONS AND TACTICS



The Horton Academy
Duty-Knowledge-Leadership

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RSLAF

STAFF OFFICER'S HANDBOOK (SOHB)

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PREFACE

The Staff Officer's Handbook (SOHB) Part 1 is a document designed to support students attending courses at the Horton Academy. It is provided to students as a personal issue and is further intended to act as a ready reference of extant RSLAF doctrine and principles for the general use of officers at Command and Staff. The SOH is an evolving document that will develop over time through use; it is expected that the handbook will go on general release across the RSLAF in due course.

GENERAL

SIERRA LEONE NATIONAL PLEDGE

I pledge my love and loyalty to my country Sierra Leone;
I vow to serve her faithfully at all times;
I promise to defend her honour and good name;
Always work for her unity, peace, freedom and prosperity;
And put her interest above all else
So help me God.

THE NATIONAL ANTHEM

High we exalt thee, realm of the free;
Great is the love we have for thee;
Firmly united ever we stand,
Singing thy praise. O native land.
We raise up our hearts and our voices on high,
The hills and the valleys re-echo our cry;
Blessing and peace be ever thine own,
Land that we love, our Sierra Leone.

One with faith that wisdom inspires,
One with a zeal that never tires;
Ever we seek to honour thy name
Ours is the labour, thine fame.
We pray that no harm on thy children may fall,
That blessing and peace may descend on us all;
So may we serve thee ever alone,
Land that we love our Sierra Leone.

Knowledge and truth our forefathers spread,
Mighty the nations whom they led;
Mighty they made thee, so too may we
Show forth the good that is ever in thee.
We pledge our devotion, our strength and our might,
Thy cause to defend and to stand for thy right;
All that we have be ever thine own,
Land that we love our Sierra Leone.

SECTION 1

GLOSSARY OF TACTICAL TERMINOLOGY

Doctrine

In very basic terms it can be said that doctrine is what is taught. It is described as fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.

This glossary contains an explanation of basic doctrinal terms. It is only a summary of the main doctrinal terms you are likely to encounter on the course and is not complete. It has deliberately been kept to the bare minimum to prevent students becoming unnecessarily confused by a large volume of material.

- **advance to contact**
An offensive operation designed to gain or re-establish contact with the enemy.
- **ambush**
A surprise attack by fire from concealed positions on a moving, or temporarily halted, enemy.
- **area defence**
Area Defence focuses on the retention of terrain by absorbing the enemy into a framework of static and mutually supporting positions from which he can be largely destroyed by fire. The emphasis is on retention of terrain or its denial to the enemy for a specified time.
- **assault**
 - The climax of an attack; closing with the enemy in hand-to-hand fighting.
 - A short, violent, but well-ordered attack against a local objective, such as a gun emplacement, a fort or a machine gun nest.
- **attack**
Attack is a general all embracing term to describe offensive operations and therefore care should be taken in its use. In most cases it is the appropriate verb to describe divisional or corps operations. For brigades and units, where a more specific word exists, this should be used. For example, a division could be ordered to attack but subordinate brigades might advance to contact and subordinate battle groups may be ordered to seize, secure or penetrate to an objective.
- **attack by fire**
Fire employed to destroy the enemy from a distance, which is normally used when the mission does not dictate or support occupation of the objective.
- **block**
Deny enemy access to a given area, or to prevent his advance in a particular direction.

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- **bound**
In land warfare, particularly on Advance to Contact, A bound is a feature of tactical importance on or astride the axis which could be held defensively if the need arose. Troops do not halt on the bound unless ordered to do so.
- **breach**
A tactical task in which any means available are employed to break through or secure a passage through an enemy defence, obstacle, minefield, or fortification.
- **bypass**
A tactical task that involves manoeuvring around an obstacle, position, or enemy force to maintain the momentum of advance.
- **canalise**
A tactical task used to restrict operations to a narrow zone by the use of obstacles, fire, or unit manoeuvring or positioning.
- **clear**
Clear of enemy direct fire; keep clear until handed over to another formation or unit.
- **contain**
To stop, hold, or surround the forces of the enemy or to cause the enemy to centre his activity on a given front and to prevent his withdrawing any part of his forces for use elsewhere.
- **control**
That authority exercised by a commander over part of the activities of a subordinate organisation, or other organisations not normally under his command, which encompasses the responsibility for implementing orders or directives. All or part of this authority may be transferred or delegated.
- **counter-attack**
Attack by a part or all of a defending force against an enemy attacking force, for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of his purpose in attacking. In sustained defensive operations, it is undertaken to restore the battle position and is directed at limited objectives.
- **decision point (DP)**
In IPE, a point in time and space at which the commander must make a decision if he is to influence the operation in a particular target area of interest (TAI). DPs, which are linked to particular TAIs, must be offset from the point where the action has to take place in order to allow sufficient lead time for the action to be initiated.
- **defeat**
To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy, to the extent that he is either unable to participate in combat or at least cannot fulfill his intention.
- **delay**
An operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down the enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without, in principle, becoming decisively engaged.

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- **deliberate attack**
A type of offensive action characterised by pre-planned coordinated employment of fire power and manoeuvre to close with and destroy or capture the enemy.
- **demonstration**
An attack of show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy.
- **deny**
To prevent access by physical presence, blocking, disruption, dislocation and/or fire.
- **destroy**
To kill or so damage an enemy force that it is rendered useless.
- **diversion**
The act of drawing the attention and forces of an enemy from the point of the principal operation; an attack, or alarm, or feint which diverts attention.
- **exploitation**
 - Taking full advantage of success in battle and following up initial gains.
 - Taking full advantage of any information that has come to hand for tactical or strategic purposes.
 - An offensive operation that usually follows a successful attack and is designed to disorganise the enemy in depth.
- **extraction**
In operations, urgent removal of an individual or a group of individuals or materiel from a threat.
- **feint**
The purpose of a feint is to distract the action of an enemy force by seeking contact with it.
- **find**
Spans locating, identifying and assessing.
- **fix**
To deny the enemy his goals and to distract him, thus depriving him of freedom of action, in order to gain us freedom of action.
- **flank guard**
A security element operating to the flank of a moving or stationary force to protect it from enemy ground observation, direct fire, and surprise attack.
- **guard**
A security element whose primary task is to protect the main force by fighting to gain time, while observing and reporting information.

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- **hasty attack**
In land operations, an attack in which preparation time is traded for speed in order to exploit an opportunity.
- **hold**
 - To maintain or retain possession of by force, as a position or an area.
 - In an attack, to exert sufficient pressure to prevent movement or re-disposition of enemy forces.
- **in support**
An expression used to denote the task of providing artillery supporting fire to a formation or unit. Liaison and observation are not normally provided.
- **infiltration**
A technique and process in which a force moves as individuals or small groups over, through or around enemy positions without detection.
- **intermediate objective**
In land warfare, an area or feature between the line of departure and an objective which must be seized and/or held.
- **isolate**
A tactical task given to a unit to seal off, both physically and psychologically, an enemy from his sources of support, deny him freedom of movement, and prevent his unit from having contact with other enemy forces. An enemy must not be allowed sanctuary within his present position.
- **Key terrain**
Ground which offers a distinct advantage to whoever holds it.
- **Killing Area (KA)/ Engagement Area**
An area in which a commander plans to force the enemy to concentrate, so as to destroy him with conventional or tactical nuclear weapons.
- **Main Effort**
 - A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision.
 - The Main Effort is expressed as the activity which the commander considers crucial to the success of his mission at that time.
- **manoeuvre**
Employment of forces on the battlefield through movement in combination with fire, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.
- **mobile defence**
Mobile defence focuses on the defeat of the attacking force by permitting it to advance to a position which exposes it to counter attack and envelopment by a mobile striking force. The emphasis is on destroying the enemy rather than retaining or retaking ground.

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
- **mopping up**
The liquidation of remnants of enemy resistance in an area that has been surrounded or isolated, or through which other units have passed without eliminating all active resistance.
- **mutual support**
That support which units render each other against an enemy, because of their assigned tasks, their position relative to each other and to the enemy, and their inherent capabilities.
- **objective**
The physical object of the action taken, e.g. a definite tactical feature, the seizure and/or holding of which is essential to the commander's plan.
- **objective area**
A defined geographical area within which is located an objective to be captured or reached by the military forces. This area is defined by competent authority for purposes of command and control.
- **occupy**
To gain possession of and maintain control over a place or region by military action.
- **patrol**
A detachment of ground, sea, or air forces sent out for the purpose of gathering information or carrying out a destructive, harassing, mopping up, or security mission.
- **penetration**
In land operations, a form of offensive which seeks to break through the enemy's defence and disrupt the defensive system.
- **protection**
Protection preserves the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at a decisive time and place.
- **pursuit**
An offensive operation designed to catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it.
- **raid**
An operation, usually on a small scale, involving a swift penetration of hostile territory to secure information, confuse the enemy, or destroy his installations. It ends with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission.
- **reconnaissance**
A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
- **reconnaissance by fire**
A method of reconnaissance in which fire is placed on a suspected enemy position to cause the enemy to disclose his presence by movement or return of fire.

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- **reconnaissance in force**
An offensive operation designed to discover and/or test the enemy's strength or to obtain other information.
- **reconnaissance patrol**
For ground forces, a patrol used to gain tactical information preferably without the knowledge of the enemy.
- **relief in place**
An operation in which, by direction of higher authority, all or part of a unit is replaced in an area by the incoming unit. The responsibilities of the replaced elements for the mission and the assigned zone of operations are transferred to the incoming unit. The incoming unit continues the operation as ordered.
- **screen**
A security element whose primary task is to observe, identify and report information, and which only fights in self-protection.
- **secure**
In an operational context, to gain possession of a position or terrain feature, with or without force, and to make such disposition as will prevent, as far as possible, its destruction or loss by enemy action.
- **seize**
Gain possession of a position or terrain, normally by force.
- **spoiling attack**
A tactical manoeuvre employed to impair seriously a hostile attack while the enemy is in the process of forming up or assembling for an attack.
- **strike**
 - Using the freedom of action provided by fixing the enemy, to manoeuvre and hit him unexpectedly, or in superior force, at the point selected in order to defeat him.
 - An attack which is intended to inflict damage on, seize, or destroy an objective.
- **support**
The action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other force.
- **vital ground**
Ground of such importance that it must be retained or controlled for the success of the mission.
- **withdraw**
Disengage from the enemy either in or out of contact with the enemy.

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REPUBLIC OF SIERRA LEONE ARMED FORCES – INFANTRY BATTALION ORBAT



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EQUIPMENT DATA

ARMOUR/INFANTRY AFV

Ser	AFV	Wpn	Ammo (Qty)	Ranges (m)	Crew	Wt (Kg)	Max Speed (Road)	Road Speed/Mixed
1	Challenger	120 mm 2 x 7.62 mm GPMG (L8 & L37)	APFSDS HESH Smoke (52) (4,600)	2000 1500 8000 1100 (1800)	4	62,086	56	454 256
2	T-55	100 mm 12.7 mm 7.62 coax	HE Smoke (43)	1500 2000 1000	4	36,000	48	450
3	Warrior	30 mm 7.62 mm (Chain Gun)	APDS & HE	1500 1100 (1800)	3-7	25,400	80	500 240
4	BMP	73 mm AT 3 SAGGER	HEAT	1300 500-3000	3 (+8)	13,600	80	

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SMALL ARMS

Ser	Arms	Calibre	Ammo	Maximum Effective Range (m)	
1	Pistol	9 mm	Ball	45	
2	Rifle (SLR)	7.62 mm	Ball	300 individuals 600 section	
3	AK 47 Asslt Rifle	7.62 mm	Ball	100 individual 300 section	
4	Sniper Rifle	7.62 mm	Ball	900 (man-sized tgt) 1000 (harassing fire)	
5	Rifle Grenade (GS)	40 mm	HE	150 m 300 m (indirect fire)	
6	LSW	5.56 mm	Ball Tracer	800	
7	GPMG (Light Role)	7.62 mm	4 BIT	800	
8	GPMG (SF)	7.62 mm	4 BIT 1 BIT	1100 (tracer burnout) 1800 (observed strike) 2500 (map predicted fire)	
9	Light Mortar	60 mm	HE Smoke Illuminating	800	Normal Rate of fire 6 bombs per min, Rapid 12 bombs
10	81 mm Mortar	81 mm	HE Smoke Illuminating	2,500 (line of sight) 5,675 4800	Normal rate 12 bombs per min
11	Grenade L2A2			25-35	Thrown
12	Browning MG	.50 inch		1200 (anti-IAV) 1850 (anti-pers)	
13	Grenade No 84 (RP)			25-35	Thrown
14	RPG 7			500 300 battle range	

FRONTAGES AND DEPTHS OF UNITS (KM)

Size	Defence		Offence (1)	Delay	Forward Assembly Area (2)	Forward Assembly Area (3)	BAA
	Width	Depth					
Bde (2,2)	15 (30)	25 (50)	7 (15)	30 (60)	6 x 5	10 x 15	10 x 10
Armd BG (3,1)	1.75 (3.5)	2 (4)	3 (6)	20 (40)	2 x 2.5	3 x 3	
Armd Sqn	1.5 – 2 (Cpen)		1.5	5	1 x 1	1 x 2	
Armd Inf BG (1,2)	4 (8)	5 (10)	2 (4)	15 (30)	2 x 2.5	3 x 3	
Armd Inf Coy	1.75	2	0.6	5	1 x 1	1 x 2	


Notes:

- (1) Based on 2 up, flat ground etc.
- (2) Including A1 Echelons.
- (3) Including A1 and A2 Echelons.
- (4) Where dimensions are shown in brackets, first figure is current working norm, second is planning maximum in all likely circumstances.

SECTION 2

FIGHTING POWER

Definition. Fighting power defines the ability to fight. It consists of a *conceptual component* (the ideas behind how to fight), a *moral component* (the ability to get people to fight) and a *physical component* (the means to fight); the relationships are illustrated in the diagram below. The three components overlap and influence each other and are, in turn, generated by their own sub-sets.

**LEVELS OF WARFARE**

The Levels of Warfare (or campaigns or operations more broadly) are *strategic*, *operational* and *tactical*. They are the levels at which war, or a campaign, is conducted and controlled. They are not tied to levels of command. A corps, division, brigade, or battalion commander may all operate at the operational or tactical level. Tactical actions too, can have strategic consequences.

The Strategic Level. Two aspects of strategy are particularly relevant to the armed forces:

- a. **National Strategy.** A successful national strategy sets out a path using the diplomatic, economic and military instruments of national power to achieve the long-term aims of the nation and protect its vital interests.
- b. **The Military Component of Strategy.** The military component of strategy is the application of military resources to achieve national strategic objectives.

The Operational Level. Joint campaigns and operations are constructed and directed at the operational level in fulfilment of a strategic directive. At this level, abstract strategic objectives are translated into practical tactical actions.

The Tactical Level. Battles and engagements are planned and executed at the tactical level to achieve campaign objectives.

VISUALISATION OF CONFLICT


A Spectrum of Conflict. As conflict has evolved, so have ways of visualising it in order to define military activities and to design capable forces. At the end of the 20th Century, conflict was seen in a mostly linear *spectrum*, from war to peace, with a degree of choice and separation between categories. It was considered prudent to optimise preparation for the war end of the spectrum as it was seen as the most demanding, and the point from which those forces could adjust to less demanding operations. In the light of recent operational experience and current assessments of future likelihoods, the linear model is too rigid and one-dimensional to support the organisation of military activity in the land environment, or to aid understanding of the themes which contribute to conflict. It does not take account of the reality that several *conflict themes* (for example peace, tension, instability and war) could be present in close proximity and *military activities* (for example combat and counter-insurgency) of different types could take place at the same time, perhaps in adjacent streets. A less compartmentalised view is required. Models have been developed showing how the boundaries between activities are porous and overlapping in terms of time and levels of violence. These models have been more effective in dealing with the realities of modern conflict, but can still confuse conflict themes with the military activity required to deal with them.

Military Activity and Conflict. Military activity can be understood in relation to conflict by asking a series of questions in order to understand *what is the type of conflict faced?* The questions are: *What outcomes are sought? Who else is involved and, what are their interests? Who are the adversaries? What resources are available? What are the risks?* These questions advance the analysis, in that they help to categorise the type of military activity that is required, but they do not support a more accurate visualisation than the linear spectrum.

A Mosaic of Conflict. The contemporary visualisation technique is to see conflict themes and military activities in a non-linear *mosaic*, although some find it more useful to think of a kaleidoscope, which implies a greater degree of variation in its sequences and patterns. Conflict is as complicated as it has ever been, and defies neat categorisation, for example by symmetry or asymmetry. It is often hybrid, with adversaries and challenges presented in different guises simultaneously. Within this definition, it is unhelpful to categorise conflict as ‘state on state,’ even less so if then used in comparison to ‘hybrid conflict.’ Conflict and warfare are not hybrid, but the range of threats within them is. Conflict does not need to be defined as state on state, except in the important legal sense; what matters militarily is how the adversary behaves, the capabilities he employs, and the methods he uses.

The visualisation of conflict as a mosaic sees it consisting of small pieces, all of which are required to see the full picture. The mosaic model is helpful because it acknowledges the inherent complexity of change within the land environment. Urbanisation, fluid population movement, the consequences of climate change, state failure, demographic increase in the unemployed, disenfranchised young, widening gaps between rich and poor, awareness of the scarcity of natural resources and radicalisation, have all affected relationships between conflict themes. These changes are accelerating through increasing globalisation and the internet. In some cases these causes of change are having effects more quickly than the rate at which developed states, bureaucracies and military forces are able to adapt. The diagram below illustrates how the visualisation of contemporary conflict has evolved, from a spectrum to a mosaic, with the latter overlaying military activities on a complicated background of conflict themes, with a sense of increasing violence applied to both.

Spectrum of Conflict



Mosaic of Conflict

HYBRID OPERATIONS

Definitions. Hybrid Conflict is a form of conflict waged by a range of adversaries (Symmetrical, Asymmetrical, Terrorist and Criminal) who will employ all forms of war and tactics, perhaps at the same place and time.

Threats. It follows that if conflict is not limited to inter-state war comprising engagements between conventional military forces, the future will comprise a complex, potentially enduring, mix of threats. These are highly unlikely to occur in isolation and will not necessarily stop when the ‘war’ is over. These threats will include, but not necessarily be limited to, inter-state wars, insecurity and destabilisation, cyber attacks, propaganda and CBRN attacks. Future opponents will have optimised their capacity to learn and adapt rapidly in exploiting UK weakness wherever it can be found.

THE CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT (COE)

Backgrounds. The environment in which the Army is required to conduct operations has changed significantly from that for which it has traditionally trained. The risks of large-scale armed conflict between nation states had reduced, but not disappeared. Sierra Leone faces a spectrum of threats ranging from conventional forces to international terrorists and from WMD to computer viruses. These threats may manifest themselves wherever there are Sierra Leonean interests, and can be initiated from any region on Earth. In today’s turbulent and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict and therefore the Army must be prepared to meet the challenges of any type of operation, in a range of physical environments, and against all kinds of threats, simultaneously. This is the nature of the COE, which General Krulak USMC has described as being “confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three adjacent city blocks”: the “Three Block War”.

Variables. Fundamental to understanding the COE is recognition and acknowledgement of the number of variables that affect the environment and influence the military activity that takes place within it. There are six critical environmental variables reflect the complexity of current operations and will interact with each other, change and evolve over time. The COE is therefore dynamic and accordingly no two situations are likely to be the same. The six COE variables which should be reflected in each Adaptive Foundation Training Scenario are:

Variables	Description
Physical	Encompasses the geography, climate, infrastructure and resources of an operational environment.
Political	Encompassing the historical, global, regional and national interest factors within an operational environment.
Economic	Identifies fiscal factors including economic development, external influences and opportunities within an operational environment.
Human	Includes demographics, ethnicity, religion, education, culture and the influence of the International Community.
Military	Includes conventional and asymmetric military structures, equipment, leadership, training, doctrine/ modus operandi.
Information	Includes all aspects of the national and international media, the ability to access information and the attitude of the population.

MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE LAND ENVIRONMENT

Activity	Sub-activity	Description
Combat	Combat	Combat is a fight or struggle between armed groups. It is physical and cognitive, and is by definition adversarial.
	Major Combat	Scale is often applied to the term combat to refer to <i>major combat</i> . In major combat, operations take place in a dimension usually characterised as war, in which combat is frequent, widespread, intense and conducted by formations.
Security and Stabilisation	Framework Security	Security – a life without fear – is the most fundamental human need and is most likely to motivate and regulate behaviour. Security (human, personal, national and physical) creates the conditions in which other activity crucial to well-being can take place.
	SSR and MCB	Stabilising a state in the long run depends on transferring responsibility for the provision of security to indigenous forces. This requires a comprehensive inter-agency approach to reform the security sector itself, for example by removing those who are seen as contributing to insecurity and fear, although care must be taken not to undermine the limited security architecture that may exist. Land forces will contribute to this approach by developing and working with indigenous security forces. MCB includes the following formula of overlapping activity: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Inward Investment. Depending on poverty levels and the effects of conflict, the new indigenous security structure will require inward investment. Advice and training will be meaningless without equipment, bases and other resources being made available. - Training. Indigenous forces should then be individually and collectively trained at secure and well-resourced centres away from the population, using the train-the-trainer model whenever possible. - Mentoring. Once deployed on operations, the indigenous forces must be mentored. This requires a subtle blend of encouragement, advice and compulsion, emphasising independence and confidence and playing down dependency. - Partnering. Once the indigenous force is confident and capable of independent operation with coalition support, the relationship should change further, to one of partnering. This might involve the provision of niche capabilities, joint operations with the indigenous force in the lead, or even UK units or individuals subordinated within an indigenous chain of command. - Transition and Overwatch. Over time, partnering elements can themselves withdraw, to a position, inside or outside the theatre, in support of the independent indigenous force, following a transition of power.
	Support to the Delivery of Essential Services	Sustainable security is dependent on providing essential services: electricity, water, sewerage and food delivery. The more demanding the physical environment and the more destructive the periods of combat, the keener the lack of these services will be felt.
	Support to Governance, Economic Development and Reconstruction	Although the development of national and local legislatures, executives and courts, a constitutional and legal system and other aspects of a functioning government is not traditional military business, land forces will need to understand and to some extent be involved in these processes. At the very least, these instruments will require protection and the threat environment may make it quicker for military rather than civil provision.
Counter-Insurgency		Counter-insurgency or COIN (sometimes also referred to as a category of <i>counter-irregular activity</i>) is defined as those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civil actions taken by a government or its partners to defeat insurgency.
Focussed Intervention		Focussed (or limited) Intervention (FI) has limited objectives, such as the security or evacuation of non-combatants. These operations can be aggressive, such as a strategic raid. But they are normally intended to be of short duration and specific in objective and scope, although the limited intervention may be a precursor to a larger and more deliberate intervention.
Activity	Sub-activity	Description
Peace		Military peace support activities (using the ‘operation’ label leads to the

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Support		<p>common abbreviation of PSO) are defined as those contributing to an operation that impartially makes use of diplomatic, civil and military means, normally in pursuit of UN Charter purposes and principles, to restore or maintain peace, in accordance with a mandate. The principles of peace support activity in PSO are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Conduct Comprehensive and Complementary Campaigning. Effective PSO should integrate the efforts of all military and non-military agencies. - Take Preventative Action. To prevent worsening of a situation, military forces need intelligence of any intent to disrupt the operation. - Conduct Sensitised Action. Military forces should understand the law, religion, customs and culture of the elements of the population with whom they are dealing. - Provide Security. Protection of the peace support force and civilian agencies is an important requirement, particularly if some national contingents have fragile mandates. - Ensure Transparency. There should be no doubt in the minds of factions or the population as to the aim and mandate of a PSO, nor of the penalties for transgressing the terms of any peace agreement.
Peacetime Military Engagement and Conflict Prevention		<p>Peacetime Military Engagement (PME) and Conflict Prevention encompass all military activities intended to shape the security environment in peacetime. They include programmes and exercises conducted on a bilateral or multinational basis, counter-terrorism, the provision of advisers and specialist training teams, engagement by embassy defence staffs and military talks.</p>
Homeland Security and Military Aid to the Civil Authorities		<p>The security of Sierra Leone territory itself, sometimes described as ‘homeland security’ or security of the ‘home base’, should be the primary concern of governments and hence the priority for the use of military forces. Sierra Leone within its borders needs to be secured by operations at a distance because it is usually too late to protect the state at its borders.</p>
	Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC)	<p>MACC is the provision of unarmed assistance to the country at large and has three sub-headings: emergency assistance; routine assistance and; the attachment of volunteers.</p>
	Military Aid to Government Departments (MAGD)	<p>MAGD is the assistance provided to other government departments in urgent work of national importance to maintain supplies and services essential to life, health and the safety of the community.</p>
	Military Aid to the Civil Powers (MACP)	<p>MACP is the provision of military assistance to the civil powers in the maintenance of law, order and public safety, using specialist capabilities or equipment, in situations beyond the capabilities of the civil powers. Such assistance may be armed and would normally be subordinated to police primacy.</p>
Resilience		<p>Resilience is the term used to describe activities and structures that ensure the Government can continue to function and deliver essential public services in time of crisis, including terrorist attack. The Army’s regional command structure is an example of a capability that contributes to resilience.</p>

TYPES OF LAND TACTICAL ACTIONS

Offensive Actions	Defensive Actions	Stability activities
Attack Raid Exploitation Pursuit Feint Demonstration Reconnaissance in Force Ambush Breakout	Defence Delay	Framework Security SSR & MCB Support to the Delivery of Essential Services Support to Governance, Economic Development and Reconstruction

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Cognitive Methods		
Information Action	CNA	Posture, Presence, Profile
Media Action	KLE	OPSEC
Deception	CIMIC	Psychological Action
Enabling Actions		
Reconnaissance	Withdrawal	Meeting Engagement
March	Retirement	Advance to Contact
Relief of an Encircled Force	Link-Up	Obstacle Breaching
Relief of Troops in Combat	Security	Obstacle Crossing

SECTION 3**THE PRINCIPLES OF WAR**

Principle	Description
Selection and Maintenance of the Aim	A single, unambiguous aim is at the heart of successful military operations. Selection and maintenance of the aim is regarded as the master principle of war.
Maintenance of Morale	Morale is a positive state of mind derived from inspired political and military leadership, a shared sense of purpose and values, well-being, perceptions of worth, and group cohesion.
Offensive Action	Offensive action is the practical way in which a commander seeks to gain advantage, sustain momentum, and seize the initiative.
Security	Security is the provision and maintenance of an operating environment that affords the freedom of action, when and where required, to achieve objectives.
Surprise	Surprise is the consequence of shock and confusion induced by the introduction of the unexpected.
Concentration of Force	Concentration of force involves the decisive, synchronised application of superior fighting power (physical, conceptual and moral) to realise intended effects, when and where required.
Economy of Effort	Economy of effort is the judicious exploitation of manpower, materiel, time and influence in relation to the achievement of objectives.
Flexibility	Flexibility – the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances – comprises versatility, responsiveness, resilience, acuity and adaptability.
Cooperation	Cooperation entails the incorporation of teamwork and a sharing of dangers, burdens, risks and opportunities in every aspect of warfare.
Administration	To administer a force is to generate the means by which its fighting power and freedom of action are maintained.

Selection And Maintenance Of The Aim: In the conduct of war, and therefore in all military activity, it is essential to select and define the aims clearly. Within his strategic directive, a commander may have several courses of action open, each of which would fulfil the aim. The selection of the best course will lead to the mission and outline plan being issued, the mission being a statement of the aim and its purpose. The aim passed on to subordinate commanders must be precise or expressed in unambiguous terms and attainable with the forces available. Once decided the aim must be circulated as widely as security allows so that all can direct their efforts to achieve the aim.

Maintenance Of Morale: Because success in war depends as much on moral as physical factors, morale is probably the single most important element of war. High morale fosters the offensive spirit and the will to win. It will inspire an army from the highest to the lowest ranks. Although primarily a moral aspect it is sensitive to material conditions and a commander should look after the well-being of his men.

Offensive Action: Offensive action is the chief means open to a commander to influence the outcome of a campaign or a battle. It confers the initiative on the attacker, giving him the freedom of action necessary to secure a decision. A successful defence must be followed by offensive action if it is to achieve a decisive result. Offensive action embodies a state of mind which breeds the determination to gain and hold the initiative: it is essential for the creation of confidence and to establish an ascendancy over the enemy, and thus has an effect on morale.

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Surprise: The potency of surprise as a psychological weapon at all levels should not be underestimated. It causes confusion and paralysis in the enemy's chain of command and destroys the cohesion and morale of his troops.

Flexibility: *"No plan of operations can look with any certainty beyond the first meeting with the major forces of the enemy. The commander is compelled ... to reach decisions on the basis of situations which cannot be predicted."*

General Field Marshal von Moltke

Although the aim may not alter, a commander will be required to exercise judgement and flexibility in modifying his plans to meet changed circumstances, taking advantage of fleeting chances or shifting a point of emphasis. Flexibility depends upon the mental component of openness of mind on the one hand, and simple plans which can easily be modified on the other. A balanced reserve is a prerequisite for tactical or operational flexibility.

Co-Operation: Co-operation is based on team spirit and training, and entails the coordination of the activities of all Arms, of the Services and of Allies, for the optimum combined effort. Goodwill, a common aim, a clear division of responsibilities and understanding of the capabilities and limitations of others are essential for co-operation.

Concentration Of Force: Military success will normally result from the concentration of superior force at the decisive time and place. This does not preclude dispersion which may be valuable for the purposes of deception and avoiding discovery and attack. Rapid concentration and dispersion depend on good communications and an efficient traffic control system. They also depend on balance, the essence of the next two principles.

Economy Of Effort: The corollary of concentration of force is economy of effort. It is impossible to be strong everywhere and if decisive strength is to be concentrated at the critical time and place there must be no wasteful expenditure of effort where it cannot significantly affect the issue. In order to gain a substantial advantage a commander will have to take a calculated risk in a less vital area. The application of the principle may be summed up as planning for a balanced deployment combined with a prudent allocation of resources strictly related to the aim.

Security: A degree of security by physical protection and information denial is essential to all military operations. Security should enable friendly forces to achieve their objectives despite the enemy's interference. Active measures include the defence of bases and entry points, a favourable air situation, flank protection and maintenance of adequate reserves. The principles of concentration of force, economy of effort and security are all closely interrelated.

Administration: Sound administration is a prerequisite for the success of any operation. Logistic considerations are often the deciding factor in assessing the feasibility of an operation. A clear appreciation of logistic constraints is as important to a commander as his ability to make a sound estimate of the operational situation. No tactical plan can succeed without administrative support commensurate with the aim of the operation: it follows that a commander must have a degree of control over the administrative plan proportionate to the degree of his responsibility for the operation. Scarce resources must be controlled at a high level: the administrative organization must be flexible enough to react to changes in the situation with the most economic use of the available resources.

SECTION 4

**THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH TO OPERATIONS AND MISSION
COMMAND**

THE MANOEUVRIST APPROACH

1. The Manoeuvrist Approach to Operations is one in which shattering the enemy's overall cohesion and will to fight, rather than his materiel, is paramount. It is an indirect approach which emphasizes targeting the enemy's conceptual and moral component of his fighting power rather than the physical component. The approach involves a combination of violent and non-violent means to achieve effects which **shape his understanding, undermine his will and shatter his cohesion**. It aims to apply strength against identified vulnerabilities. Significant features are momentum and tempo, which in combination lead to shock and surprise. It calls for an attitude of mind in which doing the unexpected, using initiative and seeking originality is combined with a relentless determination to succeed.

a. **Understanding.** Understanding has two major aspects. The first is an understanding the nature of conflict in general and the current conflict in particular. The second is an understanding of the current situation, including the environment, friendly forces, the enemy, and the enemy's perception of the situation. Shaping an enemy's understanding can involve any of these aspects. Social and cultural perspectives have an impact on understanding, since different societies view the same issues in different ways.

b. **Will.** Will can be regarded as the determination to persist in the face of adversity. It has two aspects: intent and resolve. Both can be attacked and so undermined. An enemy commander's intent is thwarted when he realizes that it is no longer relevant or achievable, and so desists from that course of action. His resolve is his strength of will. It is overcome when he is demoralized. Intent and resolve are not necessarily related.

c. **Cohesion.** Cohesion has three related aspects: moral, conceptual and physical. Moral cohesion is an essentially human condition. Troops who have moral cohesion stick together: they continue to fight despite adversity and local reverse. The application of common doctrine through training and education provides conceptual cohesion. Physical cohesion largely results from good tactics and balanced organizations.

2. **Attacking the Enemy's Understanding, Will and Cohesion.** A commander should, wherever possible, attack his enemy systemically. To the extent that they can be separated the commander should **shape the enemy's understanding, undermine his will and shatter his cohesion**. Doing so should leave the enemy unable to respond effectively as the situation develops. One powerful way of doing this is to induce **shock**. There are three causes of shock:

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Causes of Shock:	
Surprise	- can be generated by the unexpected timing, direction, means or methods of the tactical activity. The major factors in achieving surprise are deception, intelligence, security, speed and originality.
Shock Action	- is the sudden, concentrated application of extreme violence. Key aspects are: the concentration of violence; its sudden application; and a high rate of manoeuvre.
Destruction	- the careful selection and destruction of discrete enemy capabilities or force elements can greatly amplify the effect of surprise and shock action. Shock effects can be observed as: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Reduced participation in combat. (2) Flight, panic or surrender. (3) Inappropriate responses to our activities.

3. **Collapse.** Shock effects can at times be observed as collapse. Collapse may be either progressive or catastrophic. The perception of failure is the best mechanism by which to promote actual failure.

4. **Exploiting Success.** Localized shock effect should be expanded through exploitation to encourage collapse and paralysis at higher levels and over wider areas. Exploitation may be planned or opportunistic. This is best achieved by decentralization, to reduce the time taken both for decision-making and translating decisions into action.

5. **Ways and Means of Attack.** To attack the enemy's understanding, will and cohesion you have to have the initiative, which is defined as 'the ability to dictate the course of events'.

Ways of Attack:	
Pre-emption	- to seize an opportunity before the enemy acts in order to deny him an advantage.
Dislocation	- to deny the enemy the ability to bring his strengths to bear, thus rendering his strengths irrelevant.
Disruption	- to break or confuse those enemy assets that are essential to the employment and coherence of an enemy's fighting power.
Means of Attack:	
Manoeuvre	- to place forces in a position of advantage from where the enemy can be surprised, suppressed, shocked or assaulted.
Firepower	- destroys, neutralizes, suppresses and demoralizes. It has physical, psychological and physiological effects. However, its effects are transient and they must be exploited by manoeuvre.
Tempo	- is the rhythm or rate of activity of operations relative to the enemy. The primary goal of tempo is to gain and retain the initiative.
Simultaneity	- seeks to overload the enemy commander by attacking or threatening him in so many ways at once so that he cannot concentrate on any one threat, not establish priorities between them.
Information Operations	- can be used to manipulate the enemy's understanding of the situation.

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MISSION COMMAND

Mission Command is a philosophy of decentralized command intended for situations which are complex, dynamic and adversarial. It underpins the Manoeuvrist Approach and has four enduring tenets: timely decision-making; the importance of understanding a superior commander's intention; a clear responsibility on the part of subordinates to fulfil that intent; and determination on the part of the commander to see a plan through to a successful conclusion. The underlying requirement is the fundamental responsibility to act, or in certain circumstances to decide not to act, within the framework of the commander's intent. This approach requires a style of command which promotes decentralized command, freedom and speed of action, and initiative. Mission Command is a central pillar of Joint and Army doctrine. It has the following key elements:

- a. A commander gives his orders in a manner that ensures that his subordinates understand his intentions, their own missions, and the context of those missions.
- b. Subordinates are told what effect they are to achieve and the reason why it needs to be achieved.
- c. Subordinates are allocated sufficient resources to carry out their missions.
- d. A commander uses a minimum of control measures so as not to unnecessarily constrain his subordinates' freedom of action.
- e. Subordinates then decide for themselves how best to achieve their missions.

The commander's intent binds the activities of a dispersed force into a whole while maximising his subordinates' authority to act.

Principles of Mission Command:	
Unity of Effort	Unity of effort in a fighting force stems from a number of inter-related means. These include: the commander's ability to formulate a clear intent and mission statements; the use of common doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures; a common language of command; a high standard of collective training and teamwork; and the designation of a main effort. Unity of effort is enhanced by subordinates understanding the intentions both of their immediate superiors and of those two levels up. This is described as vertical integration and allows subordinates to nest their own plans within those of their superiors. The concept of horizontal integration, which helps subordinates understand how their missions interact with others at their own level, is equally important.
Freedom of Action	Commanders should not seek to over-coordinate the inherently complex and at times chaotic activity of war. At the tactical level, freedom of action is largely achieved through decentralisation of responsibility and authority. Freedom of action is the aim; decentralisation is the principal means. Decentralisation applies to all levels. It allows subordinates to use their initiative within their delegated freedom of action and provides them with a greater sense of involvement and commitment. Decision levels should be set as low as possible. This permits decisions to be made swiftly in the confusion and uncertainty of battle. It also reduces the need for any but essential information to be passed up and down the chain of command and ensures that decisions are taken by the commander with the most up-to-date information. The more fluid the circumstances, the lower the decision level should be set. Decentralisation of decision-making requires delegation of responsibility in the exercise of command.
Trust	Trust must be earned, not demanded. Personal trust can only be built up over time with experience, rather than by reputation. The spirit of Mission Command requires a presumption of trust between superior and subordinate, and between peers, that should develop through shared experience. In the first instance a commander should formulate and express his intent clearly and succinctly, delegate responsibility, and provide the necessary resources. He should then trust his subordinates to act as required. Likewise, a subordinate should trust that his superior has decided wisely, given effective direction, and that he will be supported when required. This bond of trust includes the tolerance of well-intentioned mistakes. Trust is based on a number of qualities including professional

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	competence, personal example and integrity. The basis of this two-way trust is respect and mutual understanding.
Mutual Understanding	Like trust, mutual understanding requires time to establish. With experience, commanders should be in a position to understand the issues and concerns facing their subordinates. Professional knowledge and study will give subordinates, in turn, an insight into command at levels higher than their own. Thus a good commander ensures that he understands his subordinates and that they understand him. Only then can they together conduct operations in a cohesive and effective manner. Mutual understanding is also based on sharing a common perception of military problems. Here a common doctrine and philosophy of command bonds commanders and subordinates together by providing a unifying framework of understanding.
Timely and Effective Decision-Making	Successful command requires timely and effective decisions at all levels. Much of the art of command depends on recognizing when to decide, which depends on good judgement and initiative. The ability to know if a decision is required and, if it is, when it must be taken is critical. Only occasionally should a commander delay making a decision if he has insufficient information, or when he is waiting for others to decide. Fleeting opportunities should be grasped. Many tactical decisions will have to be made on the basis of incomplete information. A commander who always waits for the latest available, or complete, information is unlikely to act decisively or in good time. The ability to take difficult decisions, particularly when the outcome is uncertain, marks a strong commander.

A command philosophy provides the basis for the exercise of command. The three tenets of the Mission Command are:

- a. The importance of making a timely decision.
- b. The importance of understanding the commander's intent.
- c. Clear responsibility to fulfill that intention based on:
 - (1) Clear understanding of common doctrine.
 - (2) Mutual trust between commanders.
 - (3) Obedience to orders.
 - (4) Initiative to act within any freedom of action given, or purposefully in the absence of further orders.

THE CORE FUNCTIONS

At the tactical level, at its simplest, there are two core functions: to **fix** and to **strike**. The need to **find** and to be prepared to **exploit** is implicit in both.

The Core Functions:	
Find	Finding the enemy is a basic function which endures throughout an operation. It includes locating, identifying, tracking and assessing the enemy. Forces may be directed specifically to fight the battle for information, particularly in the opening stages of an operation. Whatever its source, information is never wholly reliable. It may need checking or corroborating with other sources. Too much information is a form of friction that can impede decision-making.
Fix	To fix is to deny the enemy his goals, to distract him and thus deprive him of his freedom of action. By doing so, the friendly force gains freedom of action.
Strike	To strike is to manoeuvre and then take direct action to achieve the purpose of the mission. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Manoeuvre. To manoeuvre is to gain a position of advantage in respect of the enemy from which force can be threatened or applied. Manoeuvre means more than movement in combination with fire. It allows combat power to be focused for greatest effect, avoids strengths and exploits weakness. Recce pull. - Direct Action. Direct action in combat means seizing objectives or destroying enemy forces. Firepower and movement are focused through simultaneity and tempo, to achieve shock and surprise and break the enemy's will and cohesion.
Exploit	As a core function, exploitation is the seizure of opportunity in order to achieve a higher commander's objective, or fulfil some part of his intent, directly. Opportunistic exploitation requires action beyond the given mission. A commander should constantly search for such opportunities and, when they occur, pursue them ruthlessly. Exploitation should be expected from subordinates. They should not have to be told to exploit, and only told how far they may do so if absolutely necessary, using the term 'limit of exploitation'. Exploitation relies on offensive action, surprise and flexibility. In particular, it requires forces able to react rapidly to an unexpected opportunity.

FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT

Functions in Combat:	
Command	Command is the exercise of military authority by a designated commander for the planning, direction, coordination and control of a military force. Control is a supporting means by which command is exercised and regulated, and is normally the province of the staff.
Information and Intelligence	Accurate and timely intelligence is fundamental to the success of operations.
Firepower	Firepower destroys, neutralizes and suppresses. It is essential in defeating an enemy's ability and will to fight and has utility in both decisive and shaping operations. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Firepower in Isolation. Firepower may be used in isolation from manoeuvre to cause attrition, to delay, or to disrupt the enemy. - Firepower and Manoeuvre. When firepower and manoeuvre work together, the manoeuvre commander should control the fire.
Manoeuvre	Manoeuvre is the means of concentrating force or the threat of force at decisive points to achieve surprise, shock and opportunities for exploitation. It has both spatial and temporal dimensions which can be exploited to keep the enemy off balance: it thus also protects. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ground Manoeuvre. The positional advantages gained by ground manoeuvre forces are unique, and irreplaceable by other means. Seizing, holding and denying ground, blocking and penetrating enemy forces all contribute directly to success. - Air Manoeuvre. Air manoeuvre seeks to unite attack helicopters, ground and airborne forces, support helicopters and offensive support within a combined arms and joint approach to operations. - Manoeuvre Support. Those activities, primarily military engineering, which contribute to shaping the battlespace to enable strategic, operational and tactical freedom of manoeuvre across the continuum of operations are described as manoeuvre support.
Protection	Protection preserves the fighting potential of a force so that it can be applied at a decisive time and place.
Combat Service Support	Combat Service Support sustains the force from its home base to and within the theatre of operations. It influences the tempo, duration and intensity of all operations. It is therefore an integral part of the planning and execution of campaigns, battles and engagements.

THE OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK

The commander selects one task that will be decisive, and then describes the other tasks required to support it either as either shaping or sustaining. This is a **purposive** framework, which should be used for most operations.

The Operational Framework:	
Shaping	- creating/preserving the conditions for the success of the decisive operation.
Decisive	- an act which, if successful, should lead inevitably to the achievement of the assigned mission.
Sustaining	- operations which enable land forces to live, to move and to fight, in order to conduct decisive or shaping operations.

THE GEOGRAPHICAL FRAMEWORK

The integrated framework of operations known as deep, close and rear is a means of visualising operations. It is also used to aid synchronisation. It helps the commander relate friendly forces to one another, and to the enemy, in terms of time, space, resources and purpose. Formations and units may engage in deep, close and rear operations at different stages of the battle. It is preferable to conduct deep and close operations concurrently, not only because each will influence the other, but also because the enemy is best defeated by fighting him simultaneously throughout his depth. Deep, close and rear provide concepts for the command and synchronisation of operations.

DEEP OPERATIONS

Nature of Deep Operations. Deep operations expand the battlefield in time and space, making it difficult for the enemy to concentrate combat power without loss, and thus diminish the coherence and tempo of his actions. They are usually conducted at long range and over a protracted time scale against the enemy's forces or resources not currently engaged in the close battle. Deep operations are essentially offensive and may lead to close combat. By keeping the enemy away from his objectives and constraining his freedom of action, deep operations help to create favourable conditions for close operations. They disrupt his manoeuvre and protect the force by restricting the enemy's offensive capability before it can be brought to bear. Although the purpose of deep operations is often to find and fix the enemy increasingly, the range and lethality of modern weapons, tied to accurate and responsive acquisition and communication systems, allow deep operations to contribute directly to striking the enemy. He is therefore delayed, diverted from his main effort and elements of his combat power are destroyed.

Activities. Deep operations embrace three principal **activities**: deception, deep surveillance target acquisition and interdiction. The latter seeks to prevent the enemy reinforcing or reacting to

close operations and contributes to tying down his combat power. Specific targets for deep operations may include strategic key points, command systems, air defence assets, lines of communication, surface forces, combat supplies and stocks of materiel.

Focus of Deep Operations. Deep operations focus selectively on key enemy vulnerabilities. They may well also have a psychological or moral flavour, seeking for example, to influence the enemy's will to fight through his media, public support and undermining his confidence by a series of carefully targeted blows; this is especially so in Operations Other Than War. In Sierra Leone, for example, deep operations include the majority of deterrence patrolling; these influence where rebels choose to operate but are not themselves likely to lead to planned contacts - close operations. Long term surveillance work may either be directed towards the sustained interdiction of rebels' supplies - a deep operation; or it may seek to develop specific contact information leading to arrests - close operations. In this example, deep operations fix the enemy, close operations strike him and the basic function of finding is common to both.

Means of Prosecuting Deep Operations. While the principal means of prosecuting deep operations in war is firepower, the integrated application of firepower and manoeuvre produces the most effective results - hence joint interdiction. This is because the effects of firepower alone diminish with time as the enemy implements protective measures: a combination of firepower and deep manoeuvre places him at risk in a way which demands that he takes active measures to counter, exposing himself in the process. The land components of deep interdiction operations may include Special Forces, aviation and ground manoeuvre forces acting in concert, parachute and air assault troops, supported by electromagnetic and deep fire weapons systems.

Time Dimension. As with rear operations, the time dimension of deep operations is significant. Whereas close operations are invariably current and immediate, deep operations have both a current dimension and a delayed dimension, which in some types of conflict, may be protracted. For example, in counter-insurgency or peace support operations, the gaining and maintenance of popular support - hearts and minds - will be one of several lines of deep operations in the sense that it will set the conditions for close operations throughout the campaign. Equally, these types of deep operations offer little prospect of immediate results but will have long-term pay-offs. Deep operations have a critical effect at all levels of conflict; they are the keys to setting the tempo of operations.

CLOSE OPERATIONS

Concept and Purpose. Close operations are those that involve friendly forces in direct contact with the enemy. They are usually conducted at short-range and in an immediate time scale. Their purpose is primarily to strike the enemy in order to eliminate a discrete part of his combat power. The means range from destruction to arrest. Whereas deep and rear operations are designed to create the conditions for favourable close combat, close operations are about winning current battles and engagements. They are fought by forces in immediate contact with the enemy. They achieve their effect by direct action against enemy combat power. Their effect is therefore likely to be immediate and palpable. Close operations normally include the deep, close and rear operations of subordinate units.

Activities. Close operations may include: deception, manoeuvre, close combat, fire support, counter-battery fire, combat support and combat service support of forces in contact. Activities involved with close operations require precise control to avoid fratricide and unity of command is therefore vital.

Mode of Operations. Close operations place forces in the most obvious and frequently the greatest danger, therefore fighting at arms length has some attractions. Firstly, successful interdiction constrains enemy freedom of action and thus his ability to reinforce. The terms on which, close operations are engaged then become more predictable and the outcome more certain. Secondly, within close operations, fighting at arms' length implies using the effects of simultaneity, manoeuvre and counter-fire to hit and disengage. It does not mean simply seeking to out-range the enemy; desirable though as this may be, it is an uncertain product of favourable technology and terrain, neither of which can be guaranteed. Nor does it mean greater reliance on indirect rather than direct fire; each has a role and one is not a substitute for the other.

Balancing Effects. In balancing the **effects** of deep and close operations, one must be designated as the main effort at any time. Both will be conducted simultaneously but where they require common assets or resources are scarce, it must be quite clear which will take priority if either needs to be reinforced. The function of each operation must be expressed in terms of the desired effect - the commander's intent. Deep operations allow the commander to dictate where, when and under what conditions he fights his close operations. Whilst **striking**, the usual objective of close operations, is dependent ultimately on successful offensive action, **finding** and **fixing** give a force the edge in combat by giving it freedom of action.

Reserves. In close operations, **quick, simultaneous** and **violent actions** have greater potential for success than sequential or staged actions. This has implications for reserves. True reserves are a hedge against uncertainty; they allow a commander to exploit unforeseen success and they help him recover from a reverse. But if the enemy is satisfactorily fixed by deep operations, his freedom of action will be curtailed and the need for a hedge against uncertainty is reduced. In this desirable state of affairs the need for a large reserve to be held out of action is reduced. Forces may nevertheless be held in echelon to be committed sequentially but this is less desirable than achieving simultaneity by massing violent effects on an enemy level of command from a variety of directions.

Nature of Close Operations. Close operations may well not be contiguous. The responsibility for remaining aware of what is going on in the gaps must be directed to specific commanders, with a clear remit for them to maintain the security of their forces engaged in close operations. By **function**, close operations are primarily concerned with striking the enemy: the **means** available allow targets to be struck both in close proximity to own forces and at considerable separation from them. Close operations may therefore be narrowly focused in a confined space (a contact in Northern Ireland for example) or may span a considerable area, in depth, width and height.

REAR OPERATIONS

Purpose. Rear operations both increase the overall depth of operations and provide the resources to vary the tempo of operations. Their purpose is to ensure freedom of action by protecting the force, sustaining combat operations and retaining freedom of manoeuvre of uncommitted forces. They are not synonymous with combat service support, as they are much wider in scope.

Activity. The types of **activity** which may constitute rear operations include the reception into theatre, assembly, movement and security of reserves or echelon forces, redeployment of forces out of contact, host nation support, establishment and protection of secure operating bases and lodgements, establishment of lines of communication and finally support for and protection of civilians and civilian installations. Freedom of action is further enhanced by the generation of operational reserves. Rear operations control the provision of reinforcements, replacements, roulement, reconstitution and regeneration of forces.

Target of Enemy Deep Operations. Rear operations will be the target of enemy deep operations; a balance must be struck between active and passive security measures. Active measures will seek out and neutralise or destroy enemy forces capable of deep operations. Defensive measures may include the use of guards, dispersal, camouflage and deception. In protecting rear operations, our freedom of action can be enhanced; the effort and resources used are not therefore entirely nugatory but the level of protection must be appropriate to the risk because close and deep operations have a higher claim to offensive combat power. In Northern Ireland for example, protection of security force bases are necessary rear operations but the impact on the forces available for offensive tasks has to be minimised. The greatest risks occur where forces engaged in rear operations need to concentrate and lack integral protection. Their vulnerability was dramatically demonstrated by the bombing of the US Marine Corps Barracks in Beirut in 1982, which effectively ended the US campaign in Lebanon.

Co-ordination of Rear Operations. Rear operations must be focused clearly to support the commander's intent. In order to co-ordinate the many functions of rear operations, unity of command is essential. This may be complicated by the diversity of the units involved and their potentially wide geographic spread. Notwithstanding, it will usually be desirable to appoint a single functional commander with responsibility for all joint rear operations and the appropriate authority over the forces and resources involved, particularly where priorities are difficult to define.

MILITARY ANALYSIS

“The think tanks of all Militaries are Officers and it is evident that Officers are paid to think-problem solvers in the battlefield and in barracks”

(Field Marshal Viscount Wolseley)

What is Military Analysis?

A Military devise to critically examine a situation, in order to solve problems using the best Cause of action-COA

Problem Solving Circle: Tries to look at a problem and develop ways or means required to solve the problem. It systematically attempt to look at the under mentioned:

Identify the problem

Conduct cause analysis

Establish needs to solve problem

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Establish criteria required from established needs-weighting as required

Create options

Select best option by assessing how well each option satisfies needs using

Options Analysis Matrix

Options	Criteria			
War				
Diplomacy				

The options are to be scored against the criteria stipulated. This will enable you to develop various courses of action needed to solve that problem. This includes various criteria that could be used depending on the problem: For instance,

Functions in Combat:

Information & Intelligence
Command
Protection
Combat Service Support
Firepower
Manoeuvre

SECTION 5

THE SEVEN QUESTIONS COMBAT ESTIMATE

WHAT FOLLOWS IS NOT A TEACHING PRODUCT, BUT AN AIDE MEMOIRE

The teaching booklet produced by HA

“ 7 Questions Booklet”

Should be used to fully understand the estimate process

Seven Questions The fundamental questions that need to be addressed at all levels of planning are as follows:

- 1 What are the enemy doing and why?
- 2 What have I been told to do and why?
- 3 What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I give to develop a plan?
- 4 Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?
- 5 What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?
- 6 When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?
- 7 What control measures do I need to impose?

Time When time is short or an operation is underway, experience, intuition and a map may be all that is needed to address the questions. However in order to reach this point a thorough understanding of the estimate process is required.

THE COMBAT ESTIMATE
TEMPLATE

Unit:

Op/Ex:

Mission:

Time Now:
HHR:

OP Timeline:

Planning Timeline

1/3:2/3

Wng O: (can be issued at any time throughout the planning process)

RECEIPT OF ORDERS BRIEF (To all staff)

Allocate appointment to give each part of ROOB

Context

Operational Timelines

G2 Update

Mission and Tasks

Constraints

Planning Timeline

Comd's Initial Guidance

ISSUE WNG O 1

DTG:

From:

To:

BG WNG O

Ref:

Time Zone Used Throughout the Order:

Task Org:

1. **SITUATION**

a.En Forces

- (1) General Situation
- (2) Specific to BG

b. Friendly Forces

- (1) 2 Up
- (2) 1 Up

2. **BG MISSION**

3. **EXECUTION**

a.Concept of Ops. Intent Schematic

- (1) Prob Intent
- (2) Prob ME

b. Probable Msns/Tasks

c.Coord Instrs

- (1) Timings
- (2) O Gp

4. **SERVICE SUPPORT**

5. **COMMAND AND SIGNAL**


Annexes:

Acknowledge:

Authentication:

Distr:

RESTRICTED
INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD



QUESTION 1:

Question/Factor (a)	Deduction (So what/Analysis) (b)	Task/Constraint/CCIR/Clarification Product/Output (c)
<p>WHAT IS THE SITUATION AND HOW DOES IT AFFECT ME? BAE</p> <p>Terrain Analysis</p> <p>MCs & AA (Fr/En/Pop)</p> <p>Weather Analysis</p> <p>Mililux Levels</p>		

QUESTION 1 (contd):

Question/Factor	Deduction (So what/Analysis)	Task/Constraint/CCIR/Clarification Product/Output
(a)	(b)	(c)
<p>BAE (contd)</p> <p>Pop IPE (ID Fr & En Restricted and Severely Restricted Terrain</p> <p>Key Terrain & Vital Ground (either Geo or Pop)</p> <p>ASCOPE – Areas & Structures</p>		









RESTRICTED BATTLESPACE AREA EVALUATION CONVENTIONS

DEFINITION OF TYPES OF GOING¹ – GENERAL MOVEMENT




Severely Restricted² – Ground over which manoeuvre by the type of force being considered is impracticable.



Restricted – Ground over which manoeuvre is only possible at reduced speed, is likely to be canalised or will only be possible with the deployment of additional assets.

Unrestricted – Ground which is open.

Types of Terrain (a)	Severely Restricted for Armour (b)	Restricted for Armour (c)	Unrestricted for Armour (d)
Built-up Areas	Areas more than 500m in depth or which cannot be by-passed. 	Areas less than 500m in depth which cannot be by-passed. 	Areas which can be by-passed.
Water Obstacles	Water obstacles which cannot be bridged by an AVLB. Vertical banks higher than 1.2m. Water deeper than 1.2m. Current stronger than 2.5m/s. 	Water obstacles with currents, depths and bank heights less than those classified as Severely Restricted. Must possess several possible crossing sites. 	Water obstacles less than 1.5m wide, less than 0.6m deep and fordable almost anywhere.
Slopes	Uphill gradients in excess of 50%. 	Uphill gradients of between 30% and 50%. 	Uphill gradients of less than 30%.
Woods	Trees with diameter in excess of 20cm spaced at less than 5m. 	Trees with diameter in excess of 5 cm spaced at less than 5m. 	Trees with diameter of less than 5 cm or spaced at more than 5m.
Obstacles	Minefields, tank ditches, or any other artificial obstacle ³ . <i>Marking symbols as set out in APP-6A SD colour Green.</i>		No obstacles.

Additional Overlay Conventions

Mobility Corridor -  or  Main Effort 

Avenue of Approach to AA -   *Unit size indicator can be added*

Objective - *Standard markings as set out in APP-6A.*

¹ Based principally on a European setting. In other theatres, Engineer advice should be sought.

² Classification of terrain SEVERELY RESTRICTED does not mean that all movement through an area is impossible but merely that forces cannot manoeuvre.

³ The effect of these obstacles may be directional.

QUESTION 1 (contd):

Question/Factor (a)	Deduction (So what/Analysis) (b)	Task/Constraint/CCIR/Clarification Product/Output (c)
Threat Evaluation Doctrinal Overlays (including Armed Influence Activity) Capability TTPs HVT Enemy Vulnerabilities		

QUESTION 1 (contd):

Question/Factor (a)	Deduction (So what/Analysis) (b)	Task/Constraint/CCIR/Clarification Product/Output (c)
<p>Threat Evaluation (contd)</p> <p>Pop Overlay – eg reaction to kinetic activity</p> <p>ASCOPE – Capabilities, Organisations, People</p>		

QUESTION 1 (contd):

Question/Factor (a)	Deduction (So what/Analysis) (b)	Task/Constraint/CCIR/Clarification Product/Output (c)
Threat Integration En Intent & Assessed En Effects Pop COAs Situation Overlays Event Overlays ASCOPE – Events Recommended PIRs Int Collection Plan Initial NAIs		

QUESTION 1 (contd):

EN MOST DANGEROUS COURSE OF ACTION (MDCOA)	EN LOST LIKELY COURSE OF ACTION (MLCOA)
(b)	(a)

RESTRICTED
QUESTION 1 BACKBRIEF

FACTOR	KEY DEDUCTIONS & LIKELY EFFECT/CONSIDERATION FOR OP
<p>INTRODUCTION</p> <p>Location of Area.</p> <p>Mapping/Air Photos/IMINT.</p> <p>Boundaries.</p>	
<p>GROUND IN GENERAL</p> <p>Terrain</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Relief inc ground and rivers. 2. Vegetation. 3. Surface materials, inc soils and going. <p>Climate/Weather</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Temperature. 2. Precipitation. 3. Wind. 4. Visibility inc data on sun, moon, freq of fog/mist, expected vis, RED illum periods. <p>Urban Areas</p> <p>Infrastructure inc roads, railways, airports, ports, other facilities.</p>	
<p>GROUND IN DETAIL</p> <p>Observation. Effects of terrain and weather on surveillance, fields of fire, effectiveness of fire.</p> <p>Cover and Concealment. Effects of terrain on protection, tactical deception, concealment.</p> <p>Obstacles. Effects of terrain on accessibility, trafficability, and effect of an obstacle on a COA.</p> <p>Key Terrain. Based on the above three aspects, any locality or area the seizure, or retention, or control of affords a marked advantage to either side.</p> <p>Avenues of Approach. Based on all previous analysis of the tactical aspects, developing the possible avenues of approach.</p>	

QUESTION 1 BACKBRIEF (contd)

FACTOR	KEY DEDUCTIONS & LIKELY EFFECT/CONSIDERATION FOR OP
<p>ENEMY ORBATS.</p> <p>Assumptions.</p> <p>Doctrine, tactics and capability down to the level appropriate to the HQ.</p> <p>En centre of gravity, that from which it derives its strength.</p> <p>En vulnerabilities.</p> <p>HVTL – equipment and personnel.</p> <p>The use of combat multipliers and any options for the employment of reserve formations and associated movement triggers.</p> <p>Possible routes and timings that will affect the FF plan.</p> <p>Objectives and the enemy commander’s intent – the En Intent Schematic.</p> <p>En COAs - MLCOA and MDCOA – Situation Overlays.</p> <p>NAIs that will confirm an En COA – En Event Overlay.</p> <p>Recommend CCIRs.</p> <p>Recommendations for FF recce.</p>	
<p>CONTEMPORARY OPERATING ENVIRONMENT</p> <p>Tribal/ faction/civilian breakdown.</p> <p>Attitudes</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To us. 2. To religion. <p>Cultural.</p>	

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QUESTION 1 BACKBRIEF (contd)

FACTOR	KEY DEDUCTIONS & LIKELY EFFECT/CONSIDERATION FOR OP
Key influences - targets for KLE. Media. NGOs. Government/structure. Police. Indigenous AF. Asymmetric threat - Capability, Intent, methods of operating.	

QUESTION 2:

Question/Factor (a)	Deduction (So what/Analysis) (b)	Task/Constraint/CCIR/Clarification Product/Output (c)
<p>WHAT HAVE I BEEN TOLD TO DO AND WHY?</p> <p>2.1 – Higher commanders’ intent and the aims and objectives of other allied military and civilian organisations.</p>		

QUESTION 2 (contd):

Question/Factor (a)	Deduction (So what/Analysis) (b)	Task/Constraint/CCIR/Clarification Product/Output (c)
2.2 – Specified and implied tasks.		


QUESTION 2 (contd):

Question/Factor (a)	Deduction (So what/Analysis) (b)	Task/Constraint/CCIR/Clarification Product/Output (c)
2.3 – Freedoms, constraints and risks.		

QUESTION 2 (contd):

Question/Factor (a)	Deduction (So what/Analysis) (b)	Task/Constraint/CCIR/Clarification Product/Output (c)
2.4 – Has or how might the situation change and how could this affect me?		

RESTRICTED
**COMMANDER'S CRITICAL INFORMATION
 REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)**



MAIN deals with a great deal of information during planning and execution of a mission. Most of this is routine and is not **critical** to the success of the operation but merely comes under the general heading of Information Requirements (IR). However **Commander's Critical Information Requirements (CCIR)** are those pieces of information which are **CRITICAL** to the Comd's decision making – e.g. the information on which he has to base his key decisions. CCIR are therefore key to how the mission is planned and the battle is fought. The staff can recommend to the Comd during planning what they assess as critical, but he must ultimately decide what he considers critical to success. CCIRs are:

Priority Information Requirements (PIR) cover information on the enemy (such as where his bridges are during a river crossing operation so that they can become key targets).

Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR) enable the BG Comd to have a real handle on where the various parts of the BG are what their status is at any stage of the battle.

Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI). What vital capabilities must we conceal from the enemy – our bridges or the location of the BG reserve?

BG staff **MUST** be clear on what critical information requirements the CO is woken up for.

QUESTION 3: What effects do I need to achieve and what direction must I give in order to develop a plan?
(Intent Schematic)

Q3 – WHAT EFFECTS DO I NEED TO ACHIEVE AND WHAT DIRECTION MUST I GIVE IN ORDER TO DEVELOP A PLAN?						
Intent:						
INTENT SCHEMATIC						
	Ser	Effect	Purpose			
	1					
	2					
	3					
	4					
	5					
	6					
	7					
Intelligence & Info	Manoeuvre	Firepower	Protection	CSS	Command	
Main Effort:	Risk:		Potential COA(s):			
Endstate:						

Note: Direction given using either the Functions in Combat or the Principles of the Operation that is to be undertaken.

COMMANDER'S DIRECTION

FACTOR	DIRECTION
<p>ENEMY:</p> <p>Confirm likely en COA(s) to plan against.</p> <p>MSN ANALYSIS:</p> <p>Key deductions.</p> <p>EFFECTS:</p> <p>The effects he wishes to have on the enemy and why.</p> <p>To include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Intent Schematic – including Main Effort Effect and Endstate. <p>DIRECTION TO STAFF:</p> <p>Guidance by Principles of Op or Functions in Combat.</p> <p>COA - guidance on different potential COA or Comd can decide on a single COA now.</p> <p>Risk - He will confirm where he is prepared to take risk.</p> <p>Recce - Initial direction to ISTAR Gp and his own recce.</p> <p>INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS:</p> <p>Confirm his CCIR and any RFI.</p> <p>ISSUE WNG O No 2.</p>	




COA DEVELOPMENT

Example of Graphics	Example of Stages	Potential Planning Procedure
	STAGE 1 An Intent schematic given to the planning team by the Comd post Q3.	1. Comd to Cfm to staff how many COA(s) to plan against. 2. Comd to provide an Intent schematic for the staff. 3. Comd to give direction, based on Msn Analysis, using the Functions in Cbt iot focus the staff. 4. CCIR list created based on Q1 to 3 work. 5. ME identified by Comd. 6. Potential ‘battle winning idea’ given. 7. Under direction of 2IC (COS) the Staff start to record work onto DSO and DSOM, allocating ISTAR to NAIs and identifying triggers (DPs) for TAIs. 8. 2IC (COS) uses a score sheet (guide/outlining the advantages and disadvantages) to weigh up the relative merits of each COA to be planned. Used to issue a backbrief to Comd during 4 -7 development iot to allow the Comd to select one COA to develop. 9. Ser 8 is not necessarily about working up several plans but about providing choice for the Comd. 10. As you develop COA consider how each EFFECT is to be achieved, this will provide the Comd with a choice of options. Remember this is an effects based plan.
	STAGE 2 The DSO starts, working NAIs, TAIs and DPs into each option.	
		</

QUESTION 4: Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?
(DSO – straight onto map)

- STEP 1: Identify ME effect from Comd's direction.
- STEP 2: Based on terrain analysis and understanding of the En COAs, determine best location(s) to have ME effect.
- STEP 3: Marl location(s) on DSO and number TAI01, 02 etc.
- STEP 4: Identify locations where observation required to activate TAls (may have already been identified in Q1 Draft DSO).
- STEP 5: Draw suitable NAI on DSO (area, linear, point).
- STEP 6: Insert DP if required.
- STEP 7: Repeat for each effect.

NAIs / TAIs / DPs

<p>Named Areas of Interest (NAIs) – Confirm or deny enemy COA / Where to look / Acquire and track enemy to trigger an effect.</p> <p>Point NAI Road junction</p> <p>Area NAI Valley floor</p> <p>Linear NAI River</p>	
<p>Target Areas of Interest (TAIs) – Where we intend to have an effect on the enemy.</p> <p>Area TAI Valley floor</p> <p>Point TAI Road junction/bridge</p>	
<p>Decision Point (DP)/Decision Line (DL) – A point/line where a tactical decision is required in order to cue an action/effect, e.g. commit reserve, launch counter-attack</p>	

Named Areas of Interest (NAIs). In order to confirm or deny the enemy's or your own COA, the enemy must be found using the Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets available, such as Fmn or Close Recce, Snipers, MSTAR, TI (MIRA or CR2) etc. To target and focus the ISTAR assets in the BG, they are tasked with watching/clearing NAIs. You may be tasked with covering Bde NAIs within your AO. There are DEFINITION types: **Point, Area and Linear**. These will facilitate the **FIND** function.

Target Areas of Interest (TAIs). TAIs are areas in which the BG Comd intends to have an effect on the enemy and act as focus for planning. Examples of such effects are **DISRUPT, FIX, TURN, BLOCK** and **DEFEAT**. They should be shaped to the ground and named or numbered and should involve CAO planning.

Decision Points (DPs) and Decision Lines (DLs). Points or lines which indicate to the BG Comd that a pre-planned tactical decision is required. However you may have a conceptual DP such as a sub unit's combat effectiveness that acts as a trigger.

When dealing with Bde HQs you should adhere to their numbering policy for NAIs/TAIs unless they are content to change their traces to include any BG nicknames or nicknames. At BG level is far easier to refer to NAIs/TAIs with nicknames.

QUESTION 5: What resources are required to accomplish each action/effect?
(DSOM)

[illegible]

QUESTION 6: When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?
(Synch Matrix)

Scheme of Manoeuvre Schematic:		Intent:												
		SoM:												
		ME:												
M A N O E U V R E	Time													
	Enemy													
	Friendly													
	DPs													

COA COMPARISONS & DEDUCTIONS (Consider schematic for each COA – used by COS and Staff to prepare for Comd's Back Brief)

FUNCTIONS IN COMBAT	COA 1	COA 2	COA 3
Command <i>Will Comd have comms throughout?</i> <i>Is HQ well placed throughout op?</i> <i>Is the plan simple to follow?</i>			
Manoeuvre <i>Does plan make best use of manoeuvre units?</i> <i>Is the reserve adequate & mobile?</i> <i>Will plan fail if no fly?</i>			
Firepower <i>Is the OS plan well defined?</i> <i>Is direct fire put to best use?</i> <i>Is PSYOPS/CIMIC part of the plan?</i>			
Protection <i>Is there an adequate CMob plan?</i> <i>Which plan best achieves surprise/security?</i> <i>Which plan best provides force protection?</i> <i>Is the media ops plan integrated?</i>			
Information & Intelligence <i>Are ISTAR assets put to best use?</i> <i>Are the relative strengths ok?</i> <i>Is the plan flexible if new int?</i> <i>Is the deception plan ok?</i>			
CSS <i>Which plan is logistically more viable?</i> <i>Does the plan ensure med within 1 hr?</i> <i>Are there enough Log resources for success?</i>			

Note: COA comparisons (advantages and disadvantages) can be made using either the functions in combat or the principles of the operation. The questions in italics above represent **examples** of questions that could be asked to evaluate the merits of one COA against another. The questions above are by no means exhaustive.

QUESTION 7: What control measures do I need to impose?

Control Measures (BM, Codewords, PL etc)	Tasks/Constraints/CCIR/Clarification Product/Output

WARGAME:

Ser	Action	Reaction	Counteraction	Forces	Cas	Time	Military Judgement / Conclusion
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)

CCIRS

Items of information that directly affect decision making and inform the successful execution of the plan.

Priority Information Requirements (PIR)	Friendly Force Information Requirements (FFIR)	Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI)
Info about the enemy that the Comd has designated as a priority in decision making.	Info the Comd needs about his own forces for the op.	Aspects of friendly forces that, if known by the en, might compromise the op, so must be protected from enemy detection.


RESTRICTED WARGAMING

1. **Aim.** The aims of wargaming⁴ are to:

- a. Refine the plan (sequencing and co-ordination).
- b. Test the draft plan and staff products (especially the DSO, DSOM and Synch Matrix). Identify any remedial action required.
- c. Identify the need for contingency planning.

by comparing the friendly Course of Action (COA) to the selected enemy (and other protagonists and actors) COA.

2. **Explanatory Notes.** Wargaming can be conducted by box, belt or avenues of approach. It is always run by action, reaction, counter-action sequences, with the side having the initiative moving first.



Avenue. Events are wargamed chronologically along one Avenue of Approach (AA).

Belt. The battlespace is divided into areas (belts) running the width of the AO. Each belt will probably cover several AAs.

Box. Individual events or events occurring in a selected geographical area of the AO (likely to be a TAI, or proposed TAI) are wargamed.

a. The IO or G2 Cell (if appropriate) must play the enemy with doctrinal purity, and must not introduce new COAs or new elements to it (if this happens, it means that Q1 was incorrect).

b. The Influence Offr is to play WHITE and GREEN forces⁵.

c. The Ops Offr must play the plan as constructed. He may also play GREEN forces if they are embedded partners.

d. The tools required and responsibilities for sourcing them are:

⁴ Wargaming is primarily a COA refinement tool but can also be used for COA development, COA comparison, COA revision and mission rehearsal.

⁵ WHITE forces represent civilians. GREEN forces represent indigenous forces.

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- | | |
|---|-------|
| (1) Map (large scale or sketch). | IO |
| (2) Enemy Intent Schematic (same size as map/sketch). | IO |
| (3) Ops Trace and DSO to fit map/sketch.
Offr | ISTAR |
| (4) DSOM.
ISTAR Offr | |
| (5) CO's Intent Schematic.
Ops | |
| (6) Task Org (large).
Ops | |
| (7) Casualty Calculator.
BGLO | |
| (8) Enemy, GREEN, WHITE and Friendly Force map symbols. | IO |

3. **Scribing.** The scribe will usually be the Adjutant (or RSO) who will note down all points on a flip chart including keeping a record of all decisions made⁶. Other individuals should write their own notes as they see fit on the product they own and then amend on completion of the wargame

4. **Wargaming Roles and Script.** Wargaming roles and script are shown in Table 1.

Ser (a)	Pers (b)	Action (c)	Remarks (d)
ROLES & RESPONSIBILITY			
1	CO	Observe and comment throughout, summarise, directs CONPLANS.	
2	BG COS	Directs the wargame by running the turns. Acts as the referee. Tests key 'what ifs?' Summary of outcomes for each turn.	
3	IO	Plays Enemy Forces.	
4	Ops	Plays Friendly Forces (and potentially GREEN Forces).	
5	Influence	Plays white: civilian, NGOs, OGDs etc and GREEN Forces.	Briefed with each turn.
6	SMEs	Input as required at the end of each turn.	Must be disciplined input.
7	Scribes	As listed above.	
PRELIMS			
8	BG COS	RFI and G2 update by exception. Provides Comds' CONOPS. Stipulates the aim of the wargame. Stipulates the method to be used. Stipulates the time segments of each turn. Lists Assumptions. Specifies roles. Maintains tempo. Reminds key points and critical events.	Tasks RFI manager and IO.
9	IO	Enemy Forces Intent, SoM, ME, Endstate (based on selected COA). Enemy str, eqpt, disp, locs,	Using Intent Schematic.

⁶ An example of the Wargame method of recording results can be found on page 29.

RESTRICTED

		laydown, orientation, HVT, res briefed by exception.	
10	Ops	Task Org, Own Intent, SoM, ME, Endstate (GREEN forces (as for Friendly Forces) if not covered by Influence Offr).	Using large Task Org and own Ops Trace/DSO.
Ser (a)	Pers (b)	Action (c)	Remarks (d)
11	Influence	WHITE elements review and general assessment. GREEN Forces (if not covered by Ops Offr).	
12	ISTAR Offr	DSO.	Using overlay.
13	BC	Fireplan.	
14	BGE	Engr plan, CAOL.	
15	BGLO	CSS plan.	Ech locs, Log Sp, Med, ES Pro.
16	RSO	Comms SoM if req.	HQ locs, RRBs, en EW, EMCON.
FOR EACH TURN			
17	IO	En Action.	If En has the initiative
18	Influence	WHITE & GREEN Reaction.	How does this affect the mission?
19	Ops	Friendly Force Reaction. How is it triggered? Outline SoM What is needed?	NAI with troops allocated. TAI and DP, check OpO. TAI observed, trigger and control measures.
20	IO	En Counter-action.	
21	BG COS/ SMEs	SME checks.	Protection – Engrs/AD NKET – Influence Offr Comms still valid? – RSO CSS Sp still valid? – BGLO Other events as per sync matrix – Ops Offr Comd arrangements – CO Casualties – BG COS
22	BG COS	Any CONPLANs required?	Identify now or CO directs at the end of the wargaming. IO may be asked what Enemy Forces MDCOA is for each turn. Ops may be asked what his response to this would be.
23	CO	Comments / Worst Friction within turn.	Directs staff on mitigation required.
24	BG COS/ Ops	Summarises turn, actions resulting and RFIs required.	Scribe assists.
AFTER FINAL TURN – SUMMARY			
25	Adjt	Summarises flip chart points.	
26	ISTAR Offr	Are all DPs observed and triggered? Are the DSO and DSOM fit for purpose?	
27	BG COS	Are all res planning options inserted into OpO?	
28	CO	Summarise and direct CONPLANs.	

Table 1: Wargaming Roles and Script

5. **Admin Kit Required.** The Ops WO is to ensure that the wargaming kit listed below is available and ready to be used:

- a. A magnetic white board.
- b. White board colour marker pens – red, blue, green and black minimum.
- c. Magnetic EF, GREEN, WHITE and FF markers.
- d. Acetate for overlays.
- e. Large fablone paper for sketch.

6. **Outputs.** The outputs are as follows:

- a. Refined Task Org.
- b. Refined Synch Matrix.
- c. Refined DPs.
- d. Refined Control Measures.
- e. CONPLANs identified.
- f. OpO, Annexes and Sp OpOs.
- g. Refined DSO and DSOM.
- h. MovO, load plans etc.

RESTRICTED

STRUCTURE OF MISSIONS AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Mission

A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.

A mission is expressed as a task, or tasks, with a unifying purpose. Where possible a mission should be expressed using defined doctrinal terms which reflect an operation of war, in order to confer consistency and avoid possible misunderstandings. At the lower tactical levels the phrasing of a mission statement should reflect the character of the recipient audience and should make use of aggressive terminology which reflects the ultimate requirement to close and kill the enemy. A mission at whatever level is taken as verbatim for the next superior comd's orders and should be given unmodified.

Concept of Operations

A clear and concise statement of the line of action chosen by a commander in order to accomplish his mission.

The Concept of Operations represents the most important element of orders after the Mission. In it, the commander expresses his Intent (what is to be achieved and why), his Scheme of Manoeuvre (where, when and with whom he intends to conduct his selected course of action in order to accomplish his mission) and the Main Effort.

Commander's Intent

A concise expression of the purpose of the campaign or operation, the desired results and how operations will progress towards achieving the desired end-state. At the tactical level, the Commander's Intent should be focused on the effect that he wishes to achieve on the enemy.

The intent tells the subordinate exactly what effects his commander is trying to achieve and why. It is derived from the Mission Analysis and Intent Schematic. It is a succinct summary of the effects he intends to achieve over the enemy and the environment related in time and space, and why. The sum of the Sub Unit Msns & Tasks should equal the intent.

Scheme of Manoeuvre

A short general description of the manoeuvre of subordinates in space and time. (*New*)

The SoM allows the Comd to explain how he sees the battle developing. He should describe what the subunits will do and how regrouping will take place. The advantage of this system is that it allows the subordinate comd receiving the orders to get an over-view of the operation and recognise his part in the operation in relation to the other sub units.

Main Effort

A concentration of forces or means, in a particular area, where a commander seeks to bring about a decision.

It is usually expressed as a single activity or task (emphasising the assessed critical activity against the enemy and time), to which a sub-unit is applied. Bottom line is that it is mandatory for the subordinate comd to support his comd's ME.

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FORMULATING MISSION STATEMENTS AND CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

A mission statement is a **direct order** to a subordinate. In formulating missions, the commander should allocate each subordinate a task or tasks together with a **unifying purpose**. One task will be the commander's main effort. Resources should be allocated such that every task is achievable. All subordinates, but particularly the subordinate on the main effort, should only be given one task wherever possible. The exception is the **mission of a reserve**, which may be given a series of contingent tasks with **no stated unifying purpose**, as in:

'Reserve. **Be prepared to...**
a.
b. (etc)'

Tasks contained in mission statements should be **substantive**. Lesser tasks, such as conducting preliminary moves or establishing liaison, should not normally be considered as tasks which form part of mission statements. They should be contained elsewhere in the orders, typically as coordinating instructions. To include them in mission statements normally detracts from the clarity and simplicity of the plan.

Tasks and purposes should both be expressed in terms of **action verbs** whose **success is measurable**. Thus 'to attack' is not a good task; 'to seize' is better since its success is measurable. The task of 'to attack to seize' may be less good because it directs the subordinate how he is to achieve his task – in this case, by attacking. Possible alternatives, such as infiltration or a turning movement, are excluded.

Occasionally it may not be possible to express a purpose with such precision. It may be necessary to use a more generic purposive verb such as one of the core functions. However, relatively vague terms such as 'to shape' or 'to set the conditions for' should be avoided. Greater precision, such as an explanation of what shaping is required, or what the relevant conditions are, should generally be used. For clarity, the statement of purpose should normally be separated from the task by the words 'in order to'.

The total list of tasks assigned to subordinates should be sufficient and necessary. They should be sufficient, in that together they fulfil the whole of the commander's mission. They should be necessary, in that activities which are not required to fulfil his mission should be excluded.

The **purposes** of all subordinates' missions, when read together, should **form a common thread** which fulfils the commander's mission in an obvious manner. That thread should clearly reflect the logic of the intent statement. Listing missions in the order suggested by the logic of the plan may be more useful than listing them by subordinates' precedence in the Army List.

Commanders should express their intentions clearly and succinctly. This includes the wording of the concept of operations and mission statements. They should be **clear, concise, and unambiguous** when taken as a whole. Repetition should be avoided and the minor conventions of staff duties **are to be broken** if doing so adds clarity. If there is repetition between the concept of operations and mission statements, the former may be reduced, whilst the latter may not; since mission statements are effectively orders. The concept of operations should be reduced if that removes duplication and adds clarity. If, when pruned, a concept of operations runs to more than a few sentences the underlying plan is probably too complex and will not succeed. Overall, both the concept of operations and the mission statements should be **succinct** and clear.

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Since ‘**what the commander is to achieve**’ is given in the mission assigned to him, the objective (or end-state) is also given. It will occur when that mission, as foreseen at the time of assigning it, is achieved. It is therefore explicit in the commander’s mission and should neither require undue emphasis nor clarification. Research has shown that **expressing an end state in tactical concepts of operations**, although well intended, has generally contributed to rather than reduced confusion on the part of subordinates. It **should be avoided**. Effort should instead be directed to ensuring that the mission given by the superior commander clearly indicates what is to be achieved. If the mission is not clear in terms of what is to be achieved, the superior commander should be asked to reconsider it.

Commanders should give orders that cover the achievement of the whole operation; that is, the achievement of the entire assigned mission. Some aspects may not be fully foreseeable in advance; it is legitimate to state in orders that details will follow in due course. The situation may change between giving the order and its execution or during it. In such circumstances the commander should review his mission and, if appropriate, give new orders. The existence of that possibility does not excuse subordinates writing their own objective or end-state.

In reviewing missions and tasks, the tasks ascribed to a subordinate may be found to have no single common purpose. In those circumstances the plan is flawed. The flaw will often lie in the selection of tasks or their allocation between subordinates (and hence, possibly, the task organization). Alternatively, the commander has not generated a clear view of how he wishes the operation to proceed: his intent is not clear. In that case he should revise his estimate.

RESTRICTED EFFECTS TERMS

Commanders have a responsibility to ensure that subordinates understand what is meant when an effect term is used. An effect is described as a *'consequence'* or *'outcome of and action'*. An effect should describe the changed circumstances of a target group (enemy/population), or the environment.

BLOCK. Deny enemy access to a given area or to prevent his advance in a particular direction.	DIVERT. Draw attention and forces from the point of the principle operation.
SEIZE. To gain possession of a position or terrain, with or without the use of force.	EMPOWER. Promote confidence or authority in.
CLEAR. To remove all lethal adversaries, and their infrastructure, from an assigned area and prevent their return.	EXPLOIT. Take full advantage of success in battle and follow up initial gain. Or to take advantage of another individual or target group(s) weakness or vulnerabilities.
COERCE. To control an unwilling individual or target group(s) behaviour through the use of force or the threat of the use of force.	FIND. Locate, identify and understand.
CONTAIN. Stop, hold or surround enemy forces or to cause the enemy to centre his activity on a given front and to prevent his withdrawing any part of his force for use elsewhere.	FIX. To deny the enemy his goals, to distract him and thus deprive him of freedom of action in order to gain own forces freedom of action.
CONVINCE. To make an audience feel certain that something is true.	HOLD. To maintain possession by direct or indirect means.
DECEIVE. Mislead the individual or target group(s) by manipulation, distortion or falsification of evidence to induce him to react in a manner prejudicial to his interests.	INTERDICT. Divert, disrupt, delay or destroy the enemy's military potential before it can be used effectively against friendly forces; or fire placed in an area or point to prevent the enemy using it.
DEFEAT. To diminish the effectiveness of the enemy to the extent that he is unable to participate further in the battle or at least cannot fulfil his mission.	ISOLATE. To seal off and deny freedom of movement and/or isolation.
DELAY. Slow and enemy's momentum without in principle becoming decisively engaged.	NEUTRALISE. To render ineffective.
DENY. To prevent access by blocking, disruption, dislocation and / or fire. Ground can be denied either by holding it or covering the area by direct or indirect fire. To deny without holding requires surveillance.	PREVENT. Monitor/ID causes of conflict and act to prevent occurrence, escalation or resumption of hostilities.
DESTROY. To kill or so damage an enemy force that it is rendered useless.	REASSURE. To reduce anxiety or worry among an audience.
DETER. Convince an individual or target group(s) that the consequences of its actions outweigh the potential gains.	SECURE. To gain possession of by direct or indirect means and to seek to retain. This may be protecting an individual or target group(s) from danger of threat.
DEVELOP. To advance capability and competence.	STABILISE. Impose security and control over an area while employing military capabilities to restore services and support civilian agencies.
DISLOCATE. To deny another party the ability to bring his strengths to bear, or to persuade that his strength is irrelevant.	SUPPORT. Aid, complement or sustain any other force, organisation or individual.
DISRUPT. Shatter the cohesion of an individual or target group(s) and prevent it from functioning correctly.	

RESTRICTED MISSION VERBS

Missions, tactical activities and tasks are carried out in order to achieve effects. An effect can be used in a mission statement, but a mission verb cannot be used to describe an effect.


Advance	Offensive operation designed to gain or re-establish contact with the enemy.
Assault	Climax of an attack; closing with enemy in hand to hand fighting. Short, violent attack, but well-ordered, against local objective.
Attack	Deliberate or hasty: types of offensive action characterised by employment of firepower and manoeuvre to close with and destroy or capture the enemy.
Breach	Deliberate or hasty: create a lane through a minefield or a clear route through a barrier or fortification.
Break Out	Continuation of a crossing operation once the force has consolidated in the bridge head; or offensive action by an encircled force to link-up with a main force.
Build-up	Attain prescribed strength of units and prescribed levels of vehicles, equipment, stores and supplies.
Bypass	Manoeuvre around an obstacle, position or enemy force to maintain the momentum of advance.
Capture	Synonymous with seize.
Convince	To make an audience certain that something is true.
Counter Attack	Attack by a part or all of a defending force for such specific purposes as regaining ground lost or cutting off or destroying enemy advance units, and with the general objective of denying to the enemy the attainment of his purpose in attacking.
Cover	Protect by offence, defence, or threat of either or both.
Cross	Deliberate or hasty: cross obstacle.
Defend	To defeat or deter a threat to provide circumstances for offensive action. Depending on what size of formation/unit is defending, defence can include delay, hold, deny and attack.
Delay	Operation in which a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down enemy's momentum and inflicting max damage, without in principle, becoming decisively engaged.
Deliver	To set free.
Demonstrate	Attack or show of force on a front where a decision is not sought, made with the aim of deceiving the enemy. To distract the enemy's attention without seeking contact.
Deploy	Move forces within areas of operation; position forces into a formation for battle, relocate forces to desired areas of operations.
Detain	Capture and hold person temporarily including the right to search.
Detect	Discover by any means the presence of a person, object or phenomenon of potential military significance.
Disengage	Break contact with the enemy in a delay or withdrawal.
Encircle	Surround and isolate form lines of communication resulting in loss of freedom of manoeuvre.
Envelop	Pass around or over the enemy's principle defensive positions.
Escort	Accompany and protect another force or convoy.
Exfiltrate	Withdrawal as individuals, small groups or units over, through or around enemy positions while attempting to avoid contact.
Extract	Recover reconnaissance, stay-behind or encircled forces of contact with the enemy.
Feint	Distract the enemy through seeking contact but avoiding decisive engagement by the bulk of own forces.
Frighten	To force or drive somebody or something away through fear.
Guard	To protect a force by fighting to gain time, while also observing and reporting information.
Hand-over	Pass responsibility for the conduct of combat from one force to another.

MISSION VERBS (contd)

Harass	Fire designed to disturb the rest of enemy troops, limit movement and, by threat of losses, lower morale.
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
Identify	Determine by any act or means the friendly or hostile nature of a detected person, object or phenomenon.
Induce	To persuade or cause an audience to believe as true.
Infiltrate	Move as individuals or groups over, through or around enemy positions without detection.
Inform	To communicate information to an audience.
Insert	Deploy reconnaissance or stay-behind or raiding forces out of contact with the enemy.
Intercept	Search for and listen to and/or record communications and/or electronic.
Liaise	Maintain contact or intercommunication between elements of military forces to ensure mutual understanding and unity or purpose and action.
Link-up	Establishment of contact, in enemy controlled territory, between 2 or more friendly units or formations which have the same or differing missions.
Manoeuvre	Employ forces on the battlefield (using) movement in combination with fire or fire potential to achieve a position of advantage in respect to the enemy in order to accomplish the mission.
Mark	Call for fire on a specific location to orient the observer/spotter or to indicate targets.
Mask	Fire to obscure enemy observation.
Mentor	Develop capacity through example and/or advice through planning and preparation, execution and lessons captured/AAR phases.
Occupy	Move into and proper organisation of an area to be used as a battle position.
Passage of Lines	Move forward or rearward through another force's combat positions with the intention of moving onto or out of contact with the enemy.
Penetrate	Break through the enemy's defence and disrupt his defensive systems.
Permit	Give permission or consent.
Persuade	(see convince)
Pursue	Catch or cut off a hostile force attempting to escape, with the aim of destroying it.
Reconstitute	Expand force structures and infra-structure beyond existing levels, including the raising of new units and formations and the expansion of industrial capacity to support the procurement of equipment and stocks.
Rehabilitate	Process, usually in a relatively quiet area, of units and individuals recently withdrawn from combat or arduous duty, during which units recondition equipment and are rested, furnished special facilities, filled up with replacements, issued replacement supplies and equipment, given training, and generally made ready for employment in future operations.
Reinforce	Supplement in place forces.
Relieve	Replace all or part of a unit in an area.
Re-supply	Maintain required levels of supply.
Retire	To move away from the enemy when out of contact (Taken from 'retirement').
Scout	Task of actively seeking info on the en, ground and other relevant detail in support of the comd's plan.
Screen	Observe, identify and report; only fight in self-protection (also an indirect fire effect).
Suppress	Fire to inhibit the enemy's ability to acquire and attack friendly targets.
Target	To make the object of an operation
Withdraw	Disengage from the enemy when in contact with the enemy (taken from 'withdrawal operations').



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COMBAT ESTIMATE - AIDE MEMOIRE

Question	Answer/Deduction/Task
1. What are the enemy doing and why?	
2. What have I been told to do and why?	
3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy and what direction must I give to develop my plan?	
4. Where (and how) can I best accomplish each action/effect?	
5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?	
6. When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?	
7. What control measures do I need to impose?	



COMBAT ESTIMATE AIDE MEMOIRE – NOTES

Q1 - IPE

How does the ground affect enemy operations?

Routes/Axes Objectives/Killing Areas
Dominating Ground Key Terrain/Vital Ground

Going/
visibility Obstacles

What are the enemy's capabilities?

Tactics /Doctrine Weapons & Eqpt
Obstacles DFs
Air/helicopter threat NBC capability
Morale Strs and weaknesses

Key vulnerabilities

What are the enemy's intentions in my area?

Most likely COA (Plan for)

Most dangerous COA (Prep contingencies for)

*See Figure1 below

Q2 – Msn Analysis

1. What is my superior commander's intent and what is my part in his plan?

2. What tasks are specified and what tasks are implied?

3. What constraints are imposed u
on me?

4. Has the situation changed?

Q3

An effect is something you need to achieve on the enemy in order to be successful.

Given a mission to destroy an enemy, an example of an effect at platoon level might be to **blind** him if he occupies a dominant position with good observation. Some other common effects might be to **assault, protect, suppress** and **neutralise**.

Avoid using effects terms that are too general and ensure they are achievable by realistically available resources.

Block	Disrupt	Turn	Deny
Screen	Stop	Lure	Pursue
Cut-off	Push	Clear	Secure
Fix	Isolate	Strike	Seize
Blind	Unhinge	Surprise	Deceive
Neutralise	Suppress	Protect	Feint
Dislocate	Defeat	Defend	Draw
Destroy	Etc		

Identify Main Effort

Q4

Each effect should be considered in turn (in priority order) to determine where and how it can best be achieved. All aspects of each effect must be considered so that a plan/s is/are produced for each.

Q5

Allocate troops and resources to each of the selected effects / tasks - Incl Res

Confirm Task Org

Assign Missions to subordinates

Q6


Co-ordinate the actions of all manoeuvre, direct and indirect fire sp in time and space. Consider:

- Prelim ops
- All mov timings
- Direct and indirect fireplan
- Other friendly force actions

Use timeline

Q7

FSCM (Anti-fratricide measures)
Orders / signals for switching fire
Boundaries
Report Lines
LOE
Etc

FIGURE1 - INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

<p><u>Ground Orientation</u> (Adv/Attack) <u>Gr of current loc, dir of North and Axis.</u></p> <p>Point out 3 or 4 ref pts on ground giving GRs, Range and Bearing to each:</p> <p>Broad description of op in relation to ref pts: (going, cover, obstacles, key terrain). Use L, M, R.</p> <p><u>En – Locs, obs, DFs, likely intentions.</u></p> <p><u>Own Tps – Obj, bdys, FUP, LD, axis, bounds, report lines, posn of friendly forces.</u></p>	<p><u>Ground Orientation</u> (Def/Wdr/Delay) <u>Gr of current loc, dir of North and Axis.</u></p> <p>Point out 3 or 4 ref pts on ground giving GRs, Range and Bearing to each:</p> <p>Broad description of op in relation to ref pts: (going, cover, obstacles, key terrain). Use L, M, R – Near, Middle Far.</p> <p><u>En – Axis, approaches, timings, likely intentions.</u></p> <p><u>Own Tps – Bdrys, locs, KA, obs plan, OPs, DFs, FPF.</u></p>
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SECTION 6**BATTLE PROCEDURE**

The aim of battle procedure is:

To ensure that a soldier is sent into battle without waste of time and with the minimum fuss, knowing exactly what he has to do, how he is going to do it and what fire support he is going to be given.


Good battle procedure ensures that a commander commits his force to battle with the maximum preparation having taken place in the minimum time.

Good battle procedure is achieved by observing the following principles:

- a. Anticipation. Commanders at all levels must think and plan ahead beyond their immediate tasks.
- b. Efficient Drills. Well practiced drills based on good SOPs for movement make quick reaction possible.
- c. Concurrent Activity. Concurrent activity must happen at all levels and should be initiated by a Warning Order. It ensures that the best use of time is made and that soldiers start the battle rested and as fresh as possible.
- d. A Thorough Knowledge of the Grouping System. Everyone in a company and platoon must know who is involved in the reconnaissance of future tasks and who will receive the orders for them (R Groups, O Groups).

Battle Procedure relies on the efficient passage of information in a timely manner. Key to achieving this is the issue of complete Warning Orders sent in accordance with a logical and well-known format. A Warning Order containing the correct information will allow commanders at all levels to operate Mission Command allowing their subordinates to anticipate and use their initiative. Such Warning Orders are then followed by Orders, again utilizing a format, which allow subordinate commanders to conduct their estimates and produce plans and orders supporting the Commanders' intent and most specifically the defined Main Effort.

Commanders at all levels must allow sufficient time for their orders to be received and acted upon by subordinates. The 1/3:2/3 rule should be applied to all aspects of Battle procedure.



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WARNING ORDER (SPOTOCA)

Situation – (incl comds intent 1 & 2 levels up, ground & enemy)

Probable Mission – (probable mission and probable missions for subordinates)

Own Main Effort – (if known/applicable)

Timings – (particularly earliest H Hr, NTM, NMB)

O Gp – (RV and time)

CSS – (essential matters/changes to SOPs only)

Acknowledgement –

Additional

Orders for prelim ops, recce, regrouping or moves. ISTAR/STAP tasking?

Assembly area details.


Movement of advance and harbour parties.

Liaison requirements.

Limitations on recce, movement and use of transport, including helicopters.

CSS additional service support, replenishments, rest, repair and recovery, move of echelon.

Command and Signal special instructions, establish rebros, mov of HQs.



SECTION 7

THE ORDERS PROCESS (REREPI)

A commander has to:

- a. **Receive** orders himself.
- b. **Extract** from them the details that are relevant to his own command.
- c. **Reconnaissance** if possible to further assist in conducting an Estimate.
- d. Complete an **Estimate** and make a plan.
- e. **Prepare** orders for his own subordinates.
- f. **Issue** orders to his subordinates.

Receiving Orders

Before receiving orders a commander should:

- a. Study the Wng O from his superior HQ.
- b. Complete his time and mission analyses and a map study.
- c. Issue own Wng O.
- d. Arrive early at his superior's O group to study traces, air photographs and models of the ground, and to mark his own maps.

He must take with him to the O group:

- a. Map.
- b. Notebook (prepared with standard orders headings for the forthcoming operation), pencil and chinagraph.
- c. Aide Memoires.
- d. Binoculars and compass.
- e. Torch (if applicable).
- f. Communications — radio and/or a runner. It is recommended that the signaler accompanies the commander so that he can be given the comms plan.

While receiving orders, as much detail as possible should be marked directly onto the map and notes taken only on matters affecting the commander's own subunit. The remainder of the orders must be listened to carefully and understood.

ORDERS

DO

- Make your orders concise, clear and simple.
- Consider use of aids (model, op overlay, photos etc.)
- Give a clear and thorough description of your **Intent**.

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- Explain the **Mission** and **Concept of Operations** of your immediate commander.
- Give subordinates their **Mission** (or tasks and a single unifying purpose), and not just a list of tasks.

DO NOT

- Try to give detailed instructions covering every possible contingency.
- Read orders from a prepared script.
- Use complex terminology or language to impress.

Preliminaries

Security of Orders Group: Location; Sentries; Actions on Attack

Administration: Introduction of attached personnel; Seating Plan (take account of Task Org); Model and/or diagrams; Map folds/traces/map marking.

Weather; Time of First/Last Light; Forecast; Moon State; Visibility

Task Organization

Ground: Describe model (or sketch), relate to the Ground, give orientation brief.

Note: In all Orders, paragraph headings are mandatory, but the contents are not. There is no need to use all headings in every box.

ORDERS FORMAT

PRELIMINARIES

- | | | | |
|----|---------------------------|----|------------------------------|
| a. | Sy of O Gp | - | Loc |
| | | - | Sentries |
| | | - | Action on Attack |
| b. | Admin | - | Intro of att pers (Ops Offr) |
| | | - | Seating Plan |
| | | - | Model |
| | | a. | Map folds |
| c. | Task Org (Ops) | | |
| d. | Ground Orientation (Engr) | | |
| e. | Weather- | | Climate |
| | | - | Rainfall |
| | | - | Visibility |
| | | - | Wind velocity |

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- Sunrise
- Sunset
- Temperatures
- First light
- Last light
- Moon rise
- Moon set
- Tides

2. **SITUATION**

a. **Enemy Forces** (Int)

- (1) Locations and strengths:
- (2) Weapons:
- (3) Equipment:
- (4) Morale:
- (5) Obstacles:
- (6) DFs:
- (7) Air threat:
- (8) NBC:
- (9) Recent en activity:
- (10) Likely intentions:

b. **Friendly Forces** (Ops)

- (1) 2 Up Comd's Intent:

- (2) 1 Up Comd's Mission and Concept of Ops (Intent, SOM and ME)

(a) Mission:

(b) Concept of ops:

- i. Intent:
- ii. SOM:
- iii. ME:

- (3) Locs and future actions of neighbouring forces which may affect the op:

- (4) Outline fire support plan:

- (5) Air:

c. **Local Forces/Civs/Refugees/Evacuees**

d.

3. **MISSION** (Comd)

Unit is to in order to

4. **EXECUTION**

a. **Concept of Ops**

- (1) Comd's intent:
- (2) Scheme of manoeuvre:
- (3) Main effort:
- (4) Key timings:

b. **Sub-Unit Missions + Tasks**

(1) **Mission:**

- (a)
- (b)
- (c)
- (d)

in order to

(2) **Mission:**

- (a)
- (b)
- (c)
- (d)

in order to

(3) **Mission:**

- (a)
- (b)
- (c)
- (d)

in order to

(4) **Indirect Fire Support:**

(a) **Mortar Mission:**
.....in order to

- (i) ME and priorities:
ME:
No 2 Pri:
No 3 Pri:

- (ii) Locs of mortar lines:

(5) **Anti-Tank:**

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(a) Tasking: KAs, flanks, res, tgt priorities

(b) Reorg:

(6) **Air Defence:**

(a) Tasks: Tgt areas, tgt priorities, flanks, OPs, res

(b) Reorg:

(7) **Engr Tasks Priorities:** Bridge dems, bridge construction, route maintenance, route denial, obs/minefields, field defences, plant for digging, obs clearance/crossing, boats, water, construction

(8) **Comms:** ESM and ECM

(9) **Avn/SH:**

a. Alloc of a/c, time:

b. Task priorities: Recce, obs, CASEVAC, tp mov, stores mov, AOP, FAC.

(10) **MP Tasks:** Refugees, stragglers, evacuees.

(11) **Other Agencies:** LOs, civil police, civil authorities, dog handlers.

c. **Co-ordinating Instructions:** (Ops)

(1) Timings: Recce, prep, posn complete, no rear mov, ptls in, posn denied, clear by, H Hr, L Hr, brakes off, land seized by.

(2) Staging areas, concentration areas, hides, assy areas:

(3) Restrictions on recce, restrictions on mov, guides, recce, har parties:

(4) Mov (road/foot), routes, traffic control, OOM, RVs, check points, embussing/disembarkation points:

(5) Air mov plan, a/c allocation, chawks, loading/rigging teams, marshalling teams, layout/markings:

(6) Boundaries, co-ord points, report lines:

(7) FUP, LD, axes, objs, rate of adv, dir, bypassing policy, reorg, LOE:

(8) Handover line, demolition/obs plan, def stores, pri of work, counter-attk plan:

(9) Anti-armr plan, fire plan, AD plan, surv plan (recce, PHS, OPs), counter-surv plan (EMCON, SOP), concealment/OPSEC, deception plan, NBC def measures:

(10) Boat crews, alloc of boats, boat off-loading point, check point, waiting areas, asslt crossing sites, bridgehead:

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(11) PWs, refugees/civpop, HNS:

(12) P Info:

5. **CSS** (Log):

- a. **SOP Variations**: Dress, eqpt, wpns
- b. **CSups**: Replen plan, ammo, rats, POL, water, IPE, CAD
- c. **Med**: Locs, CASEVAC
- d. **Ech and Rec**: Locs of echelons and rec vehs

6. **COMMAND AND SIGNAL** (Sig):

- a. **Locs of HQs**: Tac, Main, SU, Alt, Bde, Bde RV
- b. **Alt Comd/HQ**:
- c. **Liaison**:
- d. **CEI**:
- e. **EMCON**:
- f. **Codewords**: Ser, codeword, meaning, issued by
- g. **Nicknames and Passwords**:
- h. **Light and Whistle Sigs**:

7. **TIME CHECK** (Gunner Time):

8. **QUESTIONS** (Comd):

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**ALLOCATION OF ORAL ORDERS –
RESPONSIBILITIES AT BATTLEGROUP LEVEL**

Ser (a)	Event (b)	Responsibility (c)	Aids to be used (d)
1	Introduction	CO	
2	Prelims: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sy of O Gp • Actions on • Weather • Task Org (of BG for Op) 	Ops Offr RSM MAOT/BGE Ops Offr	Traffic light effect on equip and capability.
3	Environment: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ground • Human terrain and infra 	BGE Influence Offr	
4	Situation: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • En Forces • Fr Forces (2 & 1 Up) 	IO Ops Offr	EF COA schematics HVTL, HPTL. Other aids as required. FF schematic.
5	Mission	CO	
6	Execution:		
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Concept of Ops Intent Scheme of Manoeuvre Main Effort • Msn/Tasks • OS • ENGR • INFLUENCE • ISTAR (incl: DSO & DSOM) <p>Co-ord Instrs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timings/Mov/Sync • Media • ROE • LOE, IFF, BYPASS, Control Measures • Recce Restrictions • Actions on • OPSEC <p>Summary of Execution</p>	<p>CO</p> <p>CO BC OC ENGR Influence Offr OC ISTAR</p> <p>Ops Offr Media Offr Ops Offr/LEGAD Ops Offr Ops Offr Ops Offr Ops Offr</p> <p>CO</p>	<p>CO's Intent schematic SoM schematic as req.</p> <p>Focus on what sub units need to know. Do not re-hash 'concept of ops' for the sake of it.</p> <p>As required.</p> <p>(May be done at the end of O Gp – CO's preference.</p>
7	CSS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • SOP variations • Supply • Med • Maint & recovery 	BGLO BGLO BGLO/Med LO BGLO	
8	COMD & SIG <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Comms Plan and CEI • Command and Control 	RSO COS	
9	Time	BC	
10	Questions		

SECTION 8

THE OPERATIONS OF WAR

Military Operations can be grouped under, Offensive Actions, Defensive Actions, and Enabling actions.

OFFENSIVE ACTIONS**Purpose:**

The purpose of offensive actions is to defeat the enemy by imposing our will on him by the application of focused violence. It is the decisive operation of war.

Principles of Offensive Actions

Intelligence	Surprise	Concentration of Combat Power
Security	Manoeuvre	Maintenance of Momentum
Deception	Use of Terrain	

Types of Offensive Actions

Reconnaissance in Force: The purpose of reconnaissance in force is to compel the enemy to disclose the location, size, strength, disposition or possibly the intention of his force by making him respond to offensive action.

Feint and Demonstration: The purpose of a feint is to distract the **action** of an enemy force by seeking combat with it. By contrast, the purpose of a demonstration is to distract the enemy's **attention**, without seeking contact.

Counter Attack and Spoiling Attack; The purpose of a counter attack is to defeat an enemy made vulnerable by his own offensive action. The spoiling attack is similarly directed at enemy offensive actions but with the limited aim of disruption.

Raid: The purpose of a raid is to destroy or capture a vital enemy asset. Its wider purpose is to disrupt the enemy.

Ambush: An Ambush is a surprise attack launched on a moving or temporally halted enemy. The purpose of a raid is to destroy an enemy or prevent is from using particular routes or areas, thereby dominating that area.

Deliberate Attack: The purpose of the deliberate attack is to defeat the enemy, with the emphasis on massing combat power at the expense of time. (Surprise-Maintenance of Momentum-Security)

Hasty Attack:The purpose of the hasty attack is to defeat the enemy, trading mass for time, in order to seize fleeting opportunities. Other factors being equal, it is preferred to the deliberate attack. (Surprise-Concentration of Fire-Simplicity)

SECTION 8A

THE DELIBERATE ATTACK**INTRODUCTION**

One of the primary tactical roles of the infantry is to seize and hold ground. Whatever the method of approach to an objective, it will, finally only be seized and held by infantry action on foot.. The infantry on foot, break into the objective, fight through it by fire and movement, reorgize on or near it. An assault phase by a dismounted action tactics common to all types of infantry and the basis lies in the principles, mechanics and tactics of the deliberate attack. Other types of attack are variations of this,

This presis therefore will deal in details with a deliberate Attack.

Types of Attack

In General there are two types of attack. These are:

- a. **Deliberate Attack.** A Deliberate Attack is one which is mounted against well organised defences. It involves careful and detailed planning and preparation with full co-ordination of all available resources. A deliberate attack normally allows time for reconnaissance down to section level. Assaulting troops may have little room for manoeuvre but this disadvantage will be compensated for by the weight of fire support available from armour, indirect fire weapons, other battle groups, aircraft and sometimes ships.
- b. **Hasty/Quick Attack.** A quick attack is one which is mounted as swiftly as is possible in order to take full advantage of an unprepared , or disorganised, enemy defence. It may be undertaken at battle group or any lesser level and it is part of the tactics of advance. Risk must be accepted and some decentralization is necessary. Speed will be obtained by having a well established battle procedure and a simple, though not necessarily frontal, plan of attack. The need for speed may reduce the time available fro reconnaissance.

Night Attack. Despite the introduction of night fighting and driving aids in many Armies, night operations still offer great advantages to well-trained, determined troops, to deceive, confuse and destroy an enemy. The principles and tactics used in daylight apply equally at night though particular arrangements must be made for control and neutralizing enemy night fighting aids.

PRINCIPLES OF DELIBERATE ATTACK

There are three essential principle in planning and executing an attack; these are the achievement of surprise, the maintenance of Momentum, and the provision of the maximum security for the assault combat teams.

SURPRISE

Though a defender has usually chosen the general area of operation and has the advantage of detailed knowledge of the ground, an attacker has the initiative in selecting the time and direction of assault. The attacker will choose these to his maximum advantage in order to surprise the defender and may supplement his choices by deceptive measures. Surprise is best achieved through:

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a. **Timings.** At battle group and combat team levels, the timings of the assault will often depend on a higher formation requirement. However, in selecting the timings, any or all of the following will be considered to ensure the most advantageous conditions:

(1). **Visibility.** Weather in a day or night Attack,, the state of the moon, position of the sun in relation to the direction the enemy is facing, early morning mist, harmattan wind etc are important considerations.

(2). **State of the Enemy.** A weak and disorganised enemy must be attacked as quickly as possible. Enemy strength in prepared positions, with obstacles, mines and well-placed reserves, will require the maximum of thorough preparations and reconnaissance.

(3). **Co-ordination with Assault by Other Troops.** This may mean co-ordinating the assault timings with flanking battle groups, combat teams or with infiltrated troops, though this does not necessarily mean concurrent assault, often there is advantage in staggered H Hour to deceive and distract the enemy.

b. **Direction Of Assault.** Every effort should be made to avoid challenging an enemies strongest point: that is usually, by frontal assault. An attack from a less obvious direction is generally more effective, but at battle Group level is often difficult to achieve because of the danger of enfilade fire from the defenders mutually supporting positions. It is at the point of assault that the attacker will concentrate a superiority of force sufficient to overcome the defender. The greater the surprise in timings and direction of assault, the more effective this concentration of force is likely to be.

c. **Deception.** It will often be difficult to conceal that an attack is to take place and, in any event the enemy will be expecting it. Deception measures should therefore be aimed at concealing the timings and direction of assault. Possible means of achieving this may be deceptive noise, movement and illumination patterns, by patrol action or diversionary attacks. (The latter is rarely possible within a battle group resources) and by the use of infiltrated troops acting in concert with the timing of the main assault.

MAINTENANCE OF MOMENTUM

Momentum is essential in order to retain the initiative. To prevent an enemy from sealing-off any initial penetration and to prevent him from mounting a counter-attack. In a dismounted attack, momentum may be achieved by:

a. **Organizing the attack in Depth.** This involves planning sufficient phases to cover both the subsidiary and main objectives of the assault and the allocation of assault troops with well positioned reserves to each phase. It is then necessary to launch each assault phase as quickly as possible after the success of its predecessor whilst, at the same time, always being prepared to employ the reserves to deal with the unexpected.

b. **Use of maximum fire Support.** This is required to reduce interference with the mounting of the attack, to give assaulting combat team greater security during movement, and to ensure objectives once taken are secure. Fire support will include all weapons available to the CO and , whenever possible, close air support and the use of other Battle Groups. It should be continuous and diverse as ammunition supply will allow.

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c. **Impetus of the Attack.** Concomitant with the use of maximum fire support is the principle that forward movement must not be allowed to lose its impetus. The assaulting infantry must keep close to the supporting fire and, and when safe distances preclude further indirect fire support, fire from intimate armoured vehicles must cover the final approach to the objectives and the subsequent fight through.

Rapid Reorganization. Once the objective is secured, reorganization must be rapid in order that immediate enemy counter-attack may be dealt with effectively. The key to this reorganization will normally devolve on the Anti-tank weapons. Speed of reorganization is essential to the maintenance of the momentum of an attack. An attack is not complete until reorganization is complete.

SECURITY

It is essential to ensure that the area of an attack is as protected as possible in order that assaulting troops are put to the minimum risk. This involves isolating the area of operations as roughly as is possible in order to reduce outside interference. The necessary measures are:

- a. **The Line of departure must be secured.** Enemy interference at the beginning of an attack would have the maximum disruptive effect. To avoid this, the Line of Departure will always be secured and this may be achieved by:
 - (1) Assaulting through another battle group's FEBA.
 - (2) The battle group Securing its own start line even though this may require a special operation for this purpose
- b. **The flanks of the Attack Must be Protected.** To achieve this protection, direct and indirect fire weapons must be available to deal with enemy interference from flank position which enfilade assaulting troops. This may be arranged by the provision of artillery and mortar fire (Including smoke) on a timed programme, on call or impromptu and by directing from the area of the flanks of the line of Departure from tanks, GPMG (SF) and special tasked battalion anti-tank weapons. Flanking Battle groups may assist with flank protection any Helicopters may be particularly useful for flank observation.
- c. **Reorganization and Exploitation.** The objectives will be made secured by repaid reorganization and the domination of the ground forward of them by an effective fire plan, vigorous exploitation and aggressive patrols.

PLANNING AND CONDUCT

The conduct of a deliberate attack is always pre-ceded by the commander's IPB/ estimate, after which a plan is drawn for the attack. The battle procedure involved will include:

- a. Conduct of mission analysis. After the Formation commander's Orders, the CO will determine **what he has to do and why.** He will also determine what broad constraints or freedoms affect his potential options. Once a commanders his completed his mission Analysis, he would have identified his decision points and therefore a suitable time for his O Group.

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- b. Issue a detailed (if not already issued) or supplementary Warning Order (if necessary)
- c. Make a detailed time Estimate
- d. Prepare Reconnaissance Plan.
- e. Conduct detailed Reconnaissance.
- f. Conduct detail estimates and plan.
- g. Prepare and issue Orders.

It is essential that the commander take a critical look at the ground, Timings, movement and fire plan at the planning stage.

GROUND

Commencing with the position, ground should be considered area by area until, finally the position of own troops is reached. Consideration will include:

- a. Selection of the main objective, which is the area which when captured will render the enemy's position untenable.
- b. the approaches to the main objective; the cover they offer, the obstacles, suitability for armour, enemy enfilade, etc.
- c. The need to seize subsidiary objectives en route as phases of the attack.
- d. The best cover from enemy surveillance devices.
- e. Fire support (including smoke) required to cover movement on the approaches,

TIMINGS

Timings will necessitate consideration of any limitation laid down by the formation commander, how long the operation is likely to take by phases using the various Course of Action offered, the merits of a daylight or night attack, the selection of H-Hour.

MOVEMENT

- a. Plans and timings must be worked out in detail for:
 - (1) the move of the battle group;
 - (a). From the Assembly Area to the FUP and the Line of departure.
 - (2). From the Line of departure into the assault

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- b. Boundaries must be laid down. They should follow natural features, which can be easily recognized. The advantage provided by the use of natural features more than offsets the fact that one combat team may have rather more to do than its neighbour.

FIRE PLAN

General

a. All weapons must be coordinated in one fire Plan. Artillery and Mortar concentrations on enemy positions being assaulted should, if possible should be on a timed program. This timed program may be modified to enable assault Combat Teams to go as close as possible for fire to be brought down until the last safe moment.

b. The Fire plan will be arranged by stages to include:

(1) **The move from Assembly Area to the Line of Departure.**

1. Blind the enemy with smoke to cover movement , obscure enemy Ops.
2. Deception with HE, or smoke, on other parts of the local front.
3. Engagement of known, or suspected enemy surveillance devices
4. Any neutralizing of targets considered advisable.
5. Silent policy may be best hope of achieving complete surprise.

(2) **Assault, Fighting Through the Objective and Exploitation**

(a). Fire will first deal with the enemy on the near edge of the objective and can then be lifted to neutralize enemy positions in depth. At the same time, engagement of enemy weapons positions must continue.

(b) this fire can take the form of concentration on known enemy localities, smoke to blind enemy positions, “on call” targets or a combination of any of these.

(3) **Reorganization**. DF task for artillery and mortars to break up enemy counter-attack must be laid down before hand and must be corrected as soon as actual dispositions on the ground are known.

Artillery. The amount artillery adjustment allowed will be decided by the CO. Adjustment also depends on the time available. If adjustment is not allowed initially, then it should be appreciated that prediction may not produce accurate fire and adjustment by FOO ,may be necessary later. Since this can be achieved, often by correction or observation of the first round of a serial, the commander may allow the engagement of each target a minute early to enable this to be done.

Mortars

- a. Mortar platoon normally operates under centralized control and the task of mortars are similar to those for artillery; mortars of adjacent battle groups can often be used to augment the fire plan.
- b. To gain maximum advantage from its range, the mortar platoon will move forward of its reorganization position as quickly as possible after the objective has been captured.

Observation.

- a. FOOs and MFCs will move with each assault combat team for opportunity and on call target, for DF during reorganization and for modification request if necessary. They can move either by bounds from one position of observation to another forward platoons. At night, they should move with the Combat Team 'R' Group.
- b. The timed programme will be controlled by anchor Ops.

MG (SF). These may be used for:

- a. Flank Protection
- b. Provision from carefully sited positions on the flanks of the assault, of suppressive fire after the indirect fire programme had ceased.
- c. Reorganization task.

Close Air Support. Close air support weapons may include machine guns, cannon, rockets, missiles, napalm and bombs. For pre-planned targets, it will normally, be possible to match weapons to targets. For on call targets, aircraft will, probably, be armed with re-arranged standard weapon loads.

Employment of Armour.

- a. The following principles should be observed when deciding how best to use armour:
 - (1). AFV in a deliberate attack can be deployed to give intimate support to the infantry, to give fire support from a distance and to provide flank protection.
 - (2) the best fire support that armour can give to infantry is from hull down position. However, armour is likely to move to forward fire positions during an attack so that they can keep close observation of the infantry they are supporting.
 - (3) A proportion of the armour should accompany the infantry to the area of each objective for their morale effect and to ensure that intimate and accurate support is available during the assault when all other forms of fire support may have to stop for safety reasons.
 - (5) The majority of the armour cars should be released as soon as possible on reorganization in order that they are available for use elsewhere, to support

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subsequent phases and to carry out replenishment. Some Armour however, may be required to remain in the vicinity of the objective to provide a framework for anti-armour defence against counter-attack.

b. The task for AFVs are:

- (1) destroy enemy weapons, particularly those likely to hold up infantry.
- (2) Maintain momentum and pressure on the enemy
- (3) Support the infantry in seizing the objective.
- (4) Assist in the defeat of counter-attacks
- (5) Exploit success.

CONDUCT

MOVE TO AND ACTION AT LINE OF DEPARTURE

The assembly

- a. The assembly area should be secured; concealment from enemy observation is the prime requirement. Its distance from the FUP in an attack on foot is, normally between two and four kilometers. The assembly area will be reconnoitred by the harbour party and the area within it will be allotted to combat team etc.
- b. In an assembly area troops will receive orders carry out administrative and battle preparations and rest.
- c. Regrouping will be complete in an assembly area and, in particular, infantry armour communication will be tested.

Move to an FUP. From an assembly area, assault troops will move on foot to FUP, whilst others, eg, mortar platoon and flank protection elements, will move to their battle positions ready for the H-Hour. The move to an FUP must be planned with care, an order of march consistent with the requirement in the FUP, timings for leaving the assembly area, and guides en route must all be arranged detailed and, where appropriate, they should be rehearsed.

FUP

- a. Reception at the FUP should be arranged by the nominated guides. Armour and infantry may share the same FUP and so, the timings of their arrival, the effect of noise and dust, and their vulnerability to enemy surveillance devices, must be considered.
- b. At FUP, Assault combat teams, platoons, sections and any armour will be formed up square to their objective in the formation in which they will advance. Final briefings, orientation and the

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testing of infantry/armour communications may be carried out. Whenever possible, troops will lie down.

Line of Departure

- a. A Line Of departure (LD) should be square to the objective. It is often the forward edge of the FUP and, if possible, it should follow a natural feature such as track. On occasions, it may be necessary to mark an LD with tape and this may be done by the FUP protection party/ guides or by the intelligence section. Responsibility for this marking task will normally be included in SOPs.
- b. An LD must be held firmly by troops, normally from other than the attacking battle Group. The LD may be regarded as the firm base for the attack. If the LD is not secure a skirmish for it may develop, thus leading to serious delay of the deployment of the assaulting troops, co-ordination will therefore be disrupted and the whole attack could fail.
- c. Should the battle group have to secure its own LD, a preliminary operation of combat team strength must be carried out to do this before the main attack is launched.

Approach to the Line of Departure

- a. Assault combat teams and armoured troops move forward from the FUP at such times as will enable them to cross the LD punctually at H-Hour. They do not pause, or stop, on the LD.
- b. The reserve combat team for phase 1 may remain in the area of the FUP until it is required to move forward.

THE ASSAULT

Infantry

- a. The assault combat teams will move forward on foot at a speed consistent with the fire plan. This fire plan will be based on the an approximate, preplanned, rate of infantry advance depending on the going, cover, etc, eg, this might by day be 100 meters in two minutes in good going. Leading troops must approach as close as safety allows, (ie 250 meters from Artillery fire) to the covering fire. Only by so doing can they take full advantage of the fire plan and assault the enemy whilst he is still recovering from the shelling.
- b. A CO may have to detail reserves to deal with an enemy post passed by the leading troops. The artillery programme must be planned to allow time for assault combat teams to destroy all enemy post to their front. Enemy positions holding out on the flanks must not cause troops to weaken their determination to advance, nor deflect them from their objective.
- c. Flank protection in the initial stages of an attack can usually, be obtained from the battle group securing the LD. The use of mortars is invaluable for this purpose and smoke may be used. As the attack reaches greater depth, the CO will have to make further arrangements for flank protection. The battalion mortars, combat teams, MG and armour post should achieve this, but it may be necessary to establish MG (SF) on the exposed flank of the attack.
- d. Once assaulting infantry have reached the enemy FEBA, the difficult task of fighting through the objective begins. Infantry will fight their way forward using fire and manoeuvre. If armour is supporting the attack, the infantry will destroy enemy anti tank weapons whilst the

armour will support them the tank gun and machine gun. Assault combat teams, at this stage will also be calling for artillery and mortar support against unexpected targets through the FOO, MFCs and combat team officers and NCOs.

e. **The Reserve Combat Team**

(1) This is the means by which the CO can influence the battle, by exploiting success, strengthening the assault or dealing with the unexpected. A reserve will be detailed by the CO for every phase and will be positioned well forward ready for use; it may move by tactical bounds behind the assault combat team.

(2) If the reserve is employed to deal the unexpected on an opportunity basis, this may be at the expense of any preplanned task allotted to it in subsequent phases. In a 3 company battalion, the provision of a reserve is clearly more difficult.

Armour. Armoured vehicles are not necessarily tanks. But within their limitations can be used to support an attack, although this may be limited if the enemy has tanks or a strong anti-armour defence. This paragraph refers to 'tank' rather than armoured vehicles.

a. Tanks may move on the same, or on different axis, to the infantry. Either may lead, depending on circumstances; the lead may change during the approach and/ or for the actual assault. There may be occasions, because of the nature of the ground, or of obstacles, when it is impossible for tanks to move forward. Infantry must then assault, without the intimate support or armour, though the range and accuracy of tank guns may still allow fire support to begin from hull down position in their rear, or to a flank.

b. **Axes**

(1) Tanks and infantry on the same axis. Control and target indication are easier when tanks and infantry assault on the same axis but the infantry may mask the fire of the tanks, particularly during the final assault, and the tanks may draw fire onto the infantry.

(2) Tanks and infantry on Different axes. In this case tanks supporting fire is not masked at any stage and can be continued for a longer period, but control and target indication are more difficult and the tanks may be more vulnerable.

c. **Leading to the Objective**

(1) **Close Country and/ or Strong Enemy Anti-Armour Defence.** In such circumstances infantry lead at their own speed whilst tanks give supporting fire from the rear or flanks, depending on the axis chosen. Tanks will move from fire position to fire position at their best speed without getting ahead of the infantry. the rear or flanks, depending on the axis

(2) **Open Country and/ or Weak Enemy Anti-Armour Defence.** In these circumstances the tanks will lead using fire and movement ahead or to the flanks of the infantry who will follow at their own speed. The lead must be changed during the approach if the circumstances alter

d. **The Assault and Fighting Through.**

(1) When Artillery and mortar lift fire for safety reasons as the infantry begin the last 250 meters to the enemy's FEBA, tanks will produce maximum supporting fire to give them cover whilst they break into the FEBA, prior to fighting through.

(2) Whilst the infantry are fighting through the enemy position, tanks will give as much help to them as is possible by destroying enemy positions and by producing suppressive fire in front of the infantry advance. The tanks will accompany infantry on to the objective whenever obstacles and the closeness of the country will permit. The infantry will protect the tank by dealing with short range anti-tank weapons.

SUBSEQUENT PHASES

As an objective is seized, the CO will initiate the next phase, if any of the battle group attack; this will involve:

- a. Ensuring that the reserve combat team, or teams, nominated for the next phase are positioned in a forward FUP in dead ground to the enemy's direct fire weapons and that their LD is as secure as possible.
- b. Any regrouping necessary between combat teams eg, the movement of Armour support, or reallocation of FOOs.
- c. Confirmation of the fire plan, or alterations necessary to it due to unforeseen enemy positions and activity.
- d. The promulgation or confirmation of timings.

Command and Control Control of the battle rests with the CO and with the Combat Team Commanders at their respective levels. A CO (and his rover group) will position himself at a location from which he can observe progress and from which he intervenes personally when necessary. The rover group may move forward between positions of observation as required by the CO himself, should not leave these positions during the active phase of the battle unless he considers that his presence elsewhere, eg, with a Combat Team Commander, will directly influence the battle. The main BG HQ will move forward to a prearranged position as early as is possible after reorganization.

REORGANIZATION

The essence of reorganization is speed in organizing the defence of the area and in bringing forward support weapons in order that the battle group is firmly and rapidly established to meet counter-attack.

Combat Teams. Combat team Commanders must, as soon as possible, go round their platoons to coordinate the defensive layout against both ground and air attack. This coordination will include the selection of task for armour if allotted (MFSF) and if possible, the adjustment of DF and the planning of additional targets.

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Armour. Some Armour may be retained or replaced for anti-tank defence, whilst the balance will be organized in depth in order to be available to meet any enemy counter-attack which develops.

Action by the CO

- a. The CO, with his Rover Group, Having confirmed the site for battle Group HQ, will make a rapid estimates of the ground, and then, either confirm, or alter the preplanned defensive layout. DF tasks and anti-armour defence will be coordinated at this stage.
- b. The CO can then visit the combat teams. Apart from adjusting the defense between localities a CO's presence at this time will have a heartening effect on the soldier; all platoons should be visited. This will take time, but absence from battle group HQ for this purpose will be worth while.
- c. When reorganization is complete a CO must consider future action more thoroughly. After an attack there is a natural tendency to relax and to cease to take positive aggressive action; steps must be taken to counteract this. A CO has two main tasks: to ensure the present position is secure and to prepare for further advance. Although the battle group may have become temporarily static an aggressive attitude to maintain the initiative must prevail and steps to ensure this will include:
 - (1) The active use of patrols for gaining information.
 - (2) Thorough exploitation up to the limits allowed.
 - (3) Immediate re-supply ready for further operations.

This action after is important and neglect of it could have serious consequences. It requires firmness and self-discipline and imposes as additional strain on officers and soldiers.

EXPLOITATION

Concurrent with reorganization, exploitation will be carried out. In order to conform with plans of higher authority the extent of exploitation by a battle group, particularly in the early phases of an attack, may have to be strictly limited and purely local; limits for combat teams will be laid down in the CO's orders. At Combat team level exploitation involves the movement of patrols forward of the reorganization position in order to dominate the ground. Any adjustment of the position as a result of exploitation will be ordered by a CO as he thinks fit.

In the event of unexpected success a CO must use his own initiative to seize tactical features well ahead of his original task. Such action may well produce results and conversely, failure to do so may enable the enemy to reoccupy ground he may previously have abandoned. To do this, troops from the battle group reserve during the last phase of the attack, may be used. However, the integrity of the defensive position must be maintained and the degree to which it maybe weakened for unexpected exploitation task is a matter for the professional judgment of the CO in the light of circumstances at the time. Calculated risk should be accepted.

Co-operation of All Arms. Whilst it is the infantry who bear the burden of close physical combat in the attack, it is only the action of all arms acting in close concert which will ensure the capture of the objective and the destruction of the enemy. This is a most important point which must be stressed constantly in training.

TACTICAL HANDLING OF THE ASSAULT COMBAT TEAM IN THE DELIBERATE ATTACK

In planning an attack, a Combat Team Commander will apply the same considerations as those for a CO described in this chapter.

Movement to the Objective.

a. Formations.

(1) careful consideration of the formations to be used in approaching the objective is essential and these depend on the ground, enemy locations, and the support available from the fire plan and the intimate support tanks.

(2) When moving, combat teams should avoid a lengthy approach in the open using extended line formations; these are difficult to control and vulnerable to enfilade. Combat teams may not adopt their formations for a final assault until they are close to the objective and in a Final Assault Position; any change of formation at this point should be pre-planned, be rehearsed and adopted quickly and without halting.

(3) From a Final Assault Position, combat teams will assault in extended formation and must work forward quickly by fire and manoeuvre. The approach to the enemy FEBA should be a coordinated, rapid, aggressive movement

b. **The Reserve Platoon.** The reserve platoon will move forward behind the assaulting platoons in a position where it is not involved in their immediate battles, but is well placed to reinforce either of them, to carry, to carry out its own preplanned task or to deal with the unexpected.

Fighting Through the Objective.

a. On reaching the line of enemy FEBA, assault combat teams will begin the difficult task of fighting through using fire and movement within sections, platoons and combat teams. They will be assisted by artillery and mortar fire, and by the intimate support armour engaging targets called for by combat team HQ, FOOs, MFCs and Platoon commanders using standard request and indication procedure.

b. Control above section level will be extremely difficult once the close quarter fighting has started. The issue of radio orders to platoon commanders will be equally difficult. Assault platoons should, therefore, move direct to their objectives, which platoon commanders must indicate to their platoons, dealing only with such enemy as directly hinder this move. They should not be drawn into the engagements or into protracted mopping up en route. It is essential to get to the main objective as fast as possible and clear it. During this phase the powers of leadership, initiative and anticipation of Platoon Commanders and NCOs are exercised to the full.

c. During the assault, the reserve platoon may be held back, clear of the immediate fighting on the objective, until ordered forward by the Combat Team Commander either for a pre-planned task to deal with by-passed enemy, or to deal with the unexpected. Should lack of other resources make it necessary, the reserve platoon may provide fire support for the assaulting platoons but ammunition expenditure must be controlled carefully in order that subsequent action is not prejudiced.

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d. A combat team Commander will position himself at a point from which he can observe the fighting through and influence it by personal intervention, by calling for fire support, and by the use of the reserve platoon.

Reorganization. As soon as a combat team Commander considers the combat team has secured the objective, he will:

- a. Send a situation report to the CO.
- b. Go round his platoons quickly to coordinate the defensive layout against both ground and air attack. This co-ordination will include the selection of tasks for armour, anti-tank weapon and MG(SF) section. It will if possible include the adjustment of the existing, and the planning of additional, DF targets.
- c. Ensure that, without any delay, officers and NCOs order, and supervise, the digging of positions. Use can sometimes be made of existing positions capture from the enemy; however, the tactical requirement and not the ready ability of perhaps less well-placed, cover is the primary consideration.
- d. Establish standing patrols to give local protection and warning during the digging.
- e. Ensure that casualties are collected, and cleared by stretcher bearers. A systematic search of the battlefield should be made to ensure that no wounded soldier is overlooked.
- f. Check the fighting strength, ammunition and equipment state of the combat team.

LOGISTICS IN AN ATTACK

Thorough logistics preparations must be made to support an attack; these will be based on careful anticipation and planning; clearly, in the case of a quick attack no special logistics arrangements are feasible. The logistics preparations at battle group level will cover:

- a. Preparation for the assault.
- b. Support during reorganization.

Preparation for the Assault These will include, whenever time permits:

a. Combat Supplies

- (1) The provision of additional ammunition to cover replenishment of wastage at intense rates for the expected duration of the battle and of the reorganization. This is particularly important in the case of mortar ammunition, and, in the night attack illuminants.
- (2) The provision of any special ammunition.

b. Medical

- (1) The careful placing of the RAP and the stocking of additional medical supplies and drugs.

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- (2) The RAP should if possible be reinforced by a collecting section from the field ambulance.
- (3) Arrangements for casualty evacuation at an intense rate, whenever possible this must include helicopters if available.
- (4) The checking of issues of medical stores, field dressing and morphine to combat teams.

Support During Reorganization. There are three essentials:

- a. **The Immediate Resupply of Ammunition.** This may be moved forward in F Echelon vehicles, on armour, by helicopter or, in inaccessible locations by porters.
- b. **The Move Forward of F Echelon.** Vehicle (Primarily Command Vehicles).
- c. **Rapid casualty Evacuation.** The RAP should move forward to its reorganization position as soon as is possible and a special plan must be made for dealing with casualties during its move. This plan might involve:
 - (1) The use of another battle group's RAP for the initial stages of the attack.
 - (2) Reinforcement by a collecting section of the field ambulance to form a second RAP in order that one may be open whilst the other moves.

SECTION 8B

DEFENSIVE ACTIONS**Purpose**

The immediate purpose of defensive actions is to defeat or deter a threat in order to provide the right circumstances for offensive action.

There are two types of Defensive Actions:

- a. Defence
- b. Delay

Defensive actions, alone, will not deliver a favourable and decisive outcome to a campaign; this will be dependent upon offensive actions. The following will constitute the broad purpose of defense:

- a. To wear down the enemy's offensive capabilities in order to cause his attack to fail.
- b. To hold ground to prevent an break through.
- c. To gain time in order to prepare for subsequent operations.
- d. To fix the enemy to allow offensive action elsewhere.
- e. To force the enemy to concentrate so that he is more vulnerable to attack.

Types of Defensive Operation

The two principal types of defensive operation are:

Mobile Defence. In mobile defence, the core functions combine to defeat the enemy rather than seize ground. A fixing force denies the enemy freedom of action while a striking force manoeuvres in order to hit the enemy decisively. Commanders conducting a mobile defence use terrain, obstacles, depth and deception together with fire and manoeuvre to encourage the enemy to focus upon the wrong objective, thus rendering him vulnerable to attack from an unexpected direction. Depth and the ability to manoeuvre are particularly important factors in mobile defence.

Area Defence. The purpose of area defence is to hold ground or deny ground to the enemy. Unlike mobile defence, a force committed to area defence does not itself seek the outright destruction of the attacking force. Instead, it relies upon a separate but coordinated attack by other dedicated forces to deliver a decisive victory. In area defence, commanders employ most of their forces in a framework of static and mutually supporting positions, supplemented by an ability to conduct local counter-attacks.

Principles of Defensive Actions (DAMRODS)

a. **Depth.** Depth in defence is necessary to achieve freedom of action, to give time for reaction and to absorb the enemy's momentum. Positions in depth will surprise and unbalance the enemy thus providing the opportunities for counter-attacks. Some gaps may have to be accepted but these must be covered by observation and fire. Depth should not be sacrificed in an attempt to cover a given frontage in strength. Depth is obtained by the allocation of sufficient space for:

- (1) Employment of protective elements.

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- (2) Employment of longer range weapons to destroy, defeat, disrupt or delay enemy elements throughout the depth of the company group's area of influence.
- (3) Use of battle positions, obstacles and defensive fire throughout the area.
- (4) Positioning and movement of reserves and combat support elements.

b. **Mutual Support.** Mutual Support exist when positions are able to support each other and by direct fire, thus preventing the enemy from mounting an attack against any one position without being subjected to direct fire from one or more adjacent positions. There will be a conflict between the need need for depth and for mutual support across a wide front. Depth is more important and in creating depth, the company group can also cover gaps between dug-in positions, enhancing mutual support. In the less defence battlefield, gaps must be accepted, but they they should only exist between companies. Arcs should interlock between platoons within a company group or across a boundary, but the true mutual support will only be achieved if key weapon arcs overlap. When the threat is primarily an armoured one, mutual support between anti-armour weapons is essential.

c. **All Round Defence.** Although a defensive position is likely to be sighted in accordance with the IPB against an attack from a particular direction, the defender must be capable of repelling attack from any direction. Platoons must be fully prepared to fight when outflanked or attacked from different direction.

d. **Offensive Spirit.** Energetic offensive offensive action is fundamental to the successful defence. Defensive actions must be aggressive, harassing and dangerous to the enemy. Plans must focus on the enemy and commanders at all levels within the company, working to the company mission and main effort, must seek to grasp the initiative and dictate to the enemy the way in which the battle will be fought. Immediate counter-attacks can be launched to exploit gaps in the enemy attack formations or pauses in his plans. Assault launched by small groups of determined men can have results out of all proportion to the effort.

e. **Reserves.** Reserves are essential at all levels for immediate counter-attack task and to deal with the unexpected. Within an infantry company group, reserves will be small and will normally be provided by a depth position. Once employed, every effort should be made to reconstitute a reserve regardless of its size or make up.

f. **Deception and Concealment.** The attacker must be continually delayed and confused by the defensive layout. This can be achieved by early destruction of enemy reconnaissance, good concealment and dummy positions. Other measures include EMCON, close control of movement and a high standard of camouflage of vehicles, positions and combat supplies. However, concealment should not be sacrificed in favour of long fields of fire. Concealment at night is as important as by day and care must be taken to minimize and conceal heat emissions.

g. **Sustainability.** There should be good administration of of the defensive force. This calls for a committed plan to maintain a nd sustain troops throughout the defensive operation.

Employment of Combat forces

General. The Infantry Company group is capable of mounting an effective defence only from prepared positions and will, therefore primarily, be employed in a static role as a fixing force. Defensive positions should make the best use of barriers and be located where the ground offers scope to employ the fire power and the full range of anti-armour weapons: it is therefore,

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particularly suitable for use in close country such as wooded and built up areas. Thus enabling the position to retain its effectiveness. The position will need to be supported by armour and combat support assets.

Reconnaissance. Early location of the enemy is a fundamental requirement for successful defence. Battlegroup resources will be allocated to find and identify the enemy and then assess his intentions. At company level, standing patrols and Ops should be deployed forward to provide early warning, particularly at night or when visibility is limited, and by the use of indirect fire to achieve early attrition and disruption. Location of these patrols and Ops will be driven by the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB). And the Surveillance and target Acquisition Plan (STAP) that is subsequently produced from the IPB.

Artillery and Mortars. The roles of artillery and mortar in defence are:

- f. To commence attrition beyond the range of direct fire weapons.
- g. Pre-planned DF task for engagement on call. These targets will be planned and coordinated at battlegroup level.
- h. Fire plan in support counterattacks.
- i. The engagement of opportunity targets.
- j. The provision of illumination (Mortars only) and smoke.

FOO and MFCs. When considering firepower, the company commander must not focus solely on his direct fire weapons, leaving the planning of indirect fire to his FOO. If he does so, then this tends to leave no clear concept of the way in which fire support will in general and indirect support fire support in particular are to be employed in the overall company plan. Company group commanders must not leave their battlegroup commander's O Group without being familiar with the Battlegroup's fire plan. The company group commander with his FOO, must plan the indirect fire to compliment and re-enforce the direct fire plan. As with obstacles, fire support priorities should support the main effort. Fire support can also be used to engage the enemy in areas that the company cannot cover with direct fire weapons.

Armour. Although armour can in certain terms be dug-in on a company position and integrated into the direct fire plan, it is far more likely to be used as a mobile reserve where tanks can exploit their firepower and mobility. Tanks will be used for counterattack and blocking actions.

Anti-Armour Weapons. The main threat to the company group is likely to be posed by enemy armoured forces. The success of the defence will, therefore depend fundamentally on the deployment, coordination and control of variety of anti-armour weapon systems within the company group's area of influence. While the Battlegroup level anti-armour weapons will be coordinated at battlegroup HQ level to destroy enemy armour in designated armour killing areas, the company group commander will need to tie the companies light anti-armour weapons to supplement the battlegroup plan. The company will provide protection for the anti-armour weapons, help in preparing their positions and give administrative support as necessary.

GPMG (SF). The deployment of the GPMG(SF) platoon will be coordinated at battle group HQ level and will be linked to the anti armour plan. It is therefore likely that a GPMG (SF) section will form part of a company group task organization in defence. The section should be sited as three guns in defilade position, thereby, making best use of enfilade fire and the beaten zone.

Engineers. The company group commander must plan how to use the time and engineer

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resources available to prepare positions, routes and obstacles. He must prioritize the task so that the most important are done first: no defensive position is ever finished. The company group must continue to develop the defensive preparations until interrupted by the enemy advance. Engineer tasks will be as follows:

- a. Counter- Mobility Tasks. Counter-mobility task serve to disrupt, turn and fix or block enemy forces. They would be closely coordinated with the direct and indirect fire plan. Task will consist of development of barriers combining natural obstacles and minefields and demolitions. The completion of counter-mobility tasks is of greater importance than the completion of survivability tasks.
- b. Survivability Tasks. Survivability task will involve the construction of tank scrapes, trenches, weapon pits, command post; development of dummy positions; and providing protection for combat supplies.
- c. Mobility Tasks. Engineers will reconnoiter, improve and open routes, for both supply and counter attacks and ensure that minefield lanes are kept open.

Components of Defence

Defensive battle is usually organised in layers. These are:

- a. Screens and Guards
- b. Main defensive Troops
- c. Reserves

PLANNING

Planning of the defensive battle begins with your Estimates/IPB. This can start after map study and developed after reconnaissance of the defensive area. The commander thus select his Name and Target areas of interest based on the BAE, and Threat Integration. The Commander evolve his effects schematics. The mission analysis serve to determine what part of the force should be assigned to the various tasks. The various causes of action are evaluated and the best is chosen to develop a plan

DEFENCE PLAN

A typical Def Plan contains:

- a. Mission
- b. Concept of Operations – Intent, Scheme of Manoeuvre, Main Effort and Coordinating Instructions.
- c. Fire , Anti-Armour, Patrol and Surveillance Plans
- d. C-Penetration and Counter-Attack Plans
- e. Location for Administrative Installations and Logistics Outline Plan
- f. Locations of HQs
- g. Locations of screens and Guards
- h. Control Measure

CONDUCT

Stages of the Defensive Battle.

The defensive battle can be divided into a number of stages which in practice are unlikely to be clearly defined. These stages are:

- a. **Preparatory Stage.** During the preparatory stage, planning the defence, reconnaissance, liaison, rehearsals and counter-reconnaissance activities will take place. Maximum emphasis will be placed on concurrent activity. There is the need for the commander to outline his priority of work since time will always be a premium. This will ensure best use of limited time. Priority is often guided by; The Threat, the ground, Time and resources available.
- b. **Covering Force Action.** The covering force will fight what is essentially a delay battle. It will be a battle of movement with little time to establish or fight from positions. Maximum destruction is inflicted on the enemy so that he arrives at the main defensive position dislocated and with his cohesion undermined.
- c. **Battle Handover.** Forces in the main defensive position will assume responsibility for the battle at the hand over line. Direct and indirect fire assets from the main defence force will provide support to cover the withdrawal of the covering force. The withdrawal will involve rearward passage of lines.
- d. **Main Defensive Battle.** The decisive battle is fought in the main defensive area where the efforts of the rear area, combine with the operations of the main defence force to defeat the enemy. Much of what occurs will depend on whether the formation commander has planned for a mobile or area defence. Morale is an important issue at this stage. Unless effort are made to ensure proper routine, communication And aggressive Defence, morale will be low and the def cannot hold.
- e. **Employment of Reserves.** Forces will be earmarked as reserves for defensive tasks which are integral to the defensive concept. The primary purpose of a reserve is to preserve the commander's flexibility of action. Secondary purposes are to reinforce the defence of committed forces, block enemy forces that have penetrated the FEBA, react to rear area threats and relieve depleted units and provide for continuous operations.

Defence By Night. Defence in the night poses a lot of challenges. The comd must know what is happening in front of his position, prevent enemy infiltration, conceal his defended locality and identify friend from foe. This calls for an aggressive Patrol programme, Night Visibility and Surveillance Plan, as well as special orders to sentries.

LOGISTICS. Logistics is crucial for the success of all defensive actions.

Attention must be paid to Ammunition supply, Defence Stores, Transportation and POL, Spares parts for vehicles and weapons should also be handy. To offset the difficulties, A Echelon could be located near enough (fwd BAA) for rapid replenishment. Movement is also difficult especially after contact, and must be controlled and restricted to night.

Full replenishment/ Forward Dumping could be done before troops move into position. Dry ration should be weighed against fresh. Medical facilities and evacuation should be as far fwd as possible. Repair os casualty equipment should be conducted as far fwd as possible and be on priorities. Recovery must be aggressive to avoid En overrun vehicle casualties.

DELAY

A delay, is where a force under pressure trades space for time by slowing down its enemy's momentum and inflicting maximum damage on the enemy without itself becoming decisively engaged. A delay can be a precursor to either defensive or offensive actions.

A delay may be conducted to slow the enemy's advance in order to gain time and reduce his fighting power, as a means of gathering information about enemy intentions in order to protect friendly deployments, and as a means of shaping the battlefield in preparation for later decisive action. Thus a delay buys time to permit something else to happen at a more critical place on the battlefield.

Types of Delay

A combat team will normally fight the delay as a cohesive sub-unit as part of a battle group operation. This is to minimize both the command and control challenges inherent in a delay and the danger of the company being defeated in detail if it employs delay tactics at platoon level. There are two types of delay:

a.). **Delay from Successive Positions (Caterpillar).** This is the most likely method to be used as it is easier to control. It is used when the mission requires a wide sector or avenue of approach to be covered and all or most of the available forces have to be deployed forward to cover the area. As the battle progresses, the company fights from a series of successive positions. The method of extracting platoons, once the required delay has been brought will depend on the situation. Forward platoons can either disengage first with the depth platoon providing over watch, or the rear platoon can be withdrawn first to provide a firm base at the next position. If the situation deteriorates rapidly the entire company may have to disengage simultaneously and the possibility of becoming decisively engaged increases if enemy forces move quicker than expected. The threat of being outflanked must be continually assessed.

b. **Delay from Alternative positions (Leapfrog).** A delay from alternative positions involves two or more companies groups in a single sector occupying delaying positions in depth. Once the first company has achieved its delay, it leapfrogs past the second company and occupies apposition in greater depth while the second company takes up the fight. Although this method offers greater security than a delay from successive positions, it requires more forces and continuous coordination. The tactics of delay from alternative positions is also possible within the company if the terrain is so close that it restrict the company's frontage to a single platoon. In essence, this will be a series of platoon ambushes. However, the risk of being defeated in detail is high and coordination will be a challenge.

Principles of a Delay . ("MISS BADTU")

a. **Intelligence.** Accurate intelligence will be vital. Timely intelligence will be needed throughout on enemy intentions and capabilities. The IPB will be a key component in the planning and conduct of the delay and dissemination of its produce down to company level essential.

b. **Manoeuvre.** For the dismounted infantry company group, the principal manoeuvre effect will be its firepower. Maximum fire will need to be applied to surprise and confuse the enemy and

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to make him pause and deploy. Disengagement and movement on foot to the next delay position will be a high risk operation and will need to use concealed routes and be covered by indirect fire support.

c. **Use of Terrain.** Selection of the best ground to exact delay will be vital. The terrain should be selected with the following consideration in mind;

- (1) Good natural obstacles , or features which can easily be improved, for canalizing the enemy
- (2) Provide good observation and fields of fire
- (3) Allows easy disengagement
- (4) Provides concealed routes for withdrawal.
- (5) Provide cover and concealment for the forces on the delaying position.

d. **Timings.** There are two essential timings:

- a. the time available to prepare positions, including recce deployment and obstacle preparation.
- b. the length of delay to be imposed at each position.

e. **Space** . The depth of the delay will be closely related to time; the longer the delay required, the greater the depth. Reduced depth can only be compensated for the increase in strength of the delay forces.

f. **Aggressive Action.** Aggressive action will be vital to success and the tenet of the manoeuvrist approach must find full expression during a delay operation. An enemy who is continually harried, ambushed and counterattacked will generally conduct his advance in a cautious manner. This will not only cause delay and attrition on the enemy but is likely to reduce own casualties.

g. **Security and Protection.** Security and protection are essential to avoid being surprised and a decisive engagement ensuing. Effective STAP and counter surveillance plans must be implemented throughout the delay.

h. **Deception.** Deception is necessary to reduce the inherent vulnerability of any force during rearward movement. Deception helps maintain secrecy and assist in achieving surprise.

i. **Balance.** Balance is required within the force so that the company group is able to conduct defence, disengagement and withdrawal . Regrouping is likely to be frequent and unexpected situations will need to be dealt with.

FORCES AND TASK

Infantry. Dismounted infantry must be employed in restrictive terrain to be successful in a delay. Dismounted infantry are best employed in broken, close terrain or built up area where they can make extensive use of obstacle. Lack of both protection and speed of momentum will demand greater attention to the operations of disengagement and manoeuvre between positions. These should ideally be conducted under cover of fire support, using concealed routes and during night or

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conditions of poor visibility. Dismounted infantry can be used in a stay behind roles to harass the enemy advance by mounting ambushes and the use of indirect fire.

Armour. Armoured forces are ideal for a delay. Their long range, rapid fire systems allow them to force the enemy to slow down, deploy and react to contact. Tanks are a key element in counter attacks. They fire on the move and fast rate of fire and short engagement time for delaying force to break contact. Tanks should be used to cover the most dangerous armoured avenue of approach, but must still be vigilant against an enemy dismounted threat.

Aviation. Armed helicopters can engage enemy armour from unexpected direction using causing and delay. Their rapid deployment will provide cover for disengagement and rearward movement. Helicopters will provide vital information on enemy axis and strength.

Reconnaissance. Reconnaissance can best be used as a security force to provide the early eyes and ears to a company group. When not performing as the security force, reconnaissance elements are employed in a flank screen or required to maintain contact with the enemy. Reconnaissance elements are not organized or equipped to conduct independent delay operations.

Anti-Armour. Careful planning must ensure that anti tank systems are able to fire and move without becoming decisively engaged. Commanders should employ anti tank assets in depth and should engage the enemy as far forward as possible. MILAN will then move to subsequent position to provide in-depth, over-watching fire for the delay battle of other elements of the company.

Snipers. Snipers can perform several task in the delay. They can be deployed forward of initial positions to provide early warning, intelligence and to disrupt enemy forces by calling for indirect fire against enemy units and use precision sniper fire to kill enemy leaders.

Employment of combat Support Forces

Artillery. Fire support or the delay must be planned indepth for the entire sector. Massed fire is planned along likely enemy avenues of approach and choke points to cause him to close down, strip away infantry protection for armour and canalize him into engagement areas that permit accurate direct fire. The FOO parties will be deployed by their BC where they can best control artillery fire in support of battlegroup. Indirect fire will be used:

- a. At long range to wear down the enemy without close contact and decisive engagement.
- b. To permit manoeuvring forces to withdrawal at the critical moment.
- c. To plug gaps with scatterable mines to prevent bypass.
- d. To assist in the defence of successive fighting / defensive positions.
- e. To assist the hand-over.

Engineers. Engineers initially are forward assisting in counter-mobility, survivability and then mobility tasks. In the counter-mobility role, engineers place obstacles such as minefields and tank ditches to slow the enemy. The use nuisance mining together with rear and phoney minefields will make the enemy aware resulting in caution and delay. In the survivability role, engineers dig vehicle emplacement starting with the Main Effort. In the mobility role, Engineers clear routes

back to subsequent positions. This process continues for the follow on delay positions. The battlegroup commander will assign an engineer unit to a company, specifically either a level of completion or a time limit for them to complete their work. It is critical that the company commander and the engineer commander site the company obstacles and positions together.

PLANNING AND PREPARATION

Characteristics

Delay operations are very fluid and force the commander to be flexible and act within their superior commander's intent. The following is a list of characteristics a commander should keep in mind when planning a delay.

Force the Enemy to deploy and Manoeuvre. Terrain must be used to make maximum advantage of direct and indirect firepower and the enemy should be engaged at maximum range. This cause the enemy to take time-consuming measures to deploy, develop the situation and manoeuvre to drive the delaying force from his position. Repeated use of this technique will slow the forward progress of the enemy and will trade space for time.

Make Maximum Use of Obstacles. Man-made and artificial obstacles should be used to canalize and slow enemy progress and provide security to the flanks. To be effective, obstacles must be covered by observation and direct or indirect fire.

Maintain Contact with the Enemy. Continuous observation must be conducted to maintain contact with the enemy. Maintaining enemy contact requires visual observation of the enemy, observation and correction of fires and freedom of manoeuvre to avoid decisive engagement. Enemy forces with freedom of and mobility will try to bypass or envelop the flanks, or penetrate between units conducting the delay.

Avoid Decisive Engagement. In a delay, positions should be occupied sufficiently long to deceive and force the enemy to deploy. Thereafter, the situation can be develop to gain the initiative and manoeuvre conducted to counterattack if the situation permits. The next position must be occupied before becoming decisively engaged. Maximum used should be made of indirect fire to assist in disengaging. If a company remains in position when the enemy launches an attack, it is likely to become decisively engaged and it will sustain unnecessary losses.

Planning

Planning of the delay battle must start with the IPB and then the Estimate. The IPB should determine the ground most suitable for defence, the enemy's likely avenues of approach and bypass routes, and the decisions points for triggering direct and indirect fire for withdrawal to the next position. After reconnaissance of the delay position, the commander selects positions that allow long range fields of fire with routes suitable for rearward and lateral movement. He then establishes the order in which his sub-units will move and assign routes to them.

Efforts should be made to reduce the enemy's mobility and advantage by the use of obstacles, firepower and effective use of terrain. Enemy rates of movement using terrain should be considered by the commander in his estimates, this is compared to how fast his unit can move to the next position. These time distance factor should dictates the amount of time the commander has to engage the enemy and move his unit before becoming decisively engaged. This process should be done for each of the enemy's avenue of approach. The company commander must use clearly

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defined decision points to trigger withdrawal. It is crucial that all leaders understand these, and know when they must move. This will become important if commanders become casualties or there is a loss of communication.

Obstacles must be tied into the plan to slow the enemy long enough for the company to engage and then move. They must be covered by direct and indirect fire and force the enemy to deploy or take action. This will allow the company to disengage and set up the next position ready to re-engage the enemy.

The following should be considered when the commander makes his plan:

- a. Commanders must develop clear platoon/ company missions and task.
- b. The initial position to defend.
- c. the plan for controlling engagements, the sequence and criteria for disengagement and movement instructions.
- d. Subsequent positions to the rear.
- . General routes to follow from position to position.
- f. Instructions about the company harbour party.
- g. Instruction son the movement of supplies, equipment and vehicles.
- h. Priorities for the engineers and assault pioneers.

Control measures

Control measures a commander chooses are key to his intent. Control measures usually include:

- a. Phase lines
- b. Report Lines.
- c. Checkpoints.
- d. Battle positions and sectors.
- e. Engagement areas and target refernce points.
- f. Assembly areas, main supply routes and CSS points.
- g. Coordinating points.
- h. Routes and Lanes

Preparation

Preparation for the delay is similar to that of defence. As much work as possible must be completed early to forward positions. This ensures the appearance of a strong defence. This includes obstacles forward and covered by fire as well as Ops forward for early warning. As the enemy approaches, engineer assets can move to start preparing the next delay positions. It is crucial that commanders conduct reconnaissance of positions in depth with engineers. This allows the engineer work to continue while the battle is being fought in the forward positions.

CONDUCT

General

The sequence for the delay is depicted as follows:

- a. Initial delay positions are occupied, security and Ops are established and priority of work is determined. This creates the illusion of a determined defence and increases the amount of delay obtained.
- b. As the enemy approaches, long range direct and indirect fire are used to inflict casualties, to disorganise and force him to deploy or take action. If possible, enemy reconnaissance and advance guards are destroyed or ambushed.
- c. Each position is occupied until the enemy threatens an assault or envelopment of the position. Decisive engagement is avoided.

Disengagement

The Subunit (Company) commander must be given clear instructions on the criteria for disengagement. He then moves on the basis of pre-arranged times, trigger points, on order, or when appropriate based on his commander's intent. Movement will need to be coordinated with flanking units.

Break Contact

If elements of the Company are threatened with decisive engagement, or have become decisively engaged, the commander may take several actions to facilitate their disengagement. In order of priority, he may do any of the following

- a. Allocate priority of all indirect supporting fire to the threatened platoon. This is the most rapid and responsive method of increasing combat power.
- b. Direct adjacent units to engage enemy targets forward of the threatened platoon. This may require repositioning.
- c. Reinforce the platoon.
- d. Conduct a counterattack

Command and Control

Command is usually forward on the likely avenue of approach. This provide him the best view and allow him to appreciate the pressure on his forces. It allows him to best determine whether he can stay in position, counterattack an enemy weakness or withdraw to the next position. Map overlays can be used to depict all the control measure, and it is crucial that commanders at all levels have copies due to the fluid nature of the operations. Radios are the best means of communication, however alternatives such as pyrotechnics signal could be arranged as alternative.

Combat Service Support

Combat service support must be monitored closely during delay ops since dumping is not ideal. Movement of CSS must be timely. Supplies arrangements should be made for back loading of supplies and casualty evacuation.

SUMMARY

- e. The link between Operations of War.
- b. Complicated and often conducted under extreme pressures of time and condition.
- c. Require thorough planning, execution and coordination so as to yield desired outcome or result.
- d. Good C2 and tempo
- e. Maintenance of momentum.

SECTION 8C

ENABLING ACTIONS

“But battle must not be seen as some kind of smooth-running conveyor belt on which the various technical combat resources are merged. Battle is a complex and fickle thing. So command and control must be ready to deal with abrupt changes in the situation, and sometimes to reshape an earlier plan radically.”

(Marshal of the Soviet Union, Mikhail N. Tukhachevskiy, 1931)

Enabling Actions are:

- a. Operations that interface between Offensive and Defensive Actions.
- b. Not an independent operation and can never be carried out in its own right.
- c. Operations whose execution **MUST** lead to the active prosecution of one or more of the Operations of War.

The under mentioned are enabling actions:

Withdrawal

Advance to Contact

Reconnaissance

Meeting Engagement

Retirement

Relief Operations

- Relief of an encircled force.
- Forward Passage of Lines.
- Rearward Passage of Lines.

} Relief of troops in Combat

March

Link-Up

Obstacle Breaching/Crossing

Security

Assault River Crossing

Advance to Contact. The advance to contact seeks to regain contact with the enemy under the most favourable conditions. In order to achieve this, forces may be employed in both protective and information seeking missions. The advance to contact is normally executed in preparation for a subsequent offensive operation and therefore ends when the main force is positioned in accordance

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with the commander's plan. Subsequent operations will be determined by the mission assigned to the main force.

Meeting Engagement: A meeting engagement involves action between two moving forces. While these forces may be pursuing quite separate missions that conflict with the meeting engagement, there is the possibility that one or both may be conducting operations in which the engagement is, in fact, intentional. The dilemma for the commander is to consider how his plans may need to be modified by the unexpected.

Link-Up Operations: The aim of a link-up operation is to establish contact between two or more friendly units or formations that may have the same or differing missions. They normally occur in enemy controlled territory.

Withdrawal: A withdrawal occurs when a force disengages from an enemy force in accordance with the will of its commander. It seeks to break the main force's contact with the enemy although contact may be maintained through other means, for example, indirect fire, reconnaissance or surveillance. The withdrawal should be conducted in a manner that minimises enemy interference and preserves fighting power. The ability to move rapidly to offensive, defensive or delaying operations should always be retained.

Relief of Troops in Combat: Relief of troops occurs when combat activities are taken over by one force from another. There are three types of relief operation:

Relief in Place: All or part of a force is replaced in a sector by an incoming unit.

Forward Passage of Lines: A force advances through another, for example holding a bridgehead, or attacks through a unit in contact with the enemy.

Rearward Passage of Lines: A force effecting a move to the rear passes through another unit in defence. In relief of troops in combat operations, command passes laterally between the forces involved and commanders are usually co-located appropriately.

Assault River Crossing: Assault River Crossing involves the tactics employed by troops in crossing major obstacle such as rivers in order to conduct operations at the far bank. The operation occurs when troops operating behind a major river would have to withdraw, or when they have to cross the river so as to pursue a fleeing enemy or attack his positions.

SECTION 9

TRAINING FOR OPERATIONS

“In no other profession are the penalties for employing untrained personnel so appalling or so irrevocable as in the military”

General Douglas MacArther

INTRODUCTION

The ACDS Pers/Trg at the MOD is responsible for laying down the policy for training in the RSLAF. Often and then, staff at the Directorate of Defence Training Enlistment and recruitment (DDTER) in collaboration with the HQ Joint Force Command make personal visits and by close personal touch with formations and units, its staff can ensure that the best possible facilities are made available so that the training is carried out on realistic lines. In addition to exercises and discussions it can best supervise and help the training in the Army by:

- a. The allocation and maintenance of suitable ground for training.
- b. The issue of clear training directives.
- c. The issue of sufficient training stores and ammunition.
- d. Ensuring that training grants are allocated to divisions and that they are wisely spent.

Training directives are also issued from time to time dealing tactical and technical developments, special forms of training, enemy methods and scales of transportation, equipment and material. Although directives issued by JFC could vary greatly according to the formations to which they refer, they should usually include the following:

- a. Instructions with regard to any special training which needs particular attention.
- b. Instructions on how to remedy any particular weakness in training which has become apparent since the last directive was issued.
- c. Dates of exercise, lectures and discussions being held under special arrangement during the period covered by the directives, with details of those to attend and administrative requirements (provision of umpires, directing staff, etc).
- d. General allocation of training areas.

Based on his higher commander's training directive, a commander will frame his training instructions from which subordinate commanders will prepare their programmes. The training instructions must clearly state how the training is to be carried out and must therefore contain his aim as well as including:

- a. The period to be covered.

RESTRICTED

- b. Successive stages to be reached with dates.
- c. Special subjects for emphasis during training.
- d. Allotment of time between individual and collective training as well as to specific subjects.
- e. Dates of exercises and other types of training being ordered by the commander or by higher formations.
- f. Allotment of training areas, ranges and ammunition.
- g. Details of course and allotment of vacancies.

TYPES OF EXERCISES

Military Exercises include the following:

- a. Exercise Without Troops. Exercise Without Troops (EWT) include:
 - (1) Model Exercise.
 - (2) Study Period.
 - (3) Tactical Exercise Without Troops (TEWT).
- b. Skeleton Exercise (Indoor Telephone Battle).
- c. Command Post Exercise (CPX).
- d. Intelligence Exercise.
- e. War Game.
- f. Exercise With Troops. There are at least six types of exercises with troops. These include the following:
 - (1) Battle Procedure and Battle Craft.
 - (2) Field Firing Exercise.
 - (3) HQ Exercises.
 - (4) One-Sided Exercise with Troops.
 - (5) Two-Sided Exercise with Troops.
 - (6) Administrative Exercise.

The Principles Of Training

- Training is a Function of Command.
- Training is a Continuous and Progressive Process.
- Training has to be Relevant.
- Training is to be challenging and interesting.

- Training should be Realistic.
- Training must have an Aim and Objectives.
- Training and Training Methods must be actively reviewed for their Effectiveness.
- Training is to reflect Operational Doctrine.
- Training has to be Permissive of Error (freedom to fail – but learn from mistakes).
- Collective Training should, when possible, include Other Categories of Training.

Categories of Training

In principle, military training can be placed in a number of categories:

- a. Individual.
- b. Team.
- c. Collective.
- d. Operationally Specific.
- e. Command.

In practice there is, or should be, considerable overlap, and in some cases integration between categories. Training should be regarded as a cohesive whole. There is, however, a temptation to focus only on one category at a time and to disregard the others. For example, individual and team training aspects are often neglected in collective training, yet they are interdependent. The emphasis may be on a particular category of training, but it should not be to the exclusion of others. Those who plan, supervise and assess training should be aware of this tendency. There is also a danger inherent in adopting too rigid a cyclic approach, and in separating responsibilities for the different categories of training.

Individual Training

The purpose of individual training (including recruit training) is to produce a self-confident and disciplined soldier who is physically fit, well motivated, and equipped with the basic skills and fighting qualities needed to survive on the battlefield and to operate as a member of a team or crew. Individual training has two elements:

- a. Skills training.
- b. More general training that contributes to personal development.
This may be more knowledge-based and include education.

Skills training may be equipment-related or aimed at personal or physical aptitude. Some skills are considered as core or mandatory, which all should possess. These, and the standards required, are governed by Individual Training Directives (ITDs). The number of core skills, and the standards to be achieved in each, should be reviewed regularly.

Skills of all kinds deteriorate, especially if not used regularly, the extent of the deterioration depending on the individual and the particular skill. This can usually be overcome by incorporating these skills into other categories of training. The frequency of skills practice in order to sustain acceptable operational standards should be governed by balancing deterioration, operational efficiency, time and cost, rather than by any particular fixed time frame. The annual or bi-annual testing of skills in accordance with ITDs is separate from this process.

Individual training of a more general nature is aimed at developing the potential of the individual to fulfill his or her role as a commander or as a soldier in a team or unit. It is a long-term investment. Such training may be carried out both on an individual and a group basis, on formal courses or informally, and be voluntary or prescribed.

Team Training

Team or crew training provides an immediate context for most individual skills training. It is when, for example, the specialist and complementary skills of the individual members of the gun detachment are brought together. The output is team skills and proficiency which no individual alone can achieve. The team or crew is the basic unit in all low-level operations. Hence, training at this level should be revisited regularly, and particularly when there has been a change in team composition. It should also feature at the appropriate level on career courses.

Collective Training

Collective training involves the training of two or more crews or detachments, sub-units, units and formations in the conduct of tactical operations. There is in theory no limit to the size of formation which may engage in collective training.

There are 3 types of collective training:

- a. **Special to Arm Training.** Special to Arm training is collective training on a single Arm or functional basis. It provides the immediate context for team or crew training.
- b. **Combined Arms Training.** Combined Arms training is the collective training of several arms together such as infantry, artillery and aviation. Such training will normally be at sub-unit level and above and involve more than one Arm. It provides the immediate context for Special to Arm collective training.
- c. **Joint and Multinational Training.** Joint and multinational training will normally take place at unit level and above, and involve two or more Services or nations.

The Training Process

The training process normally embraces four distinct and identifiable activities:

- a. The **acquisition** of skills, competence and knowledge.
- b. The **practicing** of skills and competence and the exercising of Knowledge.
- c. The **testing** of skills, competence and knowledge.

- d. The continuous **review** of training and training methods for their effectiveness, including, where appropriate, the assessment of training against set standards.


Training should be phased to allow these activities to take place sequentially, although there may be some overlap.

The Systems Approach to Training

Training is driven by the twin needs of:

- a. The task, either generally or specifically.
- b. The individual or group, and the competence or expertise they need to acquire, develop or revise.

The content of the training should be determined by analysis of these two areas of need, a process that has been developed in the Armed Forces, and encapsulated in the Systems Approach to Training (SAT). SAT represents a systematic and performance-based approach to the development of training which is in use throughout the Army, and which is to be implemented in the design and conduct of all training. It is illustrated in the Figure overleaf:



Systems approach to training

Aide Memoire for Planning, Designing and Organising Training

- Is the training relevant to the work or task the individual or group are or may be required to carry out?
- Does it reflect the needs of the individual or group?

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- Is the aim of the training clear? Is it attainable?
- Have the objectives of the training been defined? Are they realistic and can they be achieved? Do they reflect the appropriate standards?
- Is the desired outcome of the training clear?
- Is it progressive and does it build on previous training?
- Is the training timed correctly? Does it fit in with other training and commitments? Is it in the right sequence?
- Is the type of training planned the most appropriate to achieve the training objectives?
- Is the training properly resourced and staffed?
- Are the facilities available? Has the training been costed (if appropriate)?
- Has co-ordination been effected with other training?
- Have arrangements been made to assess and validate the training?
- Have instructions been issued for the conduct of After Action Reviews and the compilation of a Post Exercise Report?
- Has time been allocated to retrain on identified weaknesses?

Aide Memoire for the Conduct of Training

- Has it been confirmed that the trainees are available and have they been warned of the purpose and nature of the training? Have they been warned of any pre-training requirements, and the dress and equipment they will require?
- Has it been confirmed that the facilities it is planned to use are available, and that where applicable facility staff have been advised of your needs?
- Have arrangements been made for the necessary equipment and ammunition to be available and to be drawn up?
- Have the instructors, tutors and other supporting staff been fully briefed on the training to be carried out and their role? Do they have the necessary experience or expertise? It may be necessary to provide instruction, practice and possibly testing (to gain a qualification) for supporting staff prior to the training.
- Is the training being pitched at the right level?
- Will there be maximum involvement of the participants?
- Is the training planned sufficiently stimulating for the participants?
- Have the safety aspects been fully covered?
- Have realism and safety been reconciled?


RESTRICTED

- Have the appropriate assessment tools been adopted. Do they measure what they are intended to measure? Is that measurement reliable and accurate?
- Has the After Action Review been planned? Is there a data collection plan for the After Action Review?
- Has time been allowed for assessment and feedback?
- Is the training sufficiently flexible to allow for discussion and correction of fault or error?
- Has a debriefing been arranged for instructors and other supporting staff?
- Have appropriate arrangements been made for post training action (reporting, administrative action)?
- If appropriate, have Public Information and Civil Affairs staffs been briefed?
- Have detailed written instructions been issued?


SECTION 10

MAP SYMBOLS

BASIC STRUCTURES




UNIT



OBSERVATION
POST



HQ/ELEMENT
OF A HQ



LOGISTICS
INSTALLATION

SIZE SYMBOLS



SECTION



BRIGADE



PLATOON



DIVISION



COMPANY/
BATTERY/
SQUADRON



CORPS



BATTALION



ARMY GROUP













BATTLE GROUP











COMBAT TEAM


SIZE SYMBOLS

	SECTION		BRIGADE
	PLATOON		DIVISION
	COMPANY/ BATTERY/ SQUADRON		CORPS
	BATTALION		ARMY GROUP
	BATTLE GROUP		COMBAT TEAM

INSTALLATION SYMBOLS

	UNSPECIFIED/ MULTI ROLE		RATION
	TPT/MOV CON		WATER
	MEDICAL		AMMO
	HOSPITAL		FUEL

UNIT SYMBOLS



INFANTRY



ENGINEER




PARACHUTE




AIR DEFENCE



TRANSPORT



ARMOUR



ARTILLERY



COMMUNICATIONS




SUPPLY (ORD)




REPAIR & RECOVERY


UNIT & SYMBOLS




RECONNAISSANCE



ANTI TANK



ARMY AVIATION




MEDICAL




MILITARY POLICE



ELECTRONIC
WARFARE



MECH INF



ARMRD ARTY




ARMRD ENGR



AD

WEAPON SYMBOLS




MG



ATK GUN



ATK MSL




ATK RL



MOR



GUN/HOW




AD MSL




SSM

VEHICLE SYMBOLS



TANK




ARMD VEH WHEELED



ARMD VEH













ARMD VEH TRACKED





APC

OBSTACLE & OTHER SYMBOLS


	ATK MINEFIELD		INTER BN BDRY
	ANTI PERS MINEFIELD		STRONG PT
	MIXED MINEFIELD		DEF POSN OCCUPIED BY A PL
	ATK DITCH (UNDER CONST)		DEF POSN TO BE OCCUPIED BY A COY
	ATK DITCH (COMPLETED)		OCCUPIED BY A PL BUT NOT IN A STATE OF DEF

COLOUR CODE


-  **BLUE** - OWN FORCES
-  **RED** - EN
-  **GREEN** - OBS, MINEFIELD, DEMOLITIONS
-  **YELLOW** - NBC

*** IF NO COLOUR, DOUBLE LINE REPRESENTS EN AND SINGLE FRIENDLY FORCES.**


EXAMPLES




EXACT LOC OF 5 INF BN
OF 2 BDE



HQ OF 2 SQN OF
1 ARMoured REGT




EXACT LOC OF 3 PL
OF A PARA COY




HQ OF A TP
OF 1 ENGR SQN

EXAMPLES




PROPOSED LOC OF HQ
5 INF BN OF 2 BDE



AREA TO BE OCCUPIED BY
2 INF BN OF 1 BDE

CLOSES 240900Z




DS A OF 66 ARTY FD AMB
WHICH CLOSES A 240900Z.



THE SITE OF A
WP CLOSED

EXAMPLES

1 BN DEPLOYMENT



SECTION 11

STATES OF COMMAND

Full Command: The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services.

Operational Command (OPCOM): The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, reassign forces and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics.

Operational Control (OPCON): The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it include administration or logistic control.

Tactical Command (TACOM): The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.

Tactical Control (TACON): The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or manoeuvres necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Under Command Administration (UCADMIN): The authority delegated to a commander to command and control all administration for those forces assigned. When the temporary nature of the command makes it necessary to effect a complete change of administrative command, a unit or formation may be placed under administrative command less certain named matters.

Under Command for Daily Maintenance (UDCM): The state of logistic/ administrative command leaves the original formation or unit with full responsibility for all administration less daily maintenance. Daily maintenance would include replenishment of combat supplies, evacuation of casualties, the provision of common user supply items and the repair and recovery of equipment.

THE APPLICATION OF STATES OF COMMAND

AUTHORITY	OPCOM	OPCON	TACOM	TACON
GRANTED TO A COMD	YES			
DELEGATED TO A COMD		YES	YES	
ASSIGN MISSION	YES			
ASSIGN TASKS	YES		YES	
DIRECT FORCES		YES		
REASSIGN FORCES	YES			
REASSIGN OPCOM	YES			
RETAIN OPCON	YES			
DELEGATE OPCON	YES	YES WITH APPROVAL		
ASSIGN TACOM		YES		
DELEGATE TACON	YES	YES		
RETAIN TACON	YES	YES		
DEPLOY FORCES	YES	YES		
ASSIGN SPECIFIC TASKS	NO			
LOCAL DIRECTION AND CONTROL OF MOVEMENTS AND MANOEUVRES				YES
ASSIGN SEPARATE EMPLOYMENT OF COMPONENTS OF UNITS				NO
ADMINISTRATIVE COMMAND	NO			
ADMINISTRATIVE CONTROL		NO		
LOGISTICS SUPPORT/COMMAND	NO			
LOGISTICS CONTROL		NO		
DAY-TO-DAY DIRECTION	NO	YES		
SUPERIOR TO TACOM		YES		

NOTES:

- a. "YES" specifically allows authority.
- b. "NO" specifically prohibits authority.
- c. Blank means references do not mention authority: some nations infer prohibition; others infer authority is allowed.
- d. States of comd and con will always be qualified by the DTG at which they begin. The DTG at which they end should also be specified if known.
- e. A comd assigned forces under FULL COMD or OPCOM may employ those forces for any purpose. Forces assigned under OPCON may only be employed within certain constraints, such as function, time or loc, imposed by the higher auth which assigns the forces.
- f. A comd assigned forces under TACOM may alloc tasks to those forces but only in accordance with the msn given to him by the higher auth that assigns the forces.

- g. Mission is defined as: “A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose.

SECTION 12

HANDLING AND SEARCHING OF A CAPTURED ENEMY AND EQUIPMENT

INTRODUCTION

1. Operations will result in the capture of the enemy and his equipment. These are valuable sources of intelligence, especially in the hands of expert interrogators. Most often than not however, valuable information from captured enemy is lost because of lack of training and awareness of this subject.

2. Poor searching techniques have led to unnecessary friendly force casualties particularly when up against a high indoctrinated and resolute en, which are skilled in the use of booby traps and are prepared to initiate them at the cost of their lives. It is therefore necessary that all commanders train their men in the handling and searching of captured enemy and equipment.

AIM

3. The aim of this précis is to highlight the factors and techniques involved in the handling and searching of captured enemy and equipment.

SCOPE

4. The précis will cover the following:

- a. The Prisoner.
- b. Types of Information.
- c. Procedure on Capture.
- d. Searching a dead enemy and equipment.
- e. Area search.
- f. Documentation of captured enemy and equipment.
- g. Conclusion.

THE PRISONER

5. At the time of capture, a prisoner will be worried, shocked and perhaps wounded and his handler must ensure that his morale is not allowed to improve. He must however be treated fairly and within the terms of the Geneva Convention. The prisoner must be constantly guarded and on no account should a prisoner be allowed to mix with other prisoners. Ideally they should be separated and blindfolded, when necessary. Officers should be separated from soldiers.

RESTRICTED

TYPES OF INFORMATION

6. All prisoners will willingly or unwillingly reveal information of varying importance. This information may be extracted during questioning or come from his equipment, insignia and documents.
7. All information can be separated into three categories;
 - a. Of Immediate Importance.
 - b. Of Short Term Importance.
 - c. Of Long Term Importance.
8. The soldier in the field however, should consider all information as of immediate importance and send it back to his higher HQ as soon as possible. The intelligence staff at the higher HQ are trained to evaluate and then disseminate intelligence..

PROCEDURE ON CAPTURE

9. Soldiers should be discouraged from becoming too friendly towards prisoners of war (PW) if the prisoner is to remain subdued for future questioning. He must not be comforted in any manner, other than to administer first aid. The emphasis must be on a firm methodical system as follows;
 - a. Disarm and Guard.
 - b. Search Thoroughly and Methodically.
 - c. Immobilize and Blindfold when necessary.
 - d. Document Prisoners.
 - e. Segregate and Guard.
10. **Body Search.** There are many cases of information being missed because of bad body search techniques. All searches must be thorough and methodical. Start from head, down to the toe. Some points commonly missed are;
 - a. Documents sewn into pocket flaps, lapels etc.
 - b. Information written on wrists and breams.
 - c. Information in butt traps of weapons.
 - d. Information concealed on enemy wounded.
 - e. Inscriptions on hands and arms of prisoners.
11. **Searching a PW.** The following method is employed;

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- a. Two personnel are detailed; the searcher and the cover man.
- b. The cover man is responsible for protecting the searcher and ensuring that PW does not escape. His weapon should remain aimed at the enemy, however he should not maintain a sight picture, as this will restrict his field of vision. He should be positioned such that;
 - (1) He is well out of arms reach of the PW.
 - (2) He is at right angles to the searcher.
 - (3) He has a clear view and line of fire to the PW.
- c. The searcher must first ensure that the enemy has placed down any visible weapon and moved away from it before he approaches him. The searcher should leave his weapon with the cover man and approach the PW at right angles, in such a manner that the PW is off balance, can be searched easily and can be overpowered quickly if necessary.

- d. Methods of positioning a PW for searching are;

- (1) Face down, feet and hands well apart, supporting the body on finger tips and toes, with back arched.
- (2) Arms extended with hands against a tree, with legs straight and feet well apart, the body forming an angle of 1600 mils to the ground. (Fig 1)





Fig 1

- (3) When a group of prisoners are caught, Position them such that each faces a wall, Forehead touching the wall, hands crossed over shoulder, back arched and legs crossed. (Fig 2)



Fig 2



- (4) Prisoners may also be made to kneel with hands over the head.
(Fig 3)

Fig 3

- (5) A difficult prisoner would be subdued by a two-man arrest position, One forces the prisoner with an arm lock While the others applies pressure points.
(Fig 4)




Fig 4

- (6) Another variation is to use a baton to immobilise the prisoner pushing the baton under the armpit and behind the neck, shoulder by locking the arm.
(Fig 7)



Fig7

- e. In using these methods the searcher should be positioned behind the PW.
- f. The searcher should first remove any webbing or equipment from the PW and put it at one side for searching later. Clothing should then be searched using a grabbing motion. This ensures that small items and single pieces of paper or cloth are not missed. Headgear, hair and boots should not be disregarded.

g. The searcher should never move between the enemy and the cover man. Once the body search is complete the enemy may be sat on the ground with legs apart, hands on the head and elbows up whilst his webbing and equipment is searched. All items and equipment found must be tagged with an equipment tag, ensuring that the equipment tag can be cross-referenced to the PW tag.

h. If more than one enemy is captured they should be segregated immediately by rank and sex, and no talking must be allowed.

SEARCHING A DEAD ENEMY AND EQUIPMENT

12. **Searching a Dead Enemy.** The following procedure is employed:

a. The first principle to obey in searching a suspected dead enemy is to ensure that he is actually dead and is not simply feigning death. A cover man must be employed whilst this is being done. Once it is confirmed that he is dead the cover man can be employed on another task.

b. If the enemy is lying on his back he should be approached from the head, and if lying on his stomach he should be approached from his feet. This prevents an enemy feigning death from quickly bringing a concealed weapon to bear on the searcher.

c. If the enemy has just been killed it is unlikely that the body has been booby-trapped and therefore no special precautions are necessary in conducting the search. This also applies to his personal weapon and equipment. However, if the enemy has been dead for sometime or for example, a body is found by a patrol, then precautions against booby traps must be taken.

13. **Searching an Enemy Equipment.** Whenever enemy equipment is found and there are indications that the equipment was not captured due to an immediate battle, booby trap precautions have to be taken to prevent casualties. The same will apply to an enemy who from indications has been dead for sometime. These precautions are described below.

14. **Booby Trap Precautions.** The following precautions should be adhered to:

a. The area around the equipment or body should first be checked for booby traps without touching any part of the equipment or body.

b. A line with grappling hook or karabiner attached is then laid from behind cover to the body. When attaching the grappling hook to the equipment or body, care must be taken not to

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move it. When pulling the body (from behind cover) the following warnings must be given to all personnel in the vicinity;

- (1) “About to Pull”. Ensure all personnel in the vicinity take cover.
- (2) “Pulling Now”. This warning is given once all personnel have taken cover. The body is pulled after this warning is given.
- (3) “All Clear”. All personnel must remain under cover until this is given. A time lapse of at least 10 seconds must be allowed between pulling and giving the all clear to counter delayed detonation.

d. When an equipment such as a radio equipment is captured in this manner, troops should not tamper with it. An expert should see to certify that it is not booby trapped inside.

AREA SEARCH

15. The type of operation that has resulted in the capture of prisoners will dictate the tactics involved in the resulting area search. It should be borne in mind that certain ethnic groups will go to incredible lengths to prevent their comrade's bodies being taken. Some seriously wounded could move away and bury themselves under rocks or shrubs to die, thereby hiding valuable documents and information.

16. In addition to suspected bodies and equipment all other stores and equipment, which are not the personal issue of a PW or recently killed enemy, must be considered suspect. This includes stockpiles of food, equipment and weapons, radio antennas, field defences and attractive items. All such items should be “pulled”.

DOCUMENTATION OF CAPTIVE AND EQUIPMENT

17. **Documentation of Equipment.** Any item removed from the enemy must be bagged and logged. Soldiers must be prevented from playing with captured items and above all they must not be allowed to take souvenirs. Quite often, seemingly small insignificant items taken as a souvenir will result in the loss of very valuable information. Soldiers investigating a captured radio could well lose the enemy's frequency.

18. **Documentation of Equipment.** Any item removed from the enemy must be bagged and logged. Soldiers must be prevented from playing with captured items and above all they must not be allowed to take souvenirs. Quite often, seemingly small insignificant items taken as a souvenir will

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result in the loss of very valuable information. Soldiers investigating a captured radio could well lose the enemy's frequency.

<u>FRONT</u>	<u>BACK</u>
ATTACH TO PW DATE OF CAPTURE:..... NAME:..... SVC NO:..... RANK:..... UNIT:..... DOB:..... PLACE OF CAPTURE:..... CAPTURING UNIT:..... SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:..... WPNS/DOCUS:.....	SEARCH THOROUGHLY TAG CORRECTLY REPORT IMMEDIATELY EVACUTE RAPIDLY SEGREGATE BY CATEGORY SAFEGUARD FROM DANGER/ESCAPE DO NOT REMOVE FROM PW
FORWARD TO UNIT DATE OF CAPTURE:..... NAME:..... SVC NO:..... RANK:..... PLACE OF CAPTURE:.....	FORWARD TO UNIT SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF CAPTURE:..
..... CAPTURING UNIT:.....
WPNS/DOCUS:.....
ATTACH TO WPNS/DOCUS DATE OF CAPTURE:..... NAME:..... SVC NO:..... RANK:..... UNIT:..... DOB:..... PLACE OF CAPTURE:..... WPNS/DOCUS (SEE OVER).	ATTACH TO WPNS/DOCUS WPNS/DOCUS:.....

Table .1 Documentation of Capture/Eqpt.

CONCLUSION

19. The value of intelligence cannot be over emphasized. All troops must realize the importance of the captured enemy or equipment from an intelligence point of view and the danger of losing vital information or sustaining casualties through bad prisoner handling techniques.

20. Remember these 4 “S”;

- a. **Search**- For weapons/documents immediately.
- b. **Segregate** - Into groups officers/OR/civilians male/female or ideally individually.
- c. **Silence**- Do not allow prisoners to communicate with each other.
- d. **Safeguard** - Prisoners, documents and materials. Tag and evacuate to the rear.

SECTION 13

THE BATTLE GROUP ORGANISATION FOR OPERATIONS

This précis is limited to ops at the BG/Bn Level.

a. Harbour Party. An advance Party tasked primarily to organise the BG's "Waiting area" ie Conc/har/Assy area prior to further ops.

b. Rear Recce Party. An advance Party tasked primarily to organise the BG's tactical deployment position such as New Defensive Area or Hide.

1. Basically the drills and sops for both Recce and harbour parties are the same. Both require recce, planning, organisation of the new position as well as the reception of the BG main body into that position.

2. **General Outline**

- a. BG Wng O issued, to include Rv and time for har/ rear recce party.
- b. BG Comd brief 2IC (if party to mov brfore BG O Gp).
- c. Sub units gps meet 2IC at the Time/RV for 2IC's brief.
- d. Mov to new Posn.
 - (1) Recce and site new Posns.
 - (2) Set out replenishment plan (if due to take place).
 - (3) Arrange reception of main body with gides at BG Rel pt.(Through which all tps must must pass). Guiding of tps into respective posns is sub-unit responsibility after the BG Rel pt.

3. **Specific task in new Position**

- a. BG 2IC. Recce, estimate, plan and site new BG posn. Hold O Gp. Visit each CT loc (if time allows) to tie up task, mutual sp, C attack task etc. Meet Main Body on its arrival at BG Rel Pt.
- b. Sig Offr. Recce, site new BG Hq Loc. Establish Alternative HQ and take over comd Bg net when ordered. Meet Bg Hg on arrival.
- c. CT Gps. 2ICs recce, make plan and give orders. Coord plan with BG 2IC. Plt Sgt spitlock trenches and mark arch of fire. Meet Ct on arrival at BG rel Pt.
- d. MT SSGT. Recce/site A Ech. Plan replenishment/feeding.

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HARBOUR AND REAR RECCE PARTIES COMPOSITION

Group	Personnel	Total	Remarks
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
BG HQ	BG 2IC Dvr (1) Sig Cpl (Bde Net) 2xRP Sig Pte (BG Net) PT Sgt RSO 2xPte Def Int Sgt Pl	11	(1) with MFC
Each CT (x3)	CT 2IC 3xPl Sgt 3xPte (I Per Pl) *(1)	8 (x3)	*(1) Exceptionally if specifically ordered, 1Pte per sect.
Mor Pl	Mor Sgt 4x Pte (I per sect)	5	CTs take Sect Rep(s) if sect(s) under comd
MG PL	Pl Sgt	1	
Asslt Pnr PL	Pl Sgt	1	
ATK PL	Pl Sgt	1	
A Ech	MT Ssgt CQMs HQ Coy Stmn (Pte) Hq Coy HQ 2x Dvrs (pte) *1	5	(*1) with 2x 4 ton Pool vehs
B Ech	(Not applicable; as always under Bde HQ control)		
*DS Arty Bty	FOO (Bty makes own arrangement to mov to new posn)		
*Recce Tp/Sqn	<u>If a Sqn</u> <u>If a Tp</u> Sqn SSM Tp Sgt Tp Sgts 1xTpr Tpr per Tp	N/A	
*Engr Tp	Tp 2IC 1xSpr	N/A	
Total (Excluding any att tps under comd		48	

*If OPCOM/TACOM

RECCE AND ORDER GROUP

Type	Incl	BG	CT	PL
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)
RECCE (R) GP	Normal	BG Comd *BC Ops Offr *Armd Comd *Engr Comd Bde/BG R Opr Sect Def Pl B’Gd/Runner	CT Comd *FOO BG R Opr Armd Comd Runner *MFC (if no FOO)	Pl Comd R Opr
	When specifically ordered	IO RSO Mor pl Comd MG Pl Comd A Pnr Pl Comd ATK Pl Comd CT Comds (for concurrent Act)	*MFC * A Pnr Sect Comd Prot Party Pl Comds (for concurrent Act	Protection Party
ORDERS (O) GP	Normal	All above plus CT comds *FOOs	All Above plus Pl Comds MFC *A Pnr Sect Comd(s) MG Pl Sect Comd (s)	All Above plus Sect Comds Atk Gun No.1
	When specifically ordered	BG 2IC Adjt OC A Ech Oc B Ech RMO RSM	CT 2IC CSM CQMS Med Ord	Pl Sgt *Comds of any Sp sects with Pl

Note: 1.When/ if Attached 2. Padre may attend BG O Gp when available

APPOINTMENT TITLES AND CALLSIGNS

Communications in the field particularly on radio need to be simple and also provide security. Personnel are therefore given appointment title to facilitate communication. The table below shows some appointment titles

RADIO APPOINTMENT TITLES

Title	For	In Inf Bn/ BG
ACORN	Int Staff	IO
BLUEBELL	EME Rep	NCO, IC LAD, Rev
FORTUNE	FAC Rep	(Air Wing) LO
FOXHOUND	Inf Rep	-
HOLDFAST	ENGR Rep	Engr/Asslt Pnr comd
IRONSIDE	Armd Rep	Sqn/ Tp comd
KESTREL	Ops	Ops Offr
MOLAR	AQ/Quartermaster	QM CQMS
PLAYTIME	Tpt	MTO
PRONTO	Sig	RSO
RICKSHAW	Ord Rep	-
SEAGULL	G Staff	Adj, CSMs
SHELLDRAKE	Mor Regt Rep	BC
STARLIGHT	Med	RMO, Med Ords
SUNRAY	Comds	CO, CT/PL Comds
WATCHDOG	Provost	Pro Sgt
MOONBEAM	Padre	Padre

ARM INDICATORS

Arm indicators are to be used always even if no support arm is on the net

Arm	Indicator	Arm	Indicator
Infantry	I or K	Air Wing	L
Recce Regt	T or U	Med	M
Mor Regt	G or W	Ord	O
Engr Regt	E or F	MP	P
Air Borne Force	B	EME	R
S&T	D	Sigs	S

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CALL SIGNS

Note:

All Inf callsigns preceded by the Arm Indicator (I or K)

HQ STNS	BG HQ- O A CT- 1 A Ech - 85 B CT- 2 B Ech- 85B C CT- 3																																																																																																																																																																									
BG HQ	CP (Comd Veh) – 0 LOs (if Any) - 94, (94A) BG Comd - 9 RSM - 95 BG 2IC - 9A Pro Sect - 95A Ops Offr (OC Sp) –9B Def Pl HQ - 96 Adj - 91 Def Pl Sects - 96A, B&C Sig Offr (RSO) - 92 FAC (if Any) -97 Sig Pl -92A (SPARE) -98 IO - 93 Bde Comd (If on net)- 99 Int Sect - 93A																																																																																																																																																																									
COMBAT TEAMS	<table><tr><td></td><td colspan="3"><u>A CT</u></td><td colspan="3"><u>B CT</u></td><td colspan="3"><u>C CT</u></td></tr><tr><td></td><td colspan="3"><u>HQ</u></td><td colspan="3"><u>HQ</u></td><td colspan="3"><u>HQ</u></td></tr><tr><td>CT HQ</td><td colspan="3">1</td><td colspan="3">2</td><td colspan="3">3</td></tr><tr><td>CT Comd</td><td colspan="3">19</td><td colspan="3">29</td><td colspan="3">39</td></tr><tr><td>CT 2IC</td><td colspan="3">19A</td><td colspan="3">29A</td><td colspan="3">39A</td></tr><tr><td>(Spare)</td><td colspan="3">19B</td><td colspan="3">29B</td><td colspan="3">39B</td></tr><tr><td>CSM</td><td colspan="3">19C</td><td colspan="3">29C</td><td colspan="3">39C</td></tr><tr><td>CQMS</td><td colspan="3">19D</td><td colspan="3">29D</td><td colspan="3">39D</td></tr><tr><td>LO (if any)</td><td colspan="3">19E</td><td colspan="3">29E</td><td colspan="3">39E</td></tr><tr><td>FAC*</td><td colspan="3">17</td><td colspan="3">27</td><td colspan="3">37</td></tr></table> <table><tr><td></td><td><u>1PL</u></td><td><u>2PL</u></td><td><u>3Pl</u></td><td><u>4PL</u></td><td><u>5PL</u></td><td><u>6PL</u></td><td><u>7PL</u></td><td><u>8PL</u></td><td><u>9PL</u></td></tr><tr><td>Pls</td><td>11</td><td>12</td><td>13</td><td>21</td><td>22</td><td>23</td><td>31</td><td>32</td><td>33</td></tr><tr><td>Pl Comds**</td><td>11L</td><td>12L</td><td>13L</td><td>21L</td><td>22L</td><td>23L</td><td>31L</td><td>32L</td><td>33L</td></tr><tr><td>1st Sect</td><td>11A</td><td>12A</td><td>13A</td><td>21A</td><td>22A</td><td>23A</td><td>31A</td><td>32A</td><td>33A</td></tr><tr><td>2nd Sect</td><td>11B</td><td>12B</td><td>13C</td><td>21B</td><td>22B</td><td>23B</td><td>31B</td><td>32B</td><td>33B</td></tr><tr><td>3rd Sect</td><td>11C</td><td>12C</td><td>13C</td><td>21C</td><td>22C</td><td>23C</td><td>31C</td><td>32C</td><td>33C</td></tr></table> <p>* -If att & on CT net</p> <p>** - L used when away from PL HQ</p>											<u>A CT</u>			<u>B CT</u>			<u>C CT</u>				<u>HQ</u>			<u>HQ</u>			<u>HQ</u>			CT HQ	1			2			3			CT Comd	19			29			39			CT 2IC	19A			29A			39A			(Spare)	19B			29B			39B			CSM	19C			29C			39C			CQMS	19D			29D			39D			LO (if any)	19E			29E			39E			FAC*	17			27			37				<u>1PL</u>	<u>2PL</u>	<u>3Pl</u>	<u>4PL</u>	<u>5PL</u>	<u>6PL</u>	<u>7PL</u>	<u>8PL</u>	<u>9PL</u>	Pls	11	12	13	21	22	23	31	32	33	Pl Comds**	11L	12L	13L	21L	22L	23L	31L	32L	33L	1 st Sect	11A	12A	13A	21A	22A	23A	31A	32A	33A	2 nd Sect	11B	12B	13C	21B	22B	23B	31B	32B	33B	3 rd Sect	11C	12C	13C	21C	22C	23C	31C	32C	33C
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SECTION 14

CONDUCT OF CAMPAIGN PLANNING ANALYSIS

Analysis includes the intelligence process and is a continuous, whole headquarters activity to gain knowledge of the factors that characterize a situation. As a situation evolves, analysis is updated by continuous assessment of progress.

PRINCIPLES

Purposeful. As a preliminary activity to planning, albeit one that continues during both planning and execution, analysis is invariably carried out against a finite, and often challenging, timeline. It should be managed pragmatically and purposefully, to provide situational understanding; analysis is a means to an end.

Expansive. Analysis is about understanding the nature of the crisis situation; it is during the planning process that a JFC searches for a solution. Analysis involves revealing factors, exploring different perspectives and expanding knowledge rather than focusing on what ought to be done to address a perceived issue.

Inclusive. Although time is always a limiting factor, consideration should be given to as many sources of information and ideas, perspectives and opinions as possible. Additional credible views and insights, however inconsistent or contradictory, can enrich understanding.

Receptive. The tendency to adopt a particular perspective early on, and then ignore information that fails to support that view, should be resisted. The impact of a closed mind may be to reject contrary views, and even exclude those who hold them, thus breaching an inclusive approach.

Challenging. A balance should be struck between being inclusive and being sufficiently discerning or discriminating. All ideas and information should be tested for their validity; any gaps in information

should be similarly examined in a bid to build a comprehensive picture of the situation in the time available.

METHODOLOGIES

The most appropriate methodologies for analysis will be dictated by the problem and the JFC's knowledge and preferences. Commonly used approaches include:

- a. **SWOT**. The SWOT analysis, frequently used in strategy formulation, helps to and threats associated with a particular object (country, group, organisation, tribe, etc). A problem situation can thus be understood as a balance between protecting Strengths, minimising Weaknesses, exploiting Opportunities and mitigating Threats.
- b. **PEST**. The PEST analysis is used to understand an object's external environment, and changes in that environment, in terms of Political, Economic, Social/demographic and Technological factors or influences. PEST factors may not be amenable to direct control by a JFC but will undoubtedly impact on how a crisis develops, and the potential effectiveness of military and other activities. There are a number of extensions and variations of the PEST analysis, such as:
 - (1) **PESTL and STEEPLE**. The PESTL and STEEPLE adds Legal, Environmental and Ethic, factors.
 - (2) **PMESII**. PMESII is used in the US and NATO planning processes, addresses Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure and Information.
- c. The **constituents of a nation or society** include the rule of law, economic and diplomacy, administration and governance (sometimes referred to as Jackson's Rope of inter-twined factors that, bound together, form the fabric of the nation or society). Each factor may represent either a

strength or weakness of the nation, and thereby an opportunity or a threat to the success (for example) of an intervention forces seeking to achieve peace and stability.

d. **Stakeholder analysis** is used to identify the driving and restraining forces for change in a situation. The eventual resolution of a crisis should satisfy the majority of stakeholders, or at least ensure that no powerful (and legitimate) stakeholder is left (too) dissatisfied. Stakeholder analysis can take a number of forms, but the purpose is broadly the same – to identify relevant stakeholders and the ways in which each may influence, or be influenced by, the situation. Actors and their influences can be depicted diagrammatically to depict formal, and informal, relationships – in essence, a stakeholder network.

e. A **cultural estimate** addresses a situation from a sociological perspective, addressing groups of actors' objectives, economic resources, political resources, means of social unification, and weaknesses. It also consider education, commercial, humanitarian health, information and military.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING

This Chapter builds on JDP 01 '*Campaigning*' and addresses the **how and why** of campaign planning, including the operational estimate. Defence Crisis Management Organisation (DCMO) addresses the **who, what and when**. For clarity, this section focuses principally on national operations to provide an overall perspective, but that broad viewpoint is also valuable in a multinational operation as a junior partner. Multinational (alliance and coalition) considerations are subsequently could also be considered in planning.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

The Formulation of National Strategy is based upon the President and Cabinet's intent, and drawing on the framework of the National Security Strategy, the National Security determines policy and national

strategic objectives through a process of political strategic analysis, and provides guidance for national planning. National policy is then implemented through an integrated cross-Government strategy, coordinated through the Cabinet and Defence Secretariat (or another cross-Government body, as appropriate).

Political strategic analysis is a cross-Government analysis of a crisis and the options for its resolution; it is not necessarily led by any one Department, although the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), in the case of Britain; guided by routinely updated Political-Military Estimates, usually leads on overseas policy including foreign security. Political strategic analysis seeks to balance national priorities and resources in often complex, ambiguous and uncertain circumstances. The crisis itself is likely to be dynamic, and it may also take time for political direction to evolve, especially where the country intends to act in conjunction with other nations or multinational institutions (who may develop their responses at a different tempo). Consequently a definitive national strategy may take time to mature; in the interim, military commanders should begin their planning based upon a judgement (informed by policy guidance) about the desired outcome. Prior to the definition of a formal national strategic aim, planners at the strategic level may agree a unifying theme (a central idea reflecting the character, context and direction of Government strategy) to underpin and provide coherence to initial planning efforts.

In the Political-Military Estimate, the MOD contributes to the formulation of national strategy by conducting its own political-military estimate. The political-military estimate is seldom neatly bounded or based on well-defined parameters from the outset; it develops over time with the cross-Government political strategic analysis and the progress of national and international political dialogue. Although MOD-led, key representation from the ONS and OGDs validates the balance of political-military advice. Its central aim is to consider potential crisis areas around the world and to assess political implications against military feasibility and sustainability. It makes a vital contribution to political strategic analysis and the development of national strategy; likewise, it informs any decision to initiate a Chief of Defence Staff's (CDS') Planning Directive.

Strategic Outcomes is a term strategic outcome describes the Government's aspirations, goals and objectives for a particular crisis. How these are articulated will vary depending upon the nature of the crisis, the nature of the intended response (with varying degrees of emphasis on the diplomatic, economic and military instruments of power), and the extent of collaboration envisaged with other nations, multinational institutions and International Organizations.

Commanders at all levels should anticipate strategic outcomes evolving overtime, their definition and detail increasing as an individual crisis unfolds. Assumptions play an important part in strategic planning. These may inform not only initial planning but also consider how events may develop in the future (to ensure that long-term contingency planning, for example, is not delayed awaiting definitive planning guidance). Frequent and unpredictable changes in strategic direction are more likely to be the rule than the exception, although the JFC has a responsibility to engage personally and proactively across the political interface to mitigate their consequence. For at least 2 reasons, military commanders may seek – perhaps unreasonable degrees of – certainty:

- a. For practical reasons, training exercises tend to be initiated by clear planning guidance (including an explicit scenario and prescriptive start state); this seldom reflects reality but may create the misperception that it is a necessary pre-requisite for subsequent military planning in real life.
- b. 'Selection and maintenance of the aim', sometimes described as the cardinal principle of warfare, can suggest that not only is a clear aim essential (which it is), but that it needs to be maintained (which it cannot necessarily). The aim must be kept both relevant and up-to-date; as a crisis unfolds, the imperatives can change. Strategic outcomes include aims and objectives,⁴ terms that are widely used, but not always well-defined across Government. The MOD ascribes specific meanings to promote clearer dialogue within MOD and with other departments.

A national strategic aim is 'the Government's declared purpose, normally expressed as a favourable and enduring outcome'. The national strategic aim may be articulated personally by Ministers, or it may be discerned indirectly from UK foreign policy statements and official records (such as the minutes of Cabinet, National Security, International Relations and Development committee, Cabinet

sub-committees and engagements with multinational partners), or through discussions between politicians and officials. Achieving the national strategic aim invariably requires contributions from cross-Government, and perhaps from multiple agencies. It provides the unifying purpose for military commanders and leaders of non-military organisations.

A strategic objective is ‘a goal to be achieved through one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim’. It may be explicit, or deduced from Government policy, strategic direction or the decisions of committees. Objectives are likely to require significant coordination across departmental boundaries, even if allocated to a particular department to lead. In practice, formulating strategic objectives by consensus between departments may be challenging; the process should, ideally, be coordinated centrally, for example through the Cabinet or National Security, International Relations and Development committee.

Military Contribution to the National Strategic Aim is the extent of the military contribution to meeting the national strategic aim is termed the military strategic end-state, expressed as a series of military strategic objectives. Within the resources, including time and space, assigned to him, a JFC is responsible for a of campaign objectives, expressed in terms of one or more Decisive Conditions (DCs), the achievement of which indicates his campaign end-state.

The national strategic aim is the government’s declared purpose in a particular situation, normally expressed in terms of reaching a future desired outcome. The **desired outcome** is a favourable and enduring situation, consistent with political direction, reached through intervention and/or as a result of some other form of influence. It invariably requires contributions from all instruments of power; it should be determined collectively.

The national strategic aim provides the unifying purpose for strategic and operational level commanders, and leaders from non-military organisations.

A **strategic objective** is a goal to be achieved by one or more instruments of national power in order to meet the national strategic aim. Military strategic objectives are goals to be achieved principally by the military (and are the responsibility of the military-strategic commander (CDS)).

The **campaign end-state** is reached when all the campaign objectives have been achieved. It therefore represents the extent of the JFC's contribution to meeting the national strategic aim.

A **campaign objective** is a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim.

PLANNING AT THE OPERATIONAL LEVEL

The operational level of warfare is the level at which campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operation. Operational level campaigns are invariably joint, and most often multinational and multi-agency.

Operational planning is command-led and dynamic. While staff may assist a JFC, ultimately it is *his* plan and he drives its development. The essence of this relationship is based on an acknowledgement that planning is a mental activity, aided but not driven by process. Although each individual campaign has a unique context, scale and mix of military activities, all campaigns share a common purpose: to translate strategic intent into tactical activity. Operational level planning requires a JFC to determine how (the *ways*) and a favourable situation (the dictated *ends*) may be created within the time and resources available (his allocated *means*). Such planning should be conducted in concert with OGDs and other agencies, whose combined and often inter-dependent efforts are required to achieve the national strategic aim.

Operational Art. Operational art is the theory and practice of planning, preparing and conducting campaigns to accomplish operational and strategic objectives. In practice, it is essentially a commander's skill in orchestrating tactical actions in concert with other agencies to achieve the desired outcome. What is *to be achieved* can be aspirational, for which it is normal to use broad terms such as

outcome, conditions and effects, which leave room for individual tactical flair and initiative. However, when describing what an individual or organisation *is to achieve*, then clear aims, objectives and activities should be used. The former tend to indicate the purpose or criteria that underlie the latter. Operational art is realised through a combination of a commander's skill and the staff-assisted processes of campaign design and campaign management. It is fundamentally a JFC's business and its mainspring is his creative and innovative thought or operational ideas.

Campaign Design develops and refines a commander's operational ideas to provide detailed, executable plans. It is underpinned by a clear understanding of the political and strategic context together with an effective framing of the problem. Tools and processes, for example the operational estimate, enable campaign design.

Campaign Management integrates, coordinates, synchronises and prioritises the execution of operations and assesses progress. Campaign design and campaign management are inter-related; during a campaign, the management function of assessment informs subsequent planning.

The product of planning will be determined by a combination of quality and speed. While acting early and fast is generally beneficial, the ideal is to assess, analyse and act *earlier and faster* than the adversary. Speed should always be seen in its appropriate context; sometimes it is right to gather all available information for a crucial decision. At other times, no amount of information will resolve ambiguity; sometimes more information will increase ambiguity. Optimum speed enables optimum weight of planning effort. Therefore, a principal skill for a JFC is to sense the *last sensible moment* to make any decision. Planning too quickly risks missing crucial information. Always seeking more information to resolve ambiguity slows down planning and risks decision paralysis. The test of any commander and of the efficiency of his staff is how well they can issue clear, achievable and above all timely orders.

CAMPAIGN PLANNING CONCEPTS

Campaign planning uses a variety of building blocks known as campaign planning concepts to focus planning (i.e. they aid analysis and understanding) and to describe a plan in directives and orders (i.e. they aid communication). Different concepts have utility at different times during campaign planning; not all concepts are useful on all occasions.

Operational Estimate and Associated Techniques. The operational estimate is a problem-solving tool; it helps a JFC to analyse an ill-structured problem. The process is rational, in that it progresses logically from fact to deduction, but a JFC is not constrained to objective analysis alone. While his intellect and practical ability will inform his decision-making, his creativity and vision are more likely to prove decisive.

Campaign Plan and Assessment. A campaign plan is the actionable expression of a JFC's intent, articulated to subordinate commanders through plans, directives and orders. During its execution, a campaign plan is kept under continuous review, informed by campaign assessment, and modified iteratively to reflect changes in the situation and in strategic direction.

Campaign End-State. End-state analysis confirms the relationship of the in-theatre military contribution within the overall effort to reach a desired outcome. A JFC may be given his campaign end-state, or he may have to derive it himself. Subsequent analysis helps him to appreciate the political and military strategic purpose behind his specific activity and the intended relationship with the other instruments of power. Many techniques can exist, for example **Hierarchical Mapping**; a campaign end-state can be mapped against other strategic outcomes, to explore their hierarchical relationship.

Centre of Gravity. Once clear on the desired outcome and associated end-state, a JFC focuses on how to change the situation from its current state of crisis or conflict to a more favourable and stable condition. CoG analysis seeks to determine the relative strengths and weaknesses of the principal protagonists. It complements the manoeuvrist approach, which applies strength against vulnerabilities,

seeking predominantly indirect ways and means to target the conceptual and moral components of an opponent's fighting power.

Defined as any 'characteristic, capability, or influence from which a nation, an alliance, a military force or other civil or militia grouping draws its freedom of action, physical strength, cohesion or will to fight', a CoG(s) can sometimes unlock a campaign end-state and is worthy of close personal engagement by the JFC. Even if the JFC cannot clearly identify a CoG, the process invariably provides crucial information. A JFC determines who or what is important using CoG *identification*; he then determines their potential strengths and weakness through the CoG *analysis* introduced by Prof Strange. The purpose of CoG analysis is to identify those attributes of friendly forces (or other positive aspects) that need to be safeguarded and promoted, and those attributes of an opponent (or other negative aspects) that need to be neutralised or overcome.

Campaign Objective. A campaign objective is a goal, expressed in terms of one or more decisive conditions, that needs to be achieved in order to meet the national strategic aim. Campaign objectives are assigned to a JFC, as part of the MOD's overall military strategy; their collective achievement represents the campaign end-state. A military campaign is seldom, however, conducted in isolation. A JFC's campaign objectives are likely to be linked to those of other actors; collaboration is invariably required to ensure that all actors' activities contribute to the national strategic aim. The following paragraphs might suggest – especially in the calm of an academic environment – that a JFC could adopt a mechanistic approach to planning. The planning process is but one way to deconstruct a complex problem to a level at which elements of it might better be understood. No matter how carefully any plan is conceived, it is neither predictable nor likely to endure contact with any determined adversary. Campaign planning, like most contemporary operations, is highly dynamic. It does not lend itself to pseudo-scientific approaches,

Decisive Conditions. A decisive condition is a specific combination of circumstances deemed necessary to achieve a campaign objective. Decisive conditions are campaign building blocks. They should reflect the inter-dependencies between individual decisive conditions and the relationship

between each condition, the operational CoG(s), and campaign objectives. Decisive conditions may relate to the physical conditions of particular people or places (though they need not be geographically bounded), less tangible virtual phenomena such as the control of information (including its reception, transmission or manipulation), and even psychological factors such as levels of comprehension, mutual trust or cohesion between individuals and organisations. Decisive conditions are:

- a. Pre-requisites for the achievement of campaign objectives and, by inference, the campaign end-state. They are derived from analysis of the campaign end-state (or relevant CoG(s)), and then later refined during the estimate process.
- b. Articulated in a way that helps make it clear when they have been achieved. At the same time that he identifies decisive conditions, a JFC should also plan how to assess progress towards them.

Decisive conditions are the criteria against which the achievement of assigned campaign objectives is judged. A JFC is unlikely to create and sustain all the conditions necessary for success without support from other actors. Moreover, he may be similarly dependent on others for the effective exploitation of decisive conditions. In either circumstance, a JFC who cannot either create the decisive conditions, or ensure that they contribute to the desired end-state, should either negotiate with others to resolve the situation collaboratively or refer it to his strategic headquarters.

As an example, a JFC may identify an effective indigenous security capability as a decisive condition to contribute to an objective of territorial integrity. He may be able to recruit and train such a force, but be unable to ensure that its members are paid or that adequate governance arrangements are in place to ensure control and accountability. For these aspects, he may rely on other actors (either through direct negotiation or indirect influence via the chain of command). Alternatively, he could seek an extension to his mandate and additional resources.

Supporting Effects. Decisive conditions are derived through a top-down analysis of campaign objectives. They are achieved by realising supporting effects; activities are conducted to create these effects. Activities may, of course, have unintended effects as well. Supporting effects are:

- a. Derived through analysis of decisive conditions, an example of which is the domain (physical, virtual or cognitive) in which supporting effects are to be realised. The dimension(s) of the battlespace, including time, in which supporting effects are to be created. They may be geographically localised or more widely distributed, be instantaneous or delayed, permanent or transitory.
- b. Measurable, either directly or indirectly.

Realising Supporting Effects. Mission command recognises that events rarely proceed according to a master plan, and while military operations are undertaken to achieve specific effects (in order to improve conditions cumulatively and progressively), experience, intuition and operational art retain primacy. Joint Action provides a framework for the orchestration of fires, influence activities and manoeuvre to realise supporting effects. It is a military construct, within which the activities of an integrated joint force are coordinated, synchronised and prioritised. Joint Action is best executed with a unified command so that orchestration can be directed rather than simply invited. It embraces supported and supporting relationships between subordinate commands while delegating the freedom to act, under mission command. In the absence of unity of command, for example where non-military actors are engaged in activities alongside the military, unity of purpose can help maintain coherence between planned activities. Plans are neither predictable nor likely to endure contact with any determined adversary. Campaign planning, like most contemporary operations, is dynamic and not suited to pseudo-scientific approaches.

Campaign objectives are expressed using an active verb, e.g. ‘**defeat the enemy**’ or ‘**restore essential infrastructure**’.

Decisive conditions are vital to achieve campaign objectives, e.g. ‘**air superiority gained**’ or ‘**enemy reconnaissance defeated**’.

Supporting effects support decisive conditions. Decisive conditions are limited in number to ensure that a campaign is properly focused, and that effort is duly concentrated on that which is truly decisive. Supporting effects are used to expand upon the changes or effects required to

create the necessary conditions, e.g. ‘**enemy AD neutralised**’ or ‘**enemy dispositions identified**’.

Activities **are tasks undertaken for specific purposes, that contribute to or realise supporting effects, for example** ‘conduct SEAD in order to neutralise enemy AD’ or ‘deploy ISTAR capabilities in order to identify enemy dispositions’

LINES OR GROUPINGS OF OPERATION

Lines or groupings of operation are used to visualise the relationships between decisive conditions, campaign objectives and, by inference, the campaign end-state and CoG(s). Because a campaign is conditions-based and must be adaptive to events, lines of operation indicate a route rather than a timetable of events. They indicate how, and in what order (and with what dependencies), it is envisaged that the activities of the joint force will contribute to the achievement of decisive conditions and desired outcomes, but without stipulating precisely when. For this reason groupings rather than lines of operation, especially in the initial stages of campaign design, may offer a more appropriate means of visualisation.

Depending upon the nature of the crisis, lines or groupings of operations may be environmental (air, maritime, etc), functional (force protection, intelligence, manoeuvre, etc) or thematic (governance, security, etc). Environmental lines may be appropriate for bi-polar warfighting; thematic lines may better suit complex crises.

SEQUENCING AND SYNCHRONISATION

Sequencing is the logical ordering of effects and activities based on their interdependencies; that is, effect/activity ‘B’ is to follow ‘A’. Synchronisation addresses time and space; effect/activity ‘B’ is to occur at a certain time in a specific place that differs from ‘A’. Sequencing establishes order and synchronisation establishes feasibility (especially where activities compete for finite resources). Broadly speaking: decisive conditions are sequenced; supporting effects are sequenced and may be

synchronised; activities are sequenced and synchronised. The staff process of sequencing and synchronisation can make a considerable contribution to the successful balancing of ends, ways and means.

a. **Phases.** A **Phase** is a plan expressed in conditions-based phases, characterised by a predominant type of military activity, or a particular set of decisive conditions that bear close relation to one or more campaign objectives. Phasing assists a JFC to plan his campaign logically; it provides a framework for planning and execution, but should not be seen as prescriptive, over-simplistic or immutable.

b. **Contingency Plans.** Contingency Plans are unintended effects (which may be positive or negative) are inevitable and should be planned for. Risk analysis and management (Annex 2H) together with red teaming, wargaming and operational analysis (Annex 2I) identify requirements for Contingency Plans (CONPLANs). Some activities will have unforeseeable effects; these cannot be planned for in advance, but the possibility that such effects may arise (unexpectedly) requires agility on the part of the JFC.

CONPLANs address both reverses (which must be countered) and opportunities (which must be seized); see Annex 2G for examples. Note the important difference between CONPLANs and contingency planning. The former are written with clear intent and form part of crisis response planning; the latter are not written with intent, but are an appraisal of potential UK military involvement in future crises that are likely to affect UK interests. Indicators and warnings are an implicit element of contingency planning. A JFC can execute CONPLANs using elements of his joint force that are already committed, with an attendant opportunity cost, or by using an uncommitted reserve. There are 2 forms of CONPLAN:

a. **Branch.** A **branch** provides an alternative way (different combination of supporting effects and activity) to achieve a decisive condition within a given phase of the campaign.

b. **Sequel.** A **sequel** provides an alternative option for the next phase of a campaign, based upon the outcome of the preceding phase. The default sequel is the next planned phase, but there may be alternatives, such as the creation of decisive conditions in a different order or sequence.

Branches and sequels are usually expressed in terms of alternative, or successive supporting effects, or groups of supporting effects to create decisive conditions in different ways or in different orders. If the situation changes significantly, or an assigned campaign end-state is modified, then a JFC may also be obliged to consider alternative decisive conditions.

c. **Campaign Fulcrum.** A campaign fulcrum is the point during a campaign when an approximate, albeit fluctuating, equilibrium between opposing forces is disrupted significantly; one side starts winning and the other losing, potentially irreversibly. In practice, reaching a campaign fulcrum is difficult to predict in advance. The very act of attempting to define it and its distinctive criteria, however, can help to identify opportunities to create the requisite conditions for success.

b. **Culminating Point.** A joint force reaches its culminating point during a campaign when current operations can be maintained, but without the prospect of further progress. Making use of the culminating point – either exploiting that of an opponent or responding to that of one's own force to break a potential deadlock – is intrinsically difficult for 2 reasons. First, it is often challenging to identify in advance what criteria bring about culmination. During combat, an attacking force culminates when it is unable either to sustain or re-launch an offensive and is limited inexorably to the defence. During stabilisation, a force may culminate if it loses authority. Second, and even if the criteria are known, it is often hard to determine (at the time) when the criteria are met. Culminating points can be physical or more abstract. Studying historic campaigns, as well as effective and timely assessment may allow a JFC to appreciate when and where he should bring his influence to bear. The possibilities are unlimited; it could be through key leader engagement (friendly, adversary or neutral) as much as it might be the timely initiation of a campaign branch or sequel.

A JFC who recognises the imminent culmination of an opponent should act swiftly to exploit the situation and to drive home his advantage against a force that is stalled. If he recognises with sufficient notice his own prospective culmination, then a JFC may defer or even prevent its onset, by imposing an operational pause, reassigning resources (including his reserve), or executing a relevant CONPLAN.

- d. **Operational Pause.** An operational pause can be imposed out of necessity (for example, a change in international mandate) or through choice (for example, to allow time for the orchestration of military and non-military activity, or as part of a deception plan). Although a pause tends to reduce tempo, at least in the short term, it can also provide greater effectiveness and improved tempo later on. Indeed, implicit in the term ‘pause’ is the ability to re-activate the campaign in order to regain the initiative and reestablish momentum. An operational pause can apply to a whole campaign or to just one line of operation, for example to concentrate effort on another. Therefore, an operational pause should be clearly identified (along with its causes), preferably in advance, and never allowed simply to occur. Regaining the initiative afterwards may require a concerted effort, purposefully planned and clearly directed, to include any necessary reallocation of resources or reassignment of missions and tasks.